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# INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS

Marietta Kies

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# INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS

BY

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Boston

ALLYN AND BACON  
1894

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P. 11. 1. 15



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## PREFACE.

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In this work, the terms "justice" and "grace" (charity) have been used for two reasons: first, to distinguish the process of evolution in man from evolution in the other orders of creation; second, because of the historical significance of these terms.

The process of development of man in institutional life is similar rather than identical with the processes of development in inorganic nature, in plant-life and in the lower forms of animal life. There is an external similarity in these processes that often leads to their identification. The inherent activity of the inorganic world often displays itself as a "superabundance of energy." In the plant-world there is a degree of individuality shown in the fact of the preservation of the species; but apparently, there is a reckless expenditure of the life of the individual plant. In the animal-world, the animals below man have sufficient self-activity and persistence to retain their space relations, and to form in consciousness a world conditioned upon feeling and sense-perception, without the higher form of reflection and reason; there is also in the animal-world a sacrifice of the individual animal, but a preservation of the species.

This process of the sacrifice of the life of one for the good of others becomes in man a conscious process of self-making. And only as there is a voluntariness in the act that indicates a free self-determining personality are the terms just and charitable applied to acts. Jus-



tice and grace can emanate only from such finite beings as have true individuality, i. e., from man.

Any student of the history of Church and State during the middle ages knows how significant are the terms justice and grace. It is not hoped that a complete adjustment of the provinces for the exercise of justice and of grace has been made; but the aim has been to show that these terms have a universal significance, and that they have a place in Ethics as well as in Theology, because the processes of mind indicated by these terms are fundamental in all motives and acts.

Comparatively little space has been given to a consideration of the nature of ethical principles, because the fundamental principles of Ethics have received so much attention by writers upon Ethics. The need of the present time seems to be a larger consideration of the ways that ethical principles become active forces in the lives of individuals and thus assist in determining the progress or retrogression of the institutions of society. The plan has therefore been to show that the highest ethical principle is the Golden Rule, and also to show that this highest principle has entered and does enter into the institutional life of society to so great an extent that the most important laws and customs of society have been and are modified and shaped through its influence.

## INTRODUCTION.

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Just at present evolutionary ethics is in the ascendancy. Evolution is the watchword that explains all social phenomena. It is true that all the phenomena of society may be included in an ethical investigation; and farther, all of these phenomena may be reduced to an orderly arrangement and the "law" of this arrangement may be enunciated, and then the various partial laws may be comprehended under one term, and that term may be "evolution." But the question arises, does such an arrangement really explain the development of events in society?

Ethics from any standpoint is concerned with the relations of human beings in the complex social organization. The external results of these relations or social phenomena may appear the same when viewed from one or more standpoints; and yet the inner principle of development may be quite different from each standpoint. From whatever standpoint, the fundamental facts of the human mind can not be ignored. The "natural law" of man's development must include these facts: that man has the power to freely originate his own motives; that these motives in the mind of a person who has arrived at the stage of self-consciousness, which is indicated by the ability to talk, are conscious thoughts; that these thoughts will be followed by the emotions correspondent to the grade of

thought, and that the formal will of the person may make the motives of the mind evident in acts. In the origination of these motives and acts of each human mind there will be to instigate these thoughts, all the relations of the self to the other members of society, and, therefore, while the phases of relationship may be countless, the consideration of these relations will be either in reference to the self as the center of interest or in reference to others as the center of interest; in other words, the two factors always present in ethical relations are the self and the other members of society.

What is the crucial point in evolutionary ethics? How is a "harmony" of all the interests of humanity brought about according to the prevailing evolutionary ethics? Evolutional ethics answers, by the same process of gradual development through which the solar system has reached its present state of perfection, and through which the plant-world and the animal-world have reached a state of harmonious relation and interdependence. But while the external results of processes in human relations may correspond to the results of other realms of development in the fact of an evolutionary process by which greater and greater harmony is attained, are not the above-mentioned facts of the human mind, to which as far as has been ascertained, there are no exactly corresponding facts in the other realms of nature, sufficient to warrant the assigning of a more comprehensive principle as explanatory of social evolution than of other realms of development? The facts of the human mind may be proved or disproved by each one; since each has his own self-consciousness by which to discover the existence of a self-determining

activity that modifies his environment to a greater extent than his environment modifies his personality.

Evolutional ethics by granting no greater degree of *self-active* energy in the individual of the human species than in that of the animal or plant or inanimate nature, is necessarily at a loss to explain altruistic motives and action; and, consequently, altruism is either omitted from the system, or it is explained as a refined egoism. Again, it is said, that the necessity of altruistic action indicates a lack in the present stage of development and that in the ideal conditions there will be no necessity of altruistic action; or still another phase of evolutional ethics regards altruism as a stage of development as natural as the stage of egoism, but, by these writers, the emphasis is placed upon sympathy developed in social relations, and the *process* by which this sympathy is developed is ignored. In other words, no evolutional ethics thus far recognizes pain and suffering involved in the voluntary sacrifice of immediate good of the individual for the good of another as a *necessary* part of the process, but pain and suffering are regarded only as accidents that will disappear in the process of evolution.

Evolutional Ethics, therefore, places the ideal as a far-off condition in which the element of self-sacrifice will be eliminated. But, if it be true that each individual is a personality, finite and therefore limited upon the side of the formal will, the process of thinking thoughts that include more and more of the universal, will involve a breaking down of the barriers of the particular finiteness and an entering into a more complete communion with the whole race. As the finite individual enters each new social relation there will be this

same process of giving up a phase of finiteness and a reception of the thoughts of others. While the amount of sacrifice will vary with different individuals as the social relations involve a reaching out to help many or few, since the human mind has this power of free self-determination and continual enlargement, will the process of growth ever be other than the one indicated, namely, a process of growing by a process of giving of the self and in return receiving the infinite thought of the social whole? But because the giving is the only sure process of receiving, the receiving is not, therefore, the end or motive in giving. The motives of receiving immediate good must give way to the thoughts of the good of others, whenever there is a conflict between the interests of the two or else the altruism is not genuine.

Instead of placing altruism as the most comprehensive motive of action, evolutionary ethics accords with hedonism and utilitarianism in placing "happiness" as the end of activity; the grades of happiness assumed as the highest motive for action vary from sensuous happiness of the individual to the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." In some of the later writers this motive is characterized as the well-being of society, but this "well-being" as defined includes little more than the happiness of the individual. The process of a freely-determined self-development through others has not yet been included in evolutionary ethics, and indeed, it can not be until the process of development in institutional life of society is regarded as different in kind from that of merely animal life; for evolution in social life is spirit-evolution, in animals and plants, it is life-evolution.

The question arises: Is evolutionary ethics institutional? The chief institutions of society are: The Family, The State, and The Church.

Writers on evolutionary ethics are fond of beginning with the instinctive family affection that animals show in their relations with one another; and after giving numerous examples of care for offspring and for each other in the male and female animal, they lead up from these examples of family affection, to the like evidences of devotion and care in the human family. As family affection among animals is shown in acts of care for the supply of food to their young ones, in protection from danger, and in the instinctive feeling for a propagation of the species, so, the offices of affection in the human family are similar. Marriage has its incentive in sexual desire and in a regard for the continuance of the race; in this union the realm of activity is in making provision for the wants of children or of such of them as "natural selection" considers as fit for survival. The picture of family life presented by evolutionary ethics is that of a struggle for an opportunity to gratify feelings of self-interest. The stronger in the contest is the one whom development favors, and the weaker individual as well as families must yield to the pressure of environment.

While it is no doubt true that many and perhaps a majority of the families present the phenomena of which evolutionary ethics takes cognizance, yet, in considering any class of phenomena, do those of less content include the greater, or should the more significant attributes indicate the character of a thing, person, or an institution? That is to say, do we judge of the family as an

institution of society by the kind of life presented by the lower types of the family or by the higher? Evolutional ethics passes over in silence the facts that thousands of mothers voluntarily spend a life of service and sacrifice for children physically and mentally weak, who can never return the love and care so freely bestowed upon them; that many a wife follows with care and love a miserable husband, hopelessly inebriated, — through long, weary months and years, sustained in the task by an affection that ignores any consideration of herself; and that husbands care tenderly for invalid wives, moved by thoughts of duty and affection that indicate a plane of life far different from that of “calculation of consequences.” How can phenomena that indicate such love and devotion be explained? The unalloyed mother-love and devotion to duty, the intellectual and spiritual union of two persons united in marriage can only be accounted for by acknowledging that each has the power of free self-surrender for the sake of another.

If the ideal of the family presented by evolutional ethics, be the highest ideal possible, what becomes of the works of the greatest creative geniuses that the world has known? Such characters as Maggie Tulliver and Romola are unexplainable on the basis of the happiness, or self-interest principle. In these characters the individual voluntarily yields her fondest desires for the sake of preserving the family. The portrayal of tragic moments which consist in the opportunity of a choice of a higher motive when action upon a lower is possible, may show each individual the meaning of the sublimest moments in his own life.

And the collision of the individual life with the institutional, or of one institution with another, as given in the master tragedians of the world more vividly illustrates the same thought. Even the Greek dramatists who saw beyond the prevailing belief in fatalism, make the life of the individual subordinate to the institution when the interests of the lower can not be adjusted to the higher. Shakespeare, in his character-evolutions renders this thought still more emphatic. In the sacrificial love of Romeo and Juliet, the families of Capulet and Montague are united. And what means the tragedy in the soul of Lady Macbeth, and of Hamlet? In a moment of weakness, they trample upon the majesty of their free-will and make for themselves an environment of motives against which finally they are powerless. But the grand moment of choice of the higher was theirs, a moment when the individual will could have been voluntarily yielded to the larger will of institutional life.

The creative genius of Del Sarto and of Raphael in portraying the Holy Family has no significance when viewed from the standpoint of Evolutional Ethics. Of what use is the portrayal in the faces of mother and child of a heavenly love that is willing to lay down even life itself for the good of others, if there is and can be no answering reality in every day family life?

The state as conceived by Herbert Spencer, is regarded as "classic" by evolutionary ethics. The main outlines of his conception,—the state as originating through force and continuing its sphere as a necessary protective organization, are too well known to need recapitulation. Some later writers, however, have modified his views



by granting that the sphere of the state government is not limited to a protection of life and property, but have assigned to the state the power of enacting and enforcing measures that shall establish conditions that enable the members of society to follow the various pursuits of life to a greater advantage than would be possible without the assistance of the state organization. Such measures are more than simply protective; they are constructive in the sense that they enable the members of the state to assert their own individuality in a way consistent with the development of the whole organism. But as soon as it is granted that the function of the state in reference to its members extends beyond the maintenance of a "police force," so soon is there admitted a principle that in consistency is not included in the fundamental thought of evolutionary ethics.

For, if the state can make and execute laws, that, in directly assisting a part of its members, do not disturb the well-being of the other part, then it is acknowledged that the motives that instigated the law included the principle of altruism. The end of such a law is justice to all, but it expresses more than justice to a part, since it helps that part to take a place in the organic unity where there is at least an opportunity to develop in sympathy with the whole; as, for instance, phases of laws respecting free education, poor-laws, sanitary measures, laws regulating some kinds of industries. In fact, that the principle of altruism is embodied more and more definitely in the laws of the most advanced countries, is shown by the history of legislation during the present century. Can it be that the state is

progressing backward? Or is it possible that, in its adhesion to the happiness principle, evolutionary ethics has not taken a principle sufficiently broad with which to interpret the various phenomena in institutional life?

Upon the fact of the Church as one of the cardinal institutions of society, evolutionary ethics is, for the most part silent. By some writers, a natural religion is acknowledged, and others name the institutions, "the family, the state, and the Representatives of Great Ideas." "God, freedom and Immortality" have little place in evolutionary ethics. Ethics from any standpoint has not for its province the field of historical and doctrinal theology, but the Church in its historic institutional life has been of great influence in making and remaking all kinds of customs in all phases of life. And while Ethics should not consider the Church from the standpoint of historical and doctrinal Theology, yet it should examine the principles and customs of the Church along with the other institutions of society from the standpoint of Reason. What can be the reason for the silence of evolutionary ethics upon an institution so important from its nature and from its historical significance? If there is little room for a personal God in evolutionary ethics and less acknowledgment of the existence of freedom and immortality, then, although there may be with such a basis, a possibility in the individual life for the exemplification of the cardinal virtues, temperance, justice, prudence and fortitude, yet faith, hope and charity have no meaning in such a system.

Faith in its power of prevision is as legitimate an act

of the mind as is sense-perception ; and hope in rendering faith active is not less important than the judgment which decides the best means of action. What faith sees, hope acts upon and these form incentives for the creation of motives which may be high or low. But charity, in making real the highest kinds of faith and hope, may become a permanent principle of life, and acts based upon true charity or altruism, accord with the advancement of the whole race. Love to others, or an altruism that implies both the giving and the receiving, is the fundamental principle of the ethical side of the Church and preëminently of the Christian Church.

This principle of the Church, however often individual members may fail to exemplify it, is charity or love, a divine altruism that is willing to sacrifice even life itself for the good of others. And any system of ethics that has a less inclusive principle than such "altruism," is rightfully silent concerning the nature and history of the Church.

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The question of the relation of ethics to theology, and to the various other subjects closely allied to ethics, is ever one of importance. While theology is more directly concerned with the historical and doctrinal phases of the Church, the ethics of the Church has for its province a consideration of the scope of the Golden Rule as a precept for action, both in the development of the Church as an institution and also in the relation of the Church to society ; this includes an investigation of the various forms of Church organization to see if these exemplify the highest ethical principle — the Golden Rule.

In these later days Ethics and Economics have some phases that are nearly identical. But it is a mistake to suppose that the large body of precepts, maxims and principles that form the basis of Political Economy have come into being without a conscious thought-process in which they originated. Even the simplest act of exchange, or of the satisfaction of one's wants involves a motive. A large number of these general principles based upon the most customary acts in business relations, and these acts in turn based upon the nature of man and his relation to his material surroundings, are now accepted as principles sufficiently universal and well established to form the positive part of Political Economy, the part sometimes called the positive science of Political Economy.\*

While these general principles of Political Economy are sufficiently established in practice and in formulation to be rightfully considered as the basis of the "science," yet it must not therefore be supposed that these principles have sprung up spontaneously and ready-made. The history of industrial society shows that the customs of the industrial world have been of slow growth, and also history shows that the systematizing of the principles has had a like slow evolution. Even the most fundamental ideas like wealth and utility and value, etc., depend for their significance upon the view that one takes of the nature of man and his relation to the external world. Such an investigation of the nature of the wants of man and the dependence of these wants upon the thought of man, and of the *process* in thought itself, and of thought as manifested in the universe, and

\* See "Scope and Methods in Political Economy," p. 46, et seq.: John N. Keynes.

of the possibility of thought to assume different forms and yet be essentially one thought-process, does not come properly in Political Economy, but in Logic, not formal logic, but the real, the Hegelian kind of logic.

Thus it may be seen that principles that are ultimate for Political Economy may not be ultimate when considered from another standpoint. And while even the positive part of Political Economy need not concern itself too particularly with the philosophical principles upon which the basal principles of economy rest, yet these basal principles must be formulated in such a manner that their interpretation from a philosophical standpoint will admit of the most comprehensive thought yet given to the philosophical world; or, if these principles are not so stated there results a "science" which is merely "opinions" of different writers.

In very much the same way that Economics is based upon principles which in turn are discovered by a philosophic insight into the nature of man and things, is Ethics based upon Psychology and Philosophy. Ethics has for its province the investigation of the will-side of man—the "substantial will" or thought, as motives, and the "formal will" or action. But these fundamental principles of Ethics must be based upon a correct insight into the "freedom of the will," and into the development of this substantial will or thought; also there must be an insight into the nature of self-activity, and therefore into the continuance of thought or the immortality of the individual; and also this power of insight includes an understanding of the relation of finite self-determined individuals to an infinite absolutely self-determined Being, or Absolute Person-

ality. As in Political Economy it is only necessary to be sure that the basal principles are correct from the logical and philosophical standpoint, so in Ethics it is only necessary that the nature of the will and thought of finite individuals, developing in and through the institutions of society, be clearly understood in order to continue the investigation into the *process* of the development of the individual will in union with other wills, and into the results of different phases of development in the organic unity of society.

This union of the life of the individual with that of others makes the institutional life of society. The continuity of institutional life is seen in History. The ethical elements of any one time or epoch can not be studied independently of the period preceding. The acts and customs of one time must be interpreted in the light of the customs that have gone before. It is, therefore, in the history of the various institutions of society that light must be sought in considering the ways that ethical principles may be exemplified.

The ethics of institutional life becomes the philosophy of history. Ethics since the time of Kant, has largely used History as its point of view. From an historical standpoint, it is seen that the ideals of the present receive a modification by the experience of the past, so that Ethics sets forth not only the motives and conduct as they ought to be, but also as they are in the practical every-day affairs of institutional life.

History presents the customs that have been formed by the stronger men and women in institutional life: and in these customs, family, civil and legal, religious and social, are seen the changes and development of

society as a whole. The ethical elements can be *directly* seen in a study of the historical movements. The ethical elements may be found also in a study of Literature and Art where we may find the problems of life as conceived by the writers and artists of the world. The stronger the grasp of the process of development of the human soul, the more valuable is the work of the writer or artist. A few of the master-minds both in Art and Literature present the problem of human development in such a manner that the experiences portrayed answer to the deepest experiences of which each knows the human soul to be capable.

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# INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS.

## CHAPTER I.

### JUSTICE AND GRACE MANIFESTED IN ALL PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE, ESPECIALLY SHOWN IN THE WILL OF MAN.

ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER:— Justice typified in movement of heavenly bodies; No loss of force in the Universe; Plant and animal life show the same process of return of energy unto the "self"; The species the "self" of plants and lower animals; In man, full exemplification of justice and grace; What is meant by Justice; Grace or Charity; Receiving and giving both included in charity; The possible extremes in motives; Motives may become wider; Justice and grace complementary principles.

THIS is a time of inquiry for ultimate principles. One realm of nature so unites with another that neither beginning nor end of each can be found. The investigator in one department rests his inductions on certain principles that he considers fundamental, and another investigator or thinker, working upon different lines, declares that the principles supposed to be ultimate, are only relative, and even the extreme position that only relativity exists may be the result of such investigations.

But does not the fact of the process of the making of the self as a human mind give a clue to the nature of the ultimate principles of the universe in its process of creation and growth? These principles may be called by different names, but the essential thing is that the principles themselves, in their nature and relation are seen; these principles are here called Justice and

Grace (charity). An attempt at a brief definition of these comprehensive terms can at best be but unsatisfactory; the plan is to unfold the definition and description of what is meant by Justice and Grace, as evidences of these principles are sought in the realm of inanimate nature, in the animal world, and especially in the will of man as it is seen in its development in the institutions of society.

The question will even then arise: Can not one of these, as Grace, be resolved into the other—Justice? The foundation idea of Justice, that it is an exaction of what is due to the self, be it a thing, an animal, or a person, precludes the possibility of regarding Grace as identical with Justice. And the fundamental thought of Grace—that it is the yielding of that which is one's own—the giving of the self for the sake of another, makes it a principle complementary to Justice, rather than that one is equivalent to the other. These are complementary in the sense that the processes indicated by these principles are sufficient in their infinite forms of manifestation, when interpreted, to offer a reasonable explanation for all phases of existence and life in its various forms of combinations and institutions.\*

In tracing the evidences of Justice and Grace in the universe, we will notice briefly inanimate nature, the plant world, the animal world, and at greater length, the world of Man, especially its institutional life.

Centuries of study represented in mathematical laws and formulas, and the researches of astronomy have made known the position and movements of the hea-

\*That Justice and Grace, as principles of explanation of all finite forms of existence, have their ground in personality—absolute personality—is here assumed.

venly bodies. Without exception the same story is told. No matter in how many different shapes the elements may combine, they do not appear once in straight lines and then disappear; their movements are in accordance with an elliptical orbit. This general circular movement of the heavenly bodies typifies the complete cycle of Reason, the return of thought unto itself. This return of the heavenly bodies unto their own places shows the phase of Justice in the creative process, an unconscious claiming of that which is their own.

Not only the position and revolution of worlds in space and time enforce this thought, but not even any force represented by heat, light, electricity, gravitation, etc., shall be wasted. Physics, chemistry, and philosophy unite in the thought of "conservation of energy." The forces correlate, one form becomes another, and so an eternal interchange—an eternal return unto the same that was. No loss, no injustice in even the inanimate forces of nature. And even the static unities of space and time dimly shadow the same principle.

As we study plant life, we find much stronger manifestations of eternal principles. The individual plant dies, but the species lives. And in this cycle of growth we see the return of living energy unto itself. And in the animal world the same process is shown, with an additional one in the case of the individual animal. The animal, through feeling, preserves his identity in space; but, because he has not true memory, he gives no evidence of an identity in time. And, therefore, in the animal world, not only the existence of the species is assured, but in this power of feeling there is a com-

pleteness of a being; it is an existence in which the parts are united and preserved as one finite being.

If the emphasis is put upon the side of the process which shows the destruction, the struggle, and the consequent "survival of the fittest," the principle of justice is not contradicted. The species lives, a sphere of energy sufficient to manifest a degree of independence that can modify its environment and cause it, in its reaction upon the species, to contribute to the life of the species. But a part of the process is that the individual shall contribute to that life of the species: the individual shall give up his life for the larger life of the species. Is not this process of giving up of the life of the individual, even among plants and lower animals, the lowest manifestations in finite objects of that eternal process indicated by the principle of Grace? Is it not the same process carried out in an unconscious way which we see in the self-conscious activity of man?

It matters not, for our purpose, if Botanists, Zoölogists, and Biologists are not agreed upon the dividing line between plants and animals, and are not able to determine where one species leaves off and another begins; and if, in the process of development, there have been countless variations, the fact still remains that there is a difference in kinds; and whether this difference in kind comes through insensible gradations, the difference in degree being sufficient to make a difference in kind, or whether from the beginning all species have existed in different parts of the universe in some stage of development, the principles remain the same, and find no contradiction in the external facts. And as we see only a temporary phase of activity

on this earth, even when in the highest forms, who shall presume to say that the energy even of the individual plant and animal has completed its cycle of existence in that one appearance?

It is in man that we find the full exemplification and revelation of the principles of justice and grace. As a child the acts of the child are returned upon him by the will of judicious parents. But as a being who has reached the stage of self-conscious intelligence, there is a continual process of return unto the self. Every thought, feeling and act shall come back in its own power, at some time, to contribute to the process of change and degeneration, or to the process of change and growth and development of the individual soul. In this process of self-determination justice is the fundamental principle. Justice exacts its own. Think, feel, do, and thou shalt receive the like in kind; nothing better, nothing worse. This process is the very basis of individuality; the individuality, the activity, that can never be destroyed.

Without this fundamental process in justice man would cease to be man. Each individual mind is finite, is limited, and in this fact is the necessity of growth, of change. Simple existence is the beginning. What is this process of change? How does man grow? By repetition of the eternal process, by self-sacrifice. Man originates his own thoughts, not simply as self-thoughts, but thoughts that shall include other than self. The return of the thoughts, feelings, and acts upon self is no less sure, but how different the content! Whereas the process in justice excludes the yielding of one's own for the sake of another, the process of grace, or

charity, is, in its very nature, the yielding of one's own immediate thoughts of self for those of, and in reference to another.

But this process of giving implies also the receiving : the small thought which originated in the self comes back enlarged by the thought of the other. This process of yielding is the process of making, and man, in thus giving up his selfish interests and desires for the interests of others, only gives up a phase of finitude, and at each succeeding step enters more and more into the nature of infinite thought and infinite love.

"Justice means the return of his deeds to each man. It, therefore, means freedom. Whatever a man does he shall do to himself. This is the essence of freedom—I should say it is the form of freedom, rather than its substance. When the man learns how to do to his fellow-man and to himself that which tends to his perfection, to the development of his soul in wisdom, virtue, and holiness—then he acquires the substance of freedom as well as its form." \*

And this process, which is true for the realization of one human soul, is the process by which all of the human race may reveal and exemplify these eternal principles. This likeness of thought to thought and feeling to feeling, or the universality of thought and feeling, constitutes the bond in the human family, the unity of the organism, the organic sympathy which is the basis of the brotherhood of man. Man, in seeing the effects of his own deeds upon himself, learns to measure justice to another; and in his struggle with evil in his own soul, and in his moments of repentance

\* Article in Christian Union December 1, 1887, by W. T. Harris.

and humiliation, and in his attempts at helpfulness to others, he learns true charity.

And herein is the difference between the conscious self-sacrifice of man and the unconscious yielding of life for others among the lower animals. Because of the free will of man, the return of his own deeds upon him is a mark of respect to his dignity, while the return of its own deed upon a lower animal may annihilate it. And if the activity of the animal is not sufficient to react upon its own deeds, there is no opportunity in the scale of animal intelligence and feeling for the self-making through others, and an opportunity therefore for a *manifestation* only and not a *revelation* of Grace.

However important may be the effects of an external act, the act as an element of the soul, as assisting to form the character, to make the man, lies in the motive. And this motive does not exist ready-made in the mind, but the mind in the thought-processes creates the motive as well as the act. In the thoughts and the corresponding emotions, as motives for action, there are two extremes of which the human soul is capable. One extreme is the haughty spiritual pride which would exclude the self from humanity; the other the overflowing love which would give up life itself for another or for the good of humanity; between these two extremes may be found, on one side, innumerable degrees of pride, envy, jealousy, anger, covetousness, lust, hypocrisy, etc., and, on the other hand, of sincerity, purity, honesty, generosity, forbearance, fair-mindedness, goodwill, and charity or love for mankind.

For a child the motives exist to a large degree ex-



ternal to the child — obedience to authority ; but as a youth and man, developing through the assistance of the institutions of society, in the expansion of thought these motives have a wider and wider range ; including at first the family and playmates, then friends and companions, and later comes the recognition of the kinship of the whole human race. These thoughts, as moving principles or motives, find opportunity for widest expression in and through the eternal institutions, the State and the Church. The sphere of the State is for the expression of Justice, while Grace is the underlying principle of the Church.

If, then, justice is the principle without which there could be no self-existence, and grace is the principle of conscious growth, or, in other words, the realization and enlargement of the self, these principles underlie the process of self-making in a complementary way. And if there be continuance and growth in institutional life, each institution, church and state, must exemplify both principles, though not to an equal degree. The expressions of justice found in state enactments have a definite relation to the spirit, the motives (and these may be the essence of charity), which gave rise to those enactments ; and the church, in its desire to reach out and save even the uttermost parts of the earth, finds that its charity must grant to each one the privilege of accepting or refusing the proffered help, or its foundation will be destroyed. This recognition of the responsibility of each individual to himself is the fundamental element, justice, without which the church would soon fail to have an opportunity to show its charity towards mankind.

## CHAPTER II.

### CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER: *Section I*, Thought, Emotions and Will — (A) Three planes of Thought; Child-stage of thought; No world-order to this stage; Scientific plane; Society an aggregate to this plane; The rational plane of thought; Society an organic unity. (B) Grade of Emotions corresponds to plane of thought; Formation of habits; Sensuous emotions; Psychical emotions; Rational emotions. (C) Freedom of thought; Substantial will; Formal will; Fate not the principle of progress; Formal will needs time for realizing the substantial will.

*Section II*, The Ethical Principle: The Unity of Society; Motives become ethical principles; Obedience to authority; Self-interest or happiness; Altruism; The highest motives may arise from an insight of faith or reason; Illustration of kinds of ethical principles; Standpoints of writers upon Ethics; Elements in the Ethical Principle; The good of others; The Conscience; An Absolute Ideal; Change of thought through application of ethical principles; The process of development eternal.

*Section III*, Results from the adoption or non-adoption of the Ethical Principle: Double aspect of deeds; A vice and a sin; Moral and immoral acts; Three states of mind; The infernal; Lust and gluttony; Avarice and prodigality; Sloth; Anger; Anger, envy and pride; Envy and its species of fraud; Pride and treachery; The repentant state, the adoption of the ethical principle; Ground of the ethical principle; Purification from Pride; From Envy; From Anger; From sloth, avarice and gluttony; Mental anguish accompanies repentant state; Faith; Hope; Charity; The heavenly state; Partial expressions of love or charity; Love for all humanity the broadest kind of charity.

### SECTION I.

#### THOUGHT, EMOTIONS, AND WILL.

*A. Three planes of thought may be distinguished.*

The mind of an individual develops as one whole, as a unit; but in this process of growth from childhood to maturity, in general, three planes of thought may be distinguished.

(1) To the child-mind, or to the mind unaccustomed to reflection, the world presents itself as a vast collection of things. Each thing exists independently of every other thing. Each tree, flower, animal, and person exists in and for the development of the one individual object, or, at most, if a connection or relation is seen, it is only an external connection or relation; one thing is put over against another to bring about some result, or modification of the individual thing, or of its environment.

As this plane of thought fails to discover the real relations between objects and between the different parts of the universe, and as in the attempt to establish the external relations, contradictory relations are established, the mind becomes confused and sometimes discouraged and hopeless. To such a person there is no world-order, and in the general mixture of external objects his own life becomes a series of contradictions, with evils, strugglings, and defeat as the predominant elements. As there is no plan, order, or real sequence of things or events to a mind in this plane of thinking, there is no real supremacy of one being over another; hence to him there can be no Creator, or at most only a "God made with hands," no spiritual existence, no immortality of the soul.

(2) But, happily, the growing mind soon passes from this plane of thought. The one stone by the wayside is no longer a single complete rock: the rock in the laboratory becomes something else; and the elements of the one rock are found in other rocks, in plants and in animals. The numerical relations are no longer of the simple orders, one, two, three, etc., and

their combinations; but the things are perceived as existing in ratios, proportions, and as continuous.

Even the sun is no longer the fixed fiery furnace that the childish thought pictures. It is seen as a force whose intensity may vary: the re-arrangement of the elements may vary the degree of heat till the energy of the sun becomes dissipated and changed into other forms of energy, or until its overpowering intensity swallows up the neighboring planets. To this second plane of thought, or plane of abstract ideas, what to the first plane of thought, or plane of sensuous ideas, seemed stability in things and objects, is changed or destroyed. All things are in a process of change. If the visible objects can become heat, light, electricity, etc., and all forms of force become heat, why may not heat itself change again to other forms?

The individual plant appears, goes through the changes of root, stem, leaves, fruitage, and dies. This second, or scientific, or "metaphysical" stage of thinking sees not only the individual plant and its uses, but it also sees the composition and nature of its fibers, the effect of the plant upon its environment and of the environment upon it, and how one species differs from another, and it recognizes that the individual tree, in its process of growth and decay, contributes to the life and continuance of the species.

This stage of thought studies not only the mechanism of the animal, but the *functions* of the whole and the parts are regarded of supreme importance. New organs are seen to be developed through use or destroyed through disuse, and, therefore, great stress is placed upon the variations produced by the environment of

the animal; and, indeed, this modification is sometimes accredited with the power of making a new species. But even when the development of the individual animal, and of the changes in the species is attributed to the power of the environment, instead of to the activity in the species itself, the emphasis in this plane of thought is placed upon the changes, the processes going on, and the relations of one object to another.

To this grade of thinking the "solitary man" is an impossibility. Men exist in society, but society appears as an aggregate, and not as an organism. Men unite and combine to form society, because it is an advantage to do so for mutual protection and development. The climate, the geographical position, and the struggles of a people with foes without and within, are regarded as the essential determining factors in the character of a people or nation. Thus, in attaching so great importance to the modifications by reason of surroundings and circumstances, the real self-activity of the individual or the people is passed over unnoticed, and fate or force, or a supreme being without personality, is regarded as the controlling principle in the life of an individual or of a nation.

(3) To the third plane of thinking a unity appears. Even time and space appear as static unities. The many forms of force become one "persistent force." "Dead matter" no longer exists. The various forms of the inorganic world are seen as manifestations of activity. Life, as shown in plants and animals, is seen to present degrees of self-activity, which, in the different degrees of independence shown, modifies the environment at least as much as the environment modifies

it. The process of change and development going on in all around, is seen to be not simply a change from lower to higher, but a change, an eternal process, in which the evolution is not by the unaided power of the lower becoming the higher, but an evolution in which the highest is continually manifested and revealed in all created things, from the lowest object up to man. Man, as developing in freedom in the organic unity of society, is seen as an adequate revelation of the Creator.

In this third plane of thinking the nature of activity is known, and the universality of thought is recognized, and with this recognition the true organic unity of the human race is seen: not a mere combination, nor aggregation, but a real union of thoughts, feelings, and purposes. And herein consists the equality of all men, an equality in the very essence of their individuality, their personality; but not necessarily an equality in the circumstances, or in the degree of self-determination attained.

The process and results of the development of the organic unity of the human race, can not be studied from the facts or phenomena presented in any one century or epoch of the world-development. Each people and nation, from the earliest historic times, represents some phase of development, of self-consciousness, corresponding to the stages of development in the grades of thought of the individual mind. The child-stage, and the scientific plane, may be found in the Oriental peoples; and the three stages, the child, scientific or metaphysical, and the philosophic in Western nations; and within each grade of development numerous de-

grees may be found, depending upon one's power of analysis.

When the economic, political, or any form of the social or ethical relations of men, is considered from this third plane of thinking, man must be seen as a free self-determining individual, whose development can take place only in union with other individuals, and whose stage of development of the nineteenth century can be discovered only by a careful searching for the germs and process of that development, in the thought and actions of peoples and nations of the past centuries.

*B. The Grade of Emotions depends upon the plane of thought.*

The instinctive feelings of the child may be made over into conscious enlightened feelings. When the child arrives at the stage of self-conscious thought, then may the feelings be regarded as emotions. The process of forming habits by himself, through external help of the family, friends, and the school, is a process of supplanting the old thoughts by a higher grade of thought, and these new thoughts return unto the individual in the form of a higher grade of emotions; and these new emotions become again re-duplicated in higher thoughts, and in this process of thought, action, and emotions, the character is formed. The child of poor, vicious parents, whose surroundings and companions constantly suggest to the innocent child-mind vile, or impure thoughts, can not have pure and wholesome feelings or emotions. If such a child shall become an integral part of society, in some way he must receive new and higher thoughts, and then will his emotional nature respond with higher and broader sympathies.

Since the Emotions are so dependent upon the thought, there may be distinguished, in general, three grades of emotions corresponding to the three stages of thought: (1) the Sensuous Emotions; (2) the Psychological, and (3) the Rational Emotions.

(1) To the child, and to the grown-up individual whose thoughts are in the plane of sensuous ideas, the "things" of life produce the greatest pleasure. Their anxiety is that there will be a lack of the necessities of life, food, clothing, and shelter: their gratification is in an abundant supply for the physical needs and wants. The measure of happiness is complete in a "good time" — a dance, a ball, a picnic, an hour's gossip with an "intimate friend." Their love and interest in humanity center around single individuals, to the exclusion of all others; hence sorrow, anger, and jealousy arise at the real or imagined coldness of such friends.

(2) When the thoughts of the Understanding perceive the fleeting nature of things, and that other things may take the place of things already possessed, without bringing a great amount of discomfort, then the emotions become of a different grade. The pleasure felt in the gratification of the wants of the physical nature becomes a pleasure in the gratification of these desires, because of the end to be attained through a well-developed body and mind; with this consciousness of a stronger, better developed mind, comes the gratification that arises from a sense of power in grappling with the secrets of nature, and in making its forces subservient to the uses of man, and that arises from the possibility of reducing the multiplicity of facts to something of an order, which, when expressed as



"laws," shall be of use to the coming generations. The interest and pleasure in humanity in this grade of emotions, is likely to be such as will cause those dependent, or associated, to contribute to the increase of power and happiness of the one individual. This enlarged power becomes reflected again in humanity, necessarily, through business, political, and social relations. Some of the world's political and military leaders, as Caesar or Napoleon, furnish illustrations; also powerful leaders in the industrial world, as a Vanderbilt or a Jay Gould.

(3) When, from the third stage of thinking, the plane of rational insight, the true nature of things, forces, and self-activity is seen, the emotions correspond in character. In spite of the seeming instability of the inorganic world, as seen from the second stage of thinking, the many unsuccessful attempts to understand all the processes of nature, the mass of heterogeneous opinions concerning the nature and object of the existence of man, and concerning the meaning of his historical development, and the seemingly contradictory theories and schemes for the future improvement of the human race, — in spite of all this, rational insight knows that there is a true world-order; that this order is established upon the eternal principles of justice and grace; that, in the great diversity there is unity, there is a purpose, and that all pure and noble thoughts and actions contribute to the fulfillment of that purpose; and that the highest vocation of man must include love and reverence to God and love and helpfulness to humanity.

As the true organic unity is seen, that is, the possible union of thoughts, feelings, and purposes of all human

hearts, there is a basis for rational action — for action that shall, in directly improving a part of the organism, at least not destroy the well-being of any part. The person whose underlying purpose in all the ways of life is to help and uplift humanity, will be filled with heavenly emotions, with “the love that exalteth and maketh not ashamed.”

There are in general three avenues by which this plane of rational emotions may be attained — through Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. To a comparatively few minds in the history of thought, it has been granted to stand upon the mountain top and to gaze upon truth in its perfection. The thousand eager questionings: “What is truth?” do not disturb such a mind. Amidst changing opinions and shifting scenes the eternal truth stands out clear and strong, and begets peace and a calm joy. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, are names that suggest this philosophic insight in as perfect a degree as the world has yet seen. Each one may strive to grasp the truth as seen by these great minds, and perhaps add new “insights” to the phases of truth already discovered, and thus be sharers in the same kind of emotions.

To a comparatively few others it has been granted to so recognize the correspondence between the finite and the infinite, that through the combination of colors and sounds and words, the artistic and poetic vision can recreate and revivify, and cause finite objects to glow and breathe forth the spirit of the divine. All human minds possess this creative imagination, and each one, awakened by the genius of Phidias, Raphael, Beethoven, or Dante, may strive to present the works

of his own creation, however far he may fall short of the perfection of thought and execution of the master minds.

While, to the majority of people, philosophy, art, and poetry are understood, seen, and thought through the medium of greater minds, in the realm of goodness, though perhaps not in the list of the world's heroes and martyrs, it is granted to all to become self-creators. The sympathy that shall go out in loving helpfulness to even the meanest and lowest of humanity, shall return to the soul in a holy joy, a blessedness such as only the "poor in spirit" can receive.

*C. True freedom in thought is made external in will.*

The thoughts and feelings belong in a special way to the self; through the formal will, or through acts, these thoughts and feelings become externalized. What to the individual is a thought, an impulse, may become to society a deed which either helps or hinders the development of society. The mind determines in freedom its own thoughts, and eventually its own emotions. This freedom is the true substantial will of the individual. This will has no restraint, except a self-restraint, which is the essence of freedom. Man's limitations come through the environment of the body and through external circumstances: he is finite. In the finite limited sphere the formal will of man never completely externalizes the true substantial will, the thought, which is infinite in its nature.

Each member of the organism determines his own thought freely, and in the attempt to realize that thought in an act, the formal will of one collides with the formal will of another, and one must yield that

especial field of action and seek another. This collision of wills is occasioned by the self-centeredness of the individual; either because of a lack of knowledge as to what thoughts should be acted upon, or because of perverseness in knowingly carrying out selfish desires. Since man has before him an ideal of absolute truth, beauty, and goodness, which he may progressively realize, an evil will which annuls the results of previous right thoughts and acts, is a disintegrating force in the individual and in the organic unity, and tends to disorder and ruin. Thus, as sin or selfishness renders impossible the true growth of the individual, so the true substantial freedom, or growth of society, can be realized only as the wills of its members are determining in holiness and righteousness.

The thoughts and purposes of God are revealed in the free-will of man; but for the realization of these thoughts and purposes, through the *formal will* of mankind, infinite time is required. In any one period of time, or epoch in the history of a nation, or even of an individual, it may seem that the constraints upon the formal will are so many, that the conclusion must be that the will of man is not free, but that circumstances, environment, or, in other words, that fate is the controlling principle. But the third plane of thinking, or Reason, which only can know true freedom, sees that fate is not the principle governing the development of society; self-activity is seen to be that principle. If the activity is placed in the circumstances, in the "totality of conditions" of an individual or of a nation, yet it is activity somewhere or in something, and the idea of fate as a blind force controlling the will of man has lost its significance.

And even the inherent or inherited tendencies can not determine the life of an individual or of a nation. The activity of the Substantial Will, or thought, can make its own motives. Circumstances, ancestry, antecedent thoughts influence, but do not control the will. While it may take a long time for the formal will to act in a new direction determined upon by the substantial will, yet the energizing of the free substantial will may, in a moment of time, create a thought which may destroy a habit of twenty years' standing. And a nation, through the wills of its representatives, may in a day overturn a form of government that has existed for centuries. The individual, or the nation, may, from day to day, and from year to year, constantly transcend the former condition, by making and realizing thoughts and purposes that shall harmonize with the possible true relations in which society is established.

## SECTION II.

### THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE.

Man is born into society; and it is through and by the means of society that the animal impulses and desires are made over into rational thoughts and emotions. The thoughts and emotions, which, in an especial way, are individual, when made evident to society, or externalized through the formal will, become, or may become, the thoughts and emotions of another, or of others, and finally of the social whole. As in the material universe the movement of particles, or change in form of forces, awakens and occasions responsive movements and changes in all parts of the universe, so in the universe of thought, the world of spirit, the thought

and acts of one individual soul may awaken responsive thoughts and acts in every human soul. There may be thus a constant communion of each soul with all and of all souls with each. The extent to which the individual is able to grapple with and grasp the infinite thought of society, make it his own, and pass it on, changed by his own particular characteristics, determines his place and helpfulness in the organic whole.

But in whatever place in society, he cannot escape some kind of social relations, and the question will be presented many times and in many forms; In view of these social relations, how shall I act? The character, as we have seen, consists in the kind of thoughts or motives that the mind of the individual makes. The motives of an individual or of a class become fixed in definite forms of expression, which become ethical principles for the guidance of conduct. The motives of one or many, made visible in acts, thus become an environment of custom. This repetition of motive, act, custom, are the continuous successive steps in the growth or retrogression of the individual or of society.

The customs of society may be formed from any or all of the grades of thought of which the mind is capable; these customs are, then, but the external expression of a thought adopted as an ethical principle. As the variations and grades or shades of thought and emotions are numberless, so the ethical principles resulting from these grades of thought and emotion may be divided and subdivided without limit. The higher the grade of thought the more comprehensive will be the ethical principle and the more varied and complex

will be its applications. But, as in the growth of an individual from childhood to maturity, there are three general stages of thought (p. 9) and emotions (p. 14) traceable, so corresponding to these grades of thought and emotions there are three grades of ethical principles distinguishable.

(1) A child, or a people representing the child-stage of development in thought, will have an ethical principle placed in external commands of rulers and ancestors, an ethical principle which demands a "blind obedience to authority."

(2) The many forms of expression of the grades of thought and emotions which are higher than the child-grade, indicate a more complex ethical principle than obedience to authority. With force, or a "fortuitous combination of circumstances" as the controlling power in society, the value of persons as determining factors in society is overlooked, and the thought of each centers about the individual to whom circumstances apparently converge—himself. Self-interest in some form would thus become the moving principle; this self-interest may vary from the desire for happiness (pleasurable sensations) of the individual to the higher form, the desire for the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number in society; or this higher form may place the end of development in the self, that thereby the good end in the self may eventually become the good of society.

(3) An ethical principle, based upon the idea of organic unity, places others as the center of interest and the self as recipient of reflected good. Such a principle is that of true altruism; an altruism that im-

plies both the giving and the receiving. Since this ethical principle arises in the plane of thought and emotions that recognizes man's relations to the divine, whether in God or man, such a principle is comprehensive enough for a guide in all the possible relations of the members of the organic unity. Ethical principles, when arising from the two lower grades of thought, when taken as guides in everyday affairs, may secure the good of one individual or of a few; but the preference by the individual of reflected to immediate good makes it possible for each and all to receive the best influences from the social whole.

For "altruism," as an ethical principle, always implies the presence of two factors—the self and the other members of society; and the statement of this altruistic principle must be comprehensive enough to admit of the true development of both, "others" and "self"; as Dr. W. T. Harris states it: "It is the preference of reflected good for immediate good—my good reflected from all humanity, my good after their good and through their good, and not my good before their good and instead of their good." Such a statement of the ethical principle is equivalent to the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would (would = ought to wish) that others do unto you."

The ethical principle of the third plane of thought is, therefore, the same as the content of the religious consciousness. For the motives love, reverence, and praise to God must find their highest expression in the relationship of humanity—in loving helpfulness to one's fellow-men. Through the "faith element" the unlettered wild man, the humble toiler, the business, class, or



party leader, those of high estate, may, each and all, by this insight of faith, adopt the divine will, the good of others, as their moving principle; and the purity of their motives and the results of their acts, where ignorance does not forbid, will be essentially the same as the motives and results from the reasoned-out ethical principle.

By "content of religious consciousness" is not meant that disinterestedness which places the end or purpose in self-sacrifice for its own sake. Such an attitude is rather the opposite of the true motive, which is helpfulness to others and the reception of one's own good through others; though in this process of expression of thought for others, healthy self-sacrifice will be involved.

The expression of these ethical principles in acts is not confined to the normal grades of thinking, classed as the child-grade, the scientific or metaphysical, and the rational. Acts resulting from an abnormal state of mind, as acts resulting from covetousness, jealousy, anger, revenge, etc., give rise to a partial expression of an ethical principle; for so long as human beings can associate together there is a phase of the ethical. The only position in which a person can be, in which there is no exemplification of the ethical, is when that person withdraws himself from others and seals his mind with unfeeling pride — the frozen condition of such a mind prevents thoughts or acts from going out to others and influences from being received from others, and thus there is complete isolation from others.

The above thought, that the ethical principle varies as the grade of thought and emotions varies, may be

seen more clearly from an illustration; as when a company of men unite themselves for the purpose of plunder. The "honor among thieves" is the ethical principle binding them to work together and to share the booty obtained. But one of these robbers might become suspicious of the faithfulness of the others and jealousy and anger fill his thoughts: still, as long as he remained in the robber-band and assisted in the tasks or in councils, he would show a phase of the ethical.

However, if the one should withdraw himself from the band in stolid indifference to his own fate and to that of the others, the one would then cease to exemplify the ethical. Such a condition, long continued, would either result in suicide—destruction of the physical, or in insanity, a complete severance for the time, from the organic unity.

And the robber may, by a lesson in legal penalty, be led to exhibit a kind of ethical principle which comes with obedience to authority, and so be led to respect the rights of others to a possession of their own property. And farther, the robber, through reformatory measures, may be led to a plane of thought which sees the relations of his own to the rights of others, in reference to the ownership of property; and, with this knowledge, his acts may now show another grade of the ethical. His motive is no longer to secure all that he can get, but he recognizes that that only is truly his which can come to him as the result of a rightly directed effort in society, or that which comes into his possession by the way of inheritance or gift. He takes his own and leaves others in the undisturbed possession of their own. The robber, now a citizen, a moral, respected man of

society, in the countless ways in which he may come in contact with his fellow-men, in his family and home life, in his business life, in his interest in the municipal, state, and county politics, in his general civil and social relations, may exhibit an ethical principle that, from the stage of thought which we are considering, would have as its main-spring some phase of self-interest. This individualism may vary from the self-centered condition which makes him a terror to his family, and gains for him the title of "hard man" among his acquaintances, to the enlightened self-interest that would lead him to help society, if eventually he would be better off himself, and that would even lead him to spend money for the public, if, thereby, his own estate might be improved, or to make a gift or bequest, if his name could be associated with it or some honor bestowed upon his family.

And, once more, the robber may be led to recognize unchanging and eternal principles; and, in the same relations in which above was placed the man actuated by self-interest is now a man with different motives. That he may get another man's money, even by skill and shrewdness and "fair play," is of secondary importance. Wealth to him is no longer an end in itself, but a means for securing the betterment physically, mentally, and morally of his own family and of the greatest number of less fortunate families, and for securing the greatest possible good to society as found in city, state, or country. His own good, while recognized as necessary for complete self-development, is received after and through the good of others. The reflected good from the use of wealth is his motive, rather than the enjoyment of its immediate use.

The different degrees of development of the ethical consciousness, denoted by the three ethical principles, indicate, in general, the different standpoints of writers upon ethical theories in the history of philosophic thought: the East Indian ethics, and, in form, much of the ethics written from the standpoint of "faith," or "intuition," are based upon the principle, "obedience to authority"; the ethical systems of the stoics and epicureans, Mediæval ethics, the earlier forms of Utilitarianism and "Evolutional Ethics" represent the ethical principle of the second grade — "happiness," or "self interest"; the ethical thoughts of Plato and the system of Aristotle, early Christian ethics, and the historical point of view of Hegel, and, perhaps, the ethics of Kant, of T. H. Green, and later utilitarianism, have, as a basis, the ethical involving a true insight of the reason — altruism.

This ethical principle, when analyzed from the historical point of view, will be found to contain at least these four elements: (1) The Greek idea of individuality; (2) the Christian idea of sacrifice for others; (3) the conception of true freedom of the will, i. e., the determination of the self in securing one's good through the good of others; and (4) the thought that there is a progressive realization of the ethical principle in the life of the individual as he develops in institutional life, i. e., what the good of others is and what is one's own good, can be learned only a step at a time, and, therefore, in each act, there will be involved the knowledge of the succession of events that has led to the present combination of circumstances, and an insight into what the true relation of events under consideration ought to be from the nature of the things or persons in which the events inhere.

Man's relations in society are principally those in reference to other persons. As a being conscious of his relations, in adopting the highest ethical rule as a guide for action, he makes others the end or purpose of his action; his activity shall go out to help others to a better and higher way of living.

But what constitutes the "good" of others is not always easy of determination in any given set of relations. What this good is has been the question that for centuries has been a center of discussion among ethical philosophers. The "happiness" ethics and the "goods" ethics have contended for the vantage ground. If one means by happiness pleasurable emotions, physical sensations of enjoyment, or even the plane of emotions described under psychical (p. 15), then the "good" here designated is not identical with happiness; but if by happiness one means the kind of emotions described under rational emotions, the kind of happiness almost described by the later utilitarians (as John Stuart Mill), then the "happiness" of the individual and the "good" of the individual become nearly identical. The idea of "good," as here used, corresponds nearly with the significance given to it by T. H. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

Each individual, in his own thoughts, emotions, and acts, learns to understand the mental life and its expression of those with whom he associates; and this unfailing source of information as to what constitutes his own good leads him to be able to find out what is good for others. Whatever contributes to the development and growth of the powers of one individual, the same in kind will contribute to the realization of a

larger self in others ; and, in this process of self-realization in and through others will come true happiness, or the highest good of both others and the self. When the preference is for the development of the self, rather than the preference of the good of others before one's own good, the reception of the good by the self is hindered and the motive becomes one of selfishness. But, in the exercise of a charity that does not ignore or contradict justice, the self, in the act of the preference of the reflected good, attains a complete development that accords with the development of others.

In striving for the good of others, it is in the motive, therefore, that the point of responsibility rests. This preference for the good of others, in any given set of relations, is the only element that can be ascertained with positiveness by the originator of the motive and act. The results of the act may be disastrous to society and to himself ; and these disastrous results may assist him to form a clearer conception of what the good of others is in his next step.

Acting according to the dictates of one's conscience, as it is called, frees one from immediate responsibility, but it does not necessarily imply that one has acted in accordance with what is good for humanity, or in accordance with ultimate right. As, for example, when a Mormon woman conscientiously receives another woman into her home as the second wife of her husband, she, in many cases, thinks she is doing the will of God and is following the dictates of her own conscience. But a wider education as to the origin of the family, its historical development, and the strong center of holiness and right-living that a well-regulated monoga-

mous family forms in society, would change her conscience in reference to polygamy. What is known as the "conscience" is a complex act of the mind, involving the two kinds of knowing indicated above (p. 27), and, when the judgment has been trained, the emotions will follow and the person will have a "clear conscience," which may be quite different in its "dictation" from the earlier "voice," and either dictation through force of habit may become spontaneous and intuitive.

Whatever may be the grade of thought of the individual, whether he consciously formulates an ethical principle or not, his acts, even in blind imitation of another, conform to some kind of an ethical principle. And at each step there is before him another possible way of acting: there is before him an ideal. This ideal may be rendered more clear and definite because of the example of some one or more in society; it may come from a clearer conception of the manner that the welfare of the self may be promoted by a closer connection with the external means of development, as with the state or with the church, or of the manner that this welfare may be promoted by securing greater happiness, activity, or good to the self through a use of nature and society; also, this ideal may come from a keener insight into what is meant by the personality of man, what is the object or end for which man was created, what is the way to secure the greatest possible development, and what are the definite means in the case of each individual for receiving the spiritual influences of the whole race. There is thus possible to the individual an ideal—an absolute ideal. This ideal is no less than perfec-

tion,—perfect as a finite developing individual: a person whose thoughts originate no motives not in sympathy with the better-being of all, and whose will never fails to act in accordance with his highest conceptions of the good of all.

Each act involves the two elements: the motive and the results of the act. The individual is directly responsible for his motives, but the results of an act are beyond definite calculation. But as the results of an act may modify the motives that may arise in similar circumstances, with each step of the realization of an ideal there is a change in that ideal; but, since there are infinite possibilities of change before the individual, progress never ceases. This progress, in the application of the ethical rule, may be seen by comparing the different periods in the life of an individual, or it may be better seen by comparing different and also widely separated epochs of history.

A few decades, even, show changes in the application of the ethical rule. The "higher education" of woman shows this process. Largely due to the struggles, trials, and self-sacrifice of a few heroic women in the early part of the present century, the general sentiment of the country and the world is undergoing a change in reference to the intellectual ability of woman. All changes may not indicate ethical progress: but any education for woman, however advanced, that does not change the direction of development of those inherently woman characteristics which have and do bless the world, must be ethical in its tendencies.

The question of "temperance" may also be taken as an illustration. While there is much opportunity for a



difference of opinion as to the means that have been used to bring about a higher ideal of what constitutes a subjection of the physical wants to the will, yet no one can doubt but that, on this question, a higher sentiment exists to-day than existed fifty years ago.

Many illustrations might be given of like changes of sentiment in reference to other questions of the day: and wherever changes have been brought about in the direction of true ethical progress, it would be found, could the process be traced, that the beginning of such changes involved, on the part of one or more, labor and the yielding of one's own immediate interest for the good of others to a greater or less degree.

And, if we notice longer periods of history, the same story will be told. Take the matter of physical exercise, the training and development of the body. The fakir of the East, bound by superstitious and false ideas of self-sacrifice, makes the body an instrument of torture.

In the repose of the fully developed physical, the Greek saw the subjection of the body to the spirit, and the beauty of this harmonious development became to him the highest object of attainment.

As if typifying the unseen and unknown channels of action which the various institutions of feudal society should follow, the cumbrous armor of the knightly warrior, concealed and made burdensome the body, whose end should be for the use, and not the hindrance, of the free spirit.

The present day sees still another ideal for the physical: the culture of the body goes alongside the culture of the mind. The ideal does not demand the exercise

of the gymnasium as an end in itself, that the body may receive the complete development demanded by Greek art, nor the athletic strength that the championship of base ball, foot ball, or boat race demands, but such physical culture as produces a sound body, that thereby greater physical and mental strength may be expended for the good of society.

And, again, the different customs of nations, in reference to slavery, serve as an illustration of the progress in the application of the ethical principle.

Even the conception of Absolute Good held by Plato, did not prevent him from arranging his ideal state with classes of menials and slaves. The Roman triumph was not complete without the captives of war becoming slaves. And in the customs of the feudal system it is difficult to tell which was man and which was land.

The conception of each man's complete ownership and control of his own body has been of slow growth. Our own nation has witnessed a most violent struggle, necessary to carry the idea of personal freedom,—ownership of self,—into effect. The ethics of nearly all nations now insists that the good of the state is better secured by the freedom of all, than by the slavery of some of the members.

And a similar change in the direction of greater realization of freedom, may be seen in the relation of the government of the state and of the church. Patriarchal government, petty rulers, suzerains, absolute monarchs, and pure democracies, are among the things of the past. Even in the most perfectly organized representative form of government of the present day evils are abundant. But the form of such a government grants opportunity to the members of the state for a self-development in freedom.

The practical application of the ethical principle in the enforcement of creeds and in church government may still be far from the ideal of the law of love, but the experience of the centuries has not been in vain. In nearly all countries at least nominal freedom of belief is granted. The long story of persecutions shows that so-called Christian belief has not, at all times, in practice included the ethical principle of the good of others to any great degree. The present century has witnessed a wonderful growth of the true missionary spirit. Lives of noble self-sacrifice brighten many dark places of the earth.

While the life of an individual may show change, progress, how slow, when the present realization is compared with the possibility of development, is that progress! And how much less rapid, also, are the changes in institutions of society! In some way, through the many different channels of influence, the lower, and even the lowest, grade of thought and purpose must be transformed by an individual reception of the divine principle of love or charity. Even a life of most mature culture, and most noble acts, shows a great incompleteness, when compared with the possible development of that individual. And since, in the very individuality of the person, there is the power to resist the environment, or make it subservient to the self, a capability of persistence under change, and at the same time a capability to so react upon the self that the self is thereby self-produced, what is there to indicate that this process of self-making ever ceases? Failure to adapt oneself to his environment produces death, it is said; but if the self is its own environment, the adapta-

tion is always possible to a greater or less degree, depending upon the strength of the individuality. And if the individual makes himself, and if there are before him infinite possibilities of development, why do not these very facts presuppose the immortality of the individual, and also presuppose this truth — that the history of institutions of society is a record of the beginning of an eternal process of development?

### SECTION III.

#### RESULTS FROM THE ADOPTION, OR NON-ADOPTION, OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE.

We have found that the character of the individual depends largely upon the grade of thought in which his emotions and acts are determined; that the activity of man is energizing in its normal condition only as he is a part of the social unity; that, in general, for each of the three grades of thought there is a corresponding ethical principle; that these ethical principles co-ordinate with the standpoints of the principal ethical systems of history; that these historical systems show a difference in the comprehensiveness of the ethical principle, and that the changes produced by the practical application of the ethical principle show a progressive realization, whose consummation can only be reached in infinite time. We have seen that justice is the fundamental principle of existence, and that self-sacrifice is, in a complementary way, the principle of growth.

Man makes his own deeds; since these deeds are the result of a self-constraint, or freedom, they react upon the originator. The deeds of an individual come back

to him. The society of free beings act and react upon the selves and upon each other. The deeds thus have a double aspect: the immediate effect upon the doer and the mediate effect, the results as reflected from other free beings.

The kind of ethical principle that the individual sets up as his ruling motive determines the kind of deeds that come back to him. He may simply follow the leadership of others and receive the results of others deeds. He may take the attitude of justice to others, the principle of individualism, known as self-interest, happiness, utilitarianism, calculation of consequences, etc., and in his careful measurement of his acts towards society he may receive like careful estimation in return. He may consciously set up the principle of his own good through others and receive the infinite good of society. He may adopt this highest ethical principle either through the insight of reason or of faith; that is, the vision of faith may illumine any and all grades of thought, and, since deeds concern the will-side of the being, the immediate results of his deeds may be the same, whether the ethical principle is adopted from the evidence of reason or from faith. The insight of reason is able to consciously formulate its principle and to see the connection of the motive with the act, and it may be able to trace the immediate effects of the deed upon the self, and the secondary effects as returned from the other members of society: a soul actuated by faith and by love to mankind only seeks the opportunity *to do*, and does not concern itself with the effects of the deeds; and, therefore, deeds actuated by faith produce the immediate effect upon the doer of joy in well doing,

but as there may have been a failure to perceive correct social relations, such deeds may be disastrous to some part of society.

To each individual there is the possibility of so determining himself that he may be in antagonism to God and to humanity, and he may thus be in the state of the inferno; or, he may recognize that his deeds originate in his own freedom, and that he only can permanently injure himself, and he can thus be in a condition to see the purifying effects of repentance and an acceptance of Divine Grace and reach the purgatorial state; or, moved by love to God and humanity, he may so act that his deeds build up and reinforce society, and he thus ascends into the paradisaical state.\*

The degrees of separation of the soul from the divine, or the vices and sins of which the human soul is capable, have been variously named by different writers upon theology and ethics. Certain cardinal virtues and their opposite vices have held their places since the time of Aristotle. Since the number of gradations in thought may be infinite, the list of virtues and vices formulated depends upon the power of introspection and analysis in the formulator. Whenever an act

\*The thoughts of this section have been largely suggested by a study of Dante's "*Divina Commedia*," and "*The Spiritual Sense of Dante's Divina Commedia*," by Dr. W. T. Harris, and other expositions of Dante. While the Divine Comedy was written nominally from the standpoint of Religion, the consideration of a deed and its motives presents the same phenomena, whether studied from the standpoint of religion or ethics: deeds that injure self and society may be called vices, rather than sins, if such a term is preferred, but these are only the phenomena of motives, and these phenomena may be looked at from the standpoint of the Church and the Bible, or from that of Reason, or from all three standpoints at the same time. The intention here is to consider the nature of motives and deeds from the standpoint of Philosophy or Reason.

destroys a good deed of the self, or of another, that act becomes a vice; if the destructive act originated in a thought or motive to act contrary to one's highest ideal of the right under the given relations, that act becomes also a sin. A sin is the determination to make a lower motive, when the possibility of making a higher is seen. A sin is, therefore, "a substitution of self for God"; an ignoring of the possibility of realizing more completely the divine ideal. A sinful thought thus becomes a barrier to the reciprocity of divine grace, and the mind voluntarily shuts the avenues of communion, and thus the possibility of receiving divine influence, revealed and transmitted through nature, books, and contact with other human souls. The results of a sin and a vice may be equally destructive to society, and the effects, as returned from society upon the doer, may be similar, but purity of motives frees the individual from immediate responsibility and from remorse, but not necessarily from regret for mistakes of judgment in interpreting a given set of social relations and the kinds of acts demanded thereby.

Acts or habits that are vices, or sins, are immoral; acts that reinforce society are virtuous, or moral, acts; acts that have become merely mechanical habits may be called unmoral, yet the initial act in the formation of those habits demanded a thought, and, therefore, a conscious motive, and thus the act is either moral or immoral.

We have already noticed the possible range of motives of which the human soul is capable (p. 7), and we have seen that variations from a standpoint of equilibrium, in which would be included all "unmoral

acts," may be either in the direction of thoughts and acts that are ugly, false, untrue, and destructive of true self-hood and of the bonds of society, or in the direction of thoughts and acts that are beautiful and good, and constructive of true personality in the self and in other members of the social organism.

The appetites and the desires of the flesh, as these are marks or characteristics of finiteness, soon, through the collision of wills in society, make occasions for the motives and acts of individuals to present all phases of variations between the two extremes already indicated. But each person may determine in freedom his own motives, and he may create any grade of sinful or of holy thoughts, and in acting habitually from that grade of thought he makes that into a rule of action, or, in other words, he adopts a higher or lower grade of ethical principle.

We will notice (1) the state of mind indicated by each of the seven mortal sins, or the results from the *non-adoption of the ethical principle*; (2) the *process* of the human mind in the act of purification from sin; and (3) the attitude of the mind and the results from the *adoption of the ethical principle*.

The seven mortal sins are\* "lust, gluttony, avarice, sloth, anger, envy, and pride": these are comprehensive terms, that denote states of the mind when in antagonism to God and humanity.

Of the seven mortal sins, pride and envy show the greatest degree of self-exclusion of the individual from others. Since lust and gluttony arise from the appetites, they may not show that wilful premeditation

\*The Spiritual Sense of the "Divina Commedia," p. 61; W. T. Harris.



for evil ways that is characteristic of envy and pride. Lust, gluttony, and intemperance are a surrender of the spirit to the desires of the flesh, and while under the dominion of appetite, reason is dethroned and man reduces himself to the condition of the brute.

Food and drink are for the renewal and continuance of the strength of the physical part of man, and whenever there are indulgences beyond such needs of the body as enable the person to carry on successfully his work, then begins the degradation of the spirit of man. All habits of eating not conducive to health, all forms of indulgence in wines, cider, strong beer, and other forms of alcoholic drinks, and also the use of tobacco, opium, etc., are illustrations of the possible ways that man renders his spirit in subjection to the desires of the flesh.

The person under the dominion of lust and appetite looks upon the evil results which follow as punishments inflicted upon him from without. He writhes in pain from dyspepsia, gout, dropsy, delirium tremens, and suffers in his business and family relations, because of inactivity of brain and many lesser inconveniences, and yet he looks upon all these consequences of his evil deeds as coming to him from other members of society in league against him; for to one in the state of inferno, or in antagonism to his own true personality and to that of others, there is little perception of the connection of sins and their necessary consequences, and, until he sees the nature of sin, he blindly struggles with himself and his evil habits.

The effects upon the individual of avarice and prodigality are similar; both tend to separate the person

from others in society. "Make avarice universal and trade and commerce are impossible, the movement of practical life ceases, and the social order is destroyed. Universalize prodigality and the result is the same. In one case no man can get anything, and in the other no man has anything."\* The avaricious man spends his days and nights in planning how he can heap up pelf. He desires wealth for its own sake, and not as a means for the gratification of reasonable wants. He must devote all his energies to the preservation of his riches after he has acquired them; therefore the avaricious man becomes burdened with care and bowed down with the weight of his possessions. He becomes anxious and worried for fear his riches will become dissipated. His mind is no longer free for more exalted thoughts, and he goes through life becoming more and more engrossed in the one line of activity that shuts him off from helpful sympathy with his fellow-men.

Sloth is the parent of many vices and sins. Man becomes good only as he puts himself in an attitude to receive divine influences. Man is free to withdraw from the influences about him, and by closing the avenues of approach to his thoughts he becomes more and more isolated. Man can produce this state of isolation, either by an act of determination, or by simply becoming inactive. The state of reciprocity is a state of activity and alertness, and the immediate effects of slothfulness are that the individual, by his lack of activity, becomes excluded from all that is pure and holy and uplifting. He fails to inquire of those about him, and so fails to receive the benefit of the experiences of

\*"A Study of Dante," p. 17: Susan E. Blow.

others. He likewise does not hold himself in readiness to impart unto others his own thoughts, and a paralysis of thought and will succeeds. There are six daughters to sloth—malice, rancor, pusillanimity, despair, torpor, and wandering thoughts.\* And the indulgence in any of these thoughts brings with it its own effects: torpor and wandering thoughts deprive the individual of a possible progress; despair leads to suicide; a pusillanimous person, in failing to respond to the influences of his environment, becomes weaker; malice and rancor are forms of anger which has its own punishment.

To the angry person all things are mingled and confused. Things and events no longer appear in their proper relations. An angry person is incapable of clear thought, and his words and actions are incoherent and unintelligible. The spirit has lost control of its own activity. The person rushes blindly into whatever line of action presents itself, and gropes about as if enveloped by "thick clouds of dark smoke."

Anger leads to violence, which may take the forms of "violence against God, against self, against one's neighbor." The violent against one's neighbors are tyrants, robbers, and murderers. Since this attitude of mind becomes expressed against organized society, this form of violence becomes a crime, as well as a sin. When anger becomes so settled in its character that it becomes despair and insanity, it takes the form of violence against self, or suicide. The effects of anger are seen in the "muddy condition" to which the soul is reduced; and when we consider the fierceness and revenge that are shown by the classes of the violent, the

\* The Spiritual Sense of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, p. 62; W. T. Harris.

remorse and despair and sullen indifference, and often suicide, that result,—these show us only too plainly to what extent man in the power, and in what may become the majesty of his free will, may go. Dante makes those who have committed suicide, “placed not in animal bodies, but in trees. Their punishment is to need their bodies.” The fixed condition of the trees symbolizes the condition of the will in a continued state of melancholy. When sullenness and melancholy become so habitual that the ideas become fixed, there is only the reality of fanciful pictures before the mind. When anger assumes the form of violence against God, in the form either of blasphemous oaths or of a denial of a Power higher than the self, it then becomes the worst possible sin—that of pride.

Anger, envy, and pride are sins forming an ascending (or descending) series of badness, pride being the worst sin. Anger, as we have seen, is a state of dissatisfaction apparently with one’s surroundings, though really with one’s self. The apparent difficulty with others really comes from a lack of control over one’s own will. Envy aims at the possessions of others. An envious person wants the fine clothes, books, or accomplishments of another without the process of working for them. Pride is aimed at God as well as man, that is, a proud person shuts himself away from both God and man. A proud person can neither give to others, nor receive from others, those spiritual influences, without which one’s power of growth and usefulness shrinks into nothingness. Pride freezes the heart so that the influences of the Holy Spirit can not touch it; this, then, is the “unpardonable sin”—spiritual pride that

refuses communion with God and man. No matter what one's profession is, if he have the attitude of pride he is dead to spiritual influences, and he can not possibly progress into the ways of beauty and holiness.

Envy manifests itself as ten species of fraud: these appear in seducers, flatterers, simonists, various kinds of fortune tellers, as diviners, soothsayers, astrologers; barterers or public peculators, hypocrites, thieves, evil counsellors, sowers of scandal, schismatics, heretics; falsifiers, such as forgers, the simulators of persons, counterfeiters of coin, liars, and false witnesses. As the fraudulent aim their efforts at obtaining from others that for which they are not willing to put forth effort in a legitimate, organized way, the immediate effects upon themselves appear in some form of disruption of thought from its normal ways of working and the appearance of this disturbed thought in the life and habits of this kind of vicious ones. Flatterers are soon unable to distinguish good from bad, and, by saying pleasing words for effect, receive the results of their acts in the distrust of their sincerity engendered among those upon whom they have heaped their sweet but meaningless words.

The simonists, in their attempts to purchase the gifts of the Holy Spirit with money, fail to distinguish the nature of spiritual gifts, and find themselves restless and disturbed at the prospect of a departure into another life. And, as if determined to make their entrance into eternal rest sure, they try to ease their consciences by investing their fraudulent gains in charitable institutions, or for the education of needy young people.

Those who pretend to be able to foretell events accustom themselves to look at the future as if it were already past. They do not treat events and actions of others as if based upon reason, but as if happening by chance. Instead of reducing events about them to a rational order, they regard all as dependent upon fate. They do not look upon the present as the opportunity for grasping that which is in the immediate future and uniting it in a systematic manner with the experiences of the past. For the fortune teller "there is no present or future; all is past time." Consequently his will becomes paralyzed. There is no possibility of realizing new hopes. Life has no longer any zest or interest. As he can only look upon what has been, he has no interest or energy to enter new fields of activity.

The barterers, or public speculators, "sell justice for money, thus confusing all moral order."

A wearisome life of pretence must be maintained by hypocrites. A continual feigning of something that they are not. A desire to appear of better rank or family, or of superior mental power, or of vast possessions, necessitates a continual make-believe. All spontaneity and naturalness of behavior become lost. The hypocrite must be watchful lest he betray his real position in society or his true character. No peace or quietude of mind. No resting in the assurance of the reality of his own self-respect, but a continual effort to maintain the artificial life which he has adopted.

The life of the thief is one of constant attempt to disguise his real occupation. "Thievery destroys property, and the thieves have their very persons stolen from them and are obliged to assume others."

Evil counsellors and sowers of scandal, by their evil words stir up hatred and animosity between friends and neighbors. Their words become fiery flames, consuming all evidence and tokens of love and friendship. In time society finds out the truth, and those who have stirred up dissensions, either intentionally or thoughtlessly, are aroused to reflect upon the nature of their deeds, and to burn with the remembrance of the wicked thoughtlessness of their own unkind and untruthful words.

Those who sever the bonds of the accepted doctrines of a received creed, or faith, have been regarded as heretics; but when the blow is aimed at the fundamental principles of Christianity, there can be no doubt of the nature of the deed, and the deed itself is its own punishment. The individual who cuts himself off from the influences of the Holy Spirit, manifested in the organized church, severs a possible connection that might have filled his soul with high and holy aspirations.

Schismatics are those who produce schisms in the family, or the state, or the church. Dante makes those who have produced schism in the state to be "mutilated about the head, to symbolize the place of their injury to society, while the one who fomented schism in the family carries his severed head in his hand—he has severed the head of the family from its limbs."\*

The four classes of falsifiers practice fraud in its most open forms. The deeds of the forger or counterfeiter become superficial. His one act of feigning must be followed by many others, to cover up the traces of

\*The Spiritual Sense of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, p. 71: W. T. Harris.

the first. His life loses its significance, and his whole thought must be directed towards covering up his acts of falsification. His false acts become a settled state of mind, and no longer able to endure the cross-currents of thought suggested by his real life and his false acts, he either leaves his home, or becomes insane, or commits suicide. The simulators of persons do indignity to their own personality, and in time lose a recognized place in society and are only counted worthy of an "alias."

The daughters of pride are four kinds of treachery: "Treachery towards one's blood relatives in the family, treachery towards one's native country, treachery towards one's friends, and treachery towards one's masters or benefactors." Pride completely isolates one from relatives, family, country, and friends. The proud acts of treachery are aimed at the most sacred and fundamental bonds of society. It attempts even the destruction of life of dear and prized friends, and thus transforms the perpetrator into a demon. There is no longer communion with others in social, business, or family relations. The individual has, by his treacherous acts, severed all relations with God and man. So long as he remains in this state of antagonism to society he is completely isolated. "Pride is consistent selfishness, because it makes itself sole end and sole means. It is frozen and it freezes all others."

We have seen that the results of the non-adoption of the Ethical Rule have been different degrees of isolation of the soul from other members of society. The individual, in such an attitude, regards all society as antagonistic to him, and he recoils before the supposed



ill-will of others. In this non-repentant state he regards every one with fear and distrust, and thinks of society as plotting against him. His "eyes are holden," and he does not enter into communion with that which is pure and holy, and so fails to receive the good that might come to him from a union with others. And in this state of unhappiness and antagonism to others he does not see that his very condition of mind has been brought about by his own thoughts and deeds, and that he is experiencing the effects of his own weak and unholy thoughts and acts.

When the individual can look upon himself as the cause of his own dark thoughts, he begins to have the true thought of the connection of his own deed with himself, and in recognizing his own responsibility for his acts he becomes sorry for his weakness and folly and sin. He no longer feels that others are reproaching him. He sees that he has need of help, and his soul melts in repentance before the thought of his own sin and weakness. His mind is in an attitude to receive divine influences from whatever source they may come. He begins to realize that his own thoughts have been the barrier to all that is good and holy. In his humility he is ready to cry out in anguish that it is his own fault that he has not entered into communion with the spiritual forces manifested in individuals and in the institutions of society. Pride no longer holds him in self-exclusion. He is "born again" into the inheritance of love and grace from which he had separated himself by his own evil acts and thoughts. He has obtained a true insight into the order of the universe, an insight into the eternal principles upon which the development of the human soul is based.

With this true thought of the divine plan for the salvation of human souls, there begins a struggle of a different sort from that which a person experiences while unrepentant. He now sees himself as he is in the "light of what he should be." His contention with others, while in the state of the inferno, is now, in the purgatorial state, turned into a struggle with his own sins and weaknesses. His sin was its own punishment while unrepentant; when penitent he recognizes the necessity of pain and struggle in the human soul, and that the soul is purified in this very process of the conflict of higher thoughts with the lower desires and impulses. But with the truly penitent these lower thoughts and impulses are not allowed to become externalized in deeds, but as the proclivities to sinning can not be checked all at once, there is a continual warring in the spirit until that time when even the wish to sin has been overcome by higher and holier thoughts and desires.

When a person comes to recognize his own responsibility for his deeds, and sees the utter insufficiency of an attitude of exclusion from holy influences, he is moved by remorse and contrition to reach out for assistance from others and to give of his experiences to others. The extent to which he is willing to receive mediatorial help and give of himself to others, determines the kind of ethical principle that he adopts. If he follows custom unthinkingly he is unmoral, rather than truly moral or immoral. As a moral man he may set up as ideals the cardinal virtues—temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude. Such ideals might originate from no higher plane of thought than that

considered under self-interest (p. 22 ). Or this moral man, placing himself in a receptive attitude, may accept the celestial virtues, faith, hope, and love, not only as virtues theoretical and possible, but as principles with which to view the world and upon which to base his actions. No principle less than the golden rule is comprehensive enough to express the faith, hope, and love of the human soul. Love, as representing the celestial virtues, is an emotion sufficient to prompt the exercise of all the cardinal virtues; but the cardinal virtues do not necessarily include the celestial.

Faith, hope, and love in man reveal the fundamental thought of the universe. The explanation of their nature involves an explanation of all the thought of relationship to God. For the relationship of man to God involves the whole creative process. And this creative process can be understood only as the relationship of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is seen in its Trinitarian completeness.\* In the creation of the heavens and the earth, in an eternal process of self-creation, in the constant return of Absolute Thought unto Himself, the Creator made known that even the Eternal Power and God-head established His nature in justice. But absolute justice demands that all energizing of thought should return unto Himself, and therefore God, as absolute justice, would give no opportunity for finite beings.

But God, the Father, in His own self-creation, creates also the Son, an eternal process of giving up self, so that the Son, in the recognition of His perfection and of His derivation from the Father, creates the Third

\*For a more complete exposition of this thought the reader is referred to the writings of Dr. W. T. Harris.

Person, the Holy Spirit, manifested and revealed in the world of finite beings. This evolution of finite beings can be studied historically only as it has taken place upon our planet, the earth; but the "Heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth His handiwork." From the beginning on unnumbered worlds has a process of evolution manifested the creative thought and love of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Only as a world reaches a given degree of development does its formation become possible of study from the standpoint of science, and it is the development from the "chaotic" stage to the occupancy of the world by man, and the combinations of men in institutional life, that is generally included in the term "evolution." But philosophical thought sees the necessity of evolution as a process of self-creation that is fundamental to the stage of "scientific evolution"; for God is a Spirit, a Personality, and no theory of "life-evolution" alone can account for "Spirit-evolution." And the divine altruism, made evident from the beginning in the creative process, is revealed in and through the thought and will of human beings in their attempts to secure their own self-development in the exercise of this same principle, the altruistic.

This process of realizing the divine in the heart and life of each individual, is one of slow and gradual growth. Each step of realization of a higher purpose in one's life, means a purification of one's heart and mind of a phase of selfishness.

While the thought is centered in self the pride of such a heart prevents the reception of holy influences, and there can be no giving nor receiving, and such an

attitude takes away all possibility of growth. When the soul realizes its own condition and willingly acknowledges its need of assistance, then the wall of pride is broken and there is a beginning of departure from the state of the inferno. Pride is the first sin that must be repented of. The soul humbles itself before the thought of its guilt and insufficiency. The mind seizes the idea of help from others and of reaching out to others. This thought is a glimpse of divine love possible to be manifested in the hearts of the sons of God. This new-born love and purpose to lead a higher and holier life, finds expression in acts of kindness and love to others. The world is no longer in antagonism to a soul in such a state.

Strong in hope arising from the new purpose, one's surroundings assume a new aspect. But the slight knowledge attained of the divine world-order, and the strength of loving purpose, have not yet taken possession of the soul completely enough to render the soul serene and secure amid the collisions of wills that necessarily come with institutional life. Then begins a process of struggle in the soul. But, so long as the soul can see the connection of the results of its deeds with its own motives and acts, and hold itself in a recipient attitude, so long the soul can rejoice in its sufferings as the way by which a higher and ever higher life is attained. Instead of thoughts of treachery to one's friends, country, or relatives, there is now an attitude of love and helpfulness.

The soul, conscious of its sin and of its need of grace, often struggles, seemingly in vain, with long-continued habits of sin and vice. But, however often

the attempt to rise to a higher plane of thought and life, the same process must be repeated. Struggle with self, in consequence of the weakness that comes with finite limited existence, must continue until the mind can grasp the full significance of the altruistic principles upon which the world-order is based, and until the will responds to this insight of faith or reason; in other words, when it becomes easier to think of the good of others before one's own good, and to act in accordance with this thought, than to do otherwise, then is the struggle over and the soul is in the heavenly state. The release from a condition of pride is the beginning of the ascent to the paradisiacal state, but, before the complete conquest over selfishness, many a weary struggle must take place. Envy, with its numerous species of fraud, presents itself in many forms to the aspiring soul.

Envy does not close the avenues of approach to the human soul so completely as pride, but it often blinds the eyes to the true interests of the self. So long as any thought of fraud, or desire of the possessions of another, fills one's mind, there is no room for thought of positive assistance to others. The resolves to continue fraudulent practices must give way to resolves to help others to retain their honest possessions, and then the envious person finds that, with this transformation of purpose, there is a reaction upon his soul, and not only is the desire of others' possessions gone, but also, in this act of meekly yielding, the "inheritance of the earth" is his, and he is now more eager to share his heritage than before to gain through fraudulent measures. The process of "gaining his life through losing it," is no longer a mystery to him.

The confusion of thought that results from a state of anger must be cleared away. The struggles with a "quick temper" are by no means insignificant. But as often as a person loses his self-control and uses hasty, ill-chosen words, he renders it impossible to utter words of helpfulness, courage, and cheer. He is also, while in a state of anger, unable to think clearly, and he either sulks by himself or disturbs all the currents of thoughts around him. When the individual sees that he is responsible for the direful consequences that result from his fits of anger and orders his soul to become self-contained, then will the process of purging begin. When his self-control is equal to even a suppression of a "flash of the eye" amid annoying circumstances, then with the effects of the use of mild words in quiet, gentle tones, he begins to realize the "blessedness of peacemakers."

Since the root of all sin is selfishness, there is an intimate connection between the different forms in which this selfishness shows itself. There is a "relation of the seven mortal sins to each other. Love is the common ground. Love remiss is sloth. . . . Love, perverted by selfishness, becomes love of evil to one's neighbor, and forms the essence of the three sins—pride, envy, and anger. Love excessive is the basis of the three sins of incontinence—lust, gluttony, and avarice."\*

As sloth is a vice that is neutralizing in its effects upon virtues that might be existent, the secondary effects of sloth, or when the soul is in a repentant state, are far-reaching. The soul struggles with the

\*The Spiritual Sense of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, pp. 98, 99.

habits formed from inactivity, and often, through failure to realize the highest possibilities of opportunities, discouragement and despair fill the heart that should be strong in hope and courage. When the will has become trained to immediate response in lines of wholesome activity suggested by lofty motives, then the slothful habit is overcome and the soul rejoices in its freedom from such an impediment to its progress.

An avaricious person, or a wasteful person, is bound fast in tenacious habits. In these vices the thoughts of the vicious do not even reach out to others, except in a limited way. The thoughts become centered more and more upon accumulation, or, what is the same as far as its effects upon society is concerned, upon reckless expenditure for personal gratification. The longer one dwells upon money-getting as an end, the more narrow and contracted do his thoughts become. A gradually narrowing range of social needs interests him. He is weighted so heavily with his material possessions that it is nearly impossible for him to think of sharing the interests and burdens of other members of society. Not until the higher thought, that wealth is a means and not an end, is grasped and made real by consistent action, will the avaricious or wasteful person be able to rise above the struggles that come when the avaricious mind sees what ought to be done, and yet is unwilling to act in accordance with its conviction. When he is willing to share the advantages of his wealth or position with others, then the blessings of the "poor in spirit" are his. The process in the repentance and purification of the "gluttonous and wine-bibbers" is one of anguish of spirit and of long duration. Rational



desires must take the place of sensuous ones. The spirit must assert its supremacy over the desires and weaknesses of the flesh. While these vices have their ground more directly in the feelings, and do not, therefore, affect society to such a degree as pride and envy, yet the results of long-continued habits in these directions affect the family, and, through the family, society as a whole. And the person strongly in the power of habits of intemperance, for instance, finds the conflict with appetite long and arduous. Not until the hunger and thirst is for righteousness, can the spirit rejoice in its freedom from the bondage of sensuous appetite.

The lustful person is consumed by his own passions. His desires are unholy. And the process of purification means a subordination of passionate desires and thoughts, to thoughts of interest and activity in pursuits that shall supplant the sensual thoughts. His time and thoughts must be wholly engrossed in occupations that are pure and holy; and when the passionate person can see the significance of his sufferings, and can even be glad in them, he is then attaining purity of heart.

The insight into the significance of pain and mental anguish is of gradual development. When the thought and action are so in harmony with the divine will that there is no inclination to sin, the repose and rest of the heavenly state is permanent. The events and circumstances of every-day life may bring annoyance and opposition of wills, but the soul that looks beyond the transient and fleeting enjoys a repose in action that is an evidence of growth of the "kingdom of heaven" within the soul. To one who has turned from the

“inferno,” and is toiling up the “purgatorial mount,” there is a continual enlargement of the vision—a growing insight into the nature of divine love and grace, and of the possibility of the appropriation of this divine influence into the individual mind and heart. Faith, hope, and charity fill the thoughts and interpenetrate the deepest recesses of the nature, and transform the dark and sinful thoughts into those of cheerful love and care for other human beings.

“Faith is the substance of things hoped for; the evidence of things not seen.” “Reason is the faith organ.” There is no contradiction between true faith and true insight of reason. “Faith means the true knowledge of the First Principle of the Universe.” Faith sees the consistency of the plan of God, and trusts that all things work together for good to those that believe in Him. Reason sees not only consistency in the plan and order of the universe, but is able to penetrate into the mysteries of the creative process, and to discover the nature of true cause, or self-cause, and to follow the manifestation of this creative thought in nature and in men as combined in the institutions of society.

Whether professed or not, each one has faith, each one believes in some plan of the world and of his own life. And each one uses this insight of faith many times each day in the practical affairs of business and social life; and even the scientist is guided in his investigations by a belief that the world is not pieced together, but has an underlying unity, that makes possible worthy results from isolated workers. Faith has much more significance when, as used in the Christian

conception, it means a belief in God and in Christ as the Savior of the world, and that human souls may be redeemed.

Hope is the practical side of faith. Hope is one of the strongest emotions of the human mind. Hope steadies the heart in hours of darkness and despair. Hope cheers the weary laborer—that there may be better days, that wages may be higher, that the family may be restored to health, that he may have a “business” for himself. No department of life continues its normal way when unilluminated by hope. As faith, in the religious sense, has a peculiar significance, so has hope. Hope expects that the consummation of the world will be in accordance with the view that faith sets up. Although present appearances may be against the realization of divine plans in the world, and although the forces of evil seem to triumph, yet hope confidently looks for a fulfillment of the plans for the regeneration and salvation of the world.

Our “hopes” are stamped upon our countenances, and, of whatever character, they leave their impress. “Nothing is so difficult to conceal as one’s conviction in regard to the origin and destiny of the world and man.”

True charity is love large enough to include the whole universe. It is the action side of faith and hope. While faith sees and hope expects, charity acts. Charity is the foundation principle of all virtues. A soul filled with love to mankind can not do anything mean or contemptible. Love in the heart seeks expression in work for others, and, engaged in divine employment, there is no room for base or evil thoughts.

Charity is not "mere alms-giving," but "devotion to others." Charity, in its finite, limited form, as shown by the individual will, is a revelation of absolute love, or charity, that has existed from the creation of the universe.

Charity, as a principle of action, does not violate or contradict the principles of courtesy and justice; for it includes all the cardinal and celestial virtues. A courteous person treats each one as if he were ideally perfect, and pays no attention to his defects. A just person attempts to measure the deeds of another and to do to another "just as he is done by." A charitable person sees the defects of another, and also the possible perfection, and he is willing to give up his selfish ease and comfort, if by so doing he can help another. A charitable person will not, in thus helping another, ignore the fact that the one he is trying to help is a human being, and, therefore, his very personality demands also courtesy and justice. The truly charitable person realizes the indignity that is placed upon another in not treating him justly, or as responsible for his own deeds. All pretence or show of helping is therefore avoided by true charity. A charitable person sees in every man a brother, one moved by like desires as himself, and subject to the same hopes and sorrows of life, and capable of like aspirations for a higher and more complete life; he, therefore, faithfully performs the commonest acts of every-day life, and illumines the path of all with whom he comes in contact with a brightness and cheerfulness that make even the lowliest lot something more than endurable.

A person may have an intellectual recognition of the

nature and desirability of charity, but not receive it into his own soul as a principle of action. In such an attitude he makes himself the center of activity, rather than others; but as soon as he gets an insight into the correctness of the principle of charity, and receives it into his own life as his principle of action, he has allied himself with the spiritual forces of the universe, and he has made it possible to understand more clearly the nature of faith, hope, and love, and to enter more completely into the thoughts and emotions of the entire race, and to attain greater satisfaction in "whatever lot," and to experience the fullness of joy in an occupation that shall be eternal—the joy of assisting struggling souls to a higher knowledge of the significance of immortal life.

With the reception of the principle of charity, or an adoption of the ethical principle into one's soul, begins the process of struggling with one's weakness and sins as they appear in the light of perfection. Growth is by a continual repetition of this process; the human being sees himself as responsible for his bad deeds, as well as his good, and he sees what he ought to be and do, and he acts according to this conception. But each step reveals a still higher possible attainment. But through lack of comprehension and effort his progress may be only a partial realization of possible heavenly attainment.

The love that is possible to the human mind is a love broad enough to take in the interests of all humanity, that is, a love that looks upon each human being as one who has the potentialities of an immortal soul and who in the essence of his humanity is equal to every other

human being. Such a love is as willing to extend sympathy and helpfulness to a beggar or a lowly person as to a king or a millionaire. Such an attitude brings with it the possibility of a realization of the influences of the Holy Spirit, as revealed in the institutions of society.

But one may fail to receive and exercise this broad Christian love for the whole of humanity: his love may be limited in a practical way to those with whom he comes in contact in his business pursuits; or his love may express itself in patriotism for his country: or this love may limit itself to affection for his family and a small circle of friends; or again it may express itself in heroic acts on especial occasions of excitement or danger. These limited forms of expression of love may come from a limited comprehension of the nature of men's relations to one another in society, or it may come through a perverseness of the will which fails to respond to the promptings of generous thoughts.

But as in the exercise of the thought and will in action, in directions obstructive to growth, each thought and deed brings with it its own consequences, so when a soul energizes in the direction of love and righteousness, the results as surely follow.

Love that is strong enough to express itself only in customary acts of obedience, after the fashion or prescribed rules of others, shows a personality that may be willing to follow, and with right leaders may become an element in society that is positive for good; but as the conscious determination came from others, the return of good to simple obedience in the grown-up man is such that comes from unmoral acts; that is, an act has decided character only as it is an expression of conscious thought.

The interest in humanity that extends to the so-called practical phases of life, to the community of feeling and interchange of thought sufficient to sustain business relations, may be, in character, a grasping, self-centered interest, or it may partake of the nature of the broad universal love which is willing to consider others' interests along with one's own, and the spiritual results to the individual will depend upon the motives and course of action that he adopts.

The more completely one embodies the divine love that is willing to sacrifice itself for the meanest and lowliest of God's creatures, if, thereby, lasting good may be accomplished, the more complete is the beatific vision and the more exalted the spiritual state of such an one. The true love in family life, and for a circle of intimate friends, is of the nature of the universal love; but in its expression it is limited, and, although most important for social stability, it must be supplemented by an interest in, and love for those beyond the immediate circle, or the character of the love may be akin to self-love.

While the individual recognizes the necessity of certain duties and conditions for family love, he knows that the Christ-like love must be large enough to include all of humanity. The human soul sees God face to face, when he sees the divine in any and all of the human race, and strives to help each brother-man to realize more of the divine love in his own soul. The glorious, eternal work of human beings is this: to help other souls to a more perfect realization of divine love.

### CHAPTER III.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIETY; THE FAMILY, THE SCHOOL, THE STATE, AND THE CHURCH; THE GENERAL SPHERE OF ASSISTANCE OF WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL MAY AVAIL HIMSELF.

From earliest years the thoughts and deeds of the individual are instigated and re-enforced by those around him. The child is born into the family; the kind of family is altogether beyond the choice of the individual. The child of the savage and of the most cultured and refined parents has in each case the potentialities of a human soul. The self-activity of each has certain tendencies through heredity; but the family life does much to shape the direction of development. The child learns in the family the use of language, habits of order and obedience, the manner of conducting himself toward other members of the family and society. Unless the child learns to subordinate his will to the will of those older and wiser, he either must learn this lesson through a humiliating process later in life, or he will fail to render that amount of assistance to society that would have been otherwise possible.

The training of the family should enable the child to make a successful transition from a state of mere obedience and customary goodness, to a conscious application of the ethical rule in this limited sphere of his activity.

The school, as an institution of society, has not the same fundamental character as the family, or state, or church. It is a voluntary institution, and its work can



be done, though less adequately, in one of the other institutions. The instruction of the school is designed to supplement and extend the training begun in the family. Whatever the kind of school, its especial assistance to the individual lies in the degree to which the activity of the child and youth is called forth and turned into channels, so that his deeds harmonize with the true development of others.

Every child is born into a State just as truly as into a family. This state may be merely patriarchal, or it may be communal, or it may be a well-organized monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or republic. Whatever the form of the state, the child-life begins in a more or less inclusive organic unity—and this unity, in however feeble a degree, shows the functions and relations of the most highly developed and organized state. The state presents the widest possible sphere for the activities of the individual. The innumerable relations of social, civil, industrial, and political life inhere in this organic unity. The extent to which the individual enters into any or all of these relations depends upon the strength of his individuality. He may enter into the thought and purposes of the whole only sufficiently to call upon the sympathies of the other members of the state, and the state, recognizing his possibilities as a human being, expresses its thought of justice in support at the almshouse, or some other fitting public institution.

The individual may enter simply into industrial and very limited social relations with others. The state attempts to establish such conditions that an equilibrium of rights may be preserved; in the social rela-

tions, that there may be freedom of communion and friendly intercourse; and, in the industrial relations, freedom to each one in his own kind of activity, both in placing in the world's market that energy of brain or muscle, and the products of these powers, and in receiving from that market an exact equivalent for the expended energy.

The individual may enter not only the social and industrial, but also into all forms of civil and political relations; in these relations one may so thoroughly enter into the thoughts and purposes of the whole, that he may, through the strength of his individuality, reflect the will of many; but the state, recognizing the limitations of the human mind, marks out the channels beyond which one may not go in the exercise of municipal, state, or national rights and duties.

While all these avenues of assistance are open to the individual, he may disregard all the conditions for entering into even the least of them, and, through his wicked deeds, destroy his connections with the true unity of the state; the state, then, must still allow him to receive his own deeds, and so makes known the fact that the individual has separated himself from society, by shutting him up in prison, or, if he has completely severed his union with others by taking the life of another without justifying circumstances, the state must still place upon him his deeds and take his life, or completely exclude him from intercourse with others.

The state, or nation, into however many parts it may be divided for convenience at any time of its development, is an institution of all people. The ideal church is also an institution that includes all souls; the real

church, or the church at any given point of history, includes only those who voluntarily enter into union and receive into their wills the principles of the divine Second Person. The individual may enter into the visible, or historic church, by expressing his willingness to conform to the established beliefs, forms, and creeds; a person enters the invisible church whenever, in the true Christ spirit, he sacrifices his selfish desires and interests to help some other soul into a larger and better life.

The fundamental principle of the visible and the invisible church is the same—the nurture of souls into a life of divine love and holiness; and the individual who enters the church places himself in a position to receive manifold spiritual influences, and to contribute his share to the upbuilding of a spiritual kingdom. The work of the church is thus not contrary or antagonistic to the work of the state, but each, in its own way, helps the individual in his work of self-development.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE FAMILY THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTION OF SOCIETY.

**ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER:** *Section I*, The Nature of the Family; Kinds of purposes at the basis of marriage; The family and the State; Early education of the child; Family relations teach altruism; Family affection.

*Section II*, Principle of historical development: The primitive family; The patriarchal family; A higher kind of family; The Roman family; The Teutonic family; Christ's teachings; Teachings of the Church; Spirit of individuality becomes individualism; Divorce laws; Necessity for a spirit of co-operation; "Higher education of women"; Conclusions.

#### SECTION I.

##### NATURE OF THE FAMILY.

Without the family neither state nor church would have existence. The family is constituted in the union of one man and one woman.\* The essence of the marriage relation is freedom. Two independent finite personalities become, in a sense, one. The thought of one coalesces with that of another. Instead of separate and private personal interests, marriage renders the interests of one identical with those of the other. There is a free surrender of mere self-thoughts for

\*The opening chapter of Thwing's "The Family, an Historical and Social Study," states that the primitive form of the family is still an unsettled question; yet Westermarck's conclusions in the "History of Human Marriage," from a study of the family in all stages of civilization, are, that the monogamous form of the family is the probable historical form. And, farther, Westermarck states, as the result of many observations among plants and animals, that there is a tendency to production from one male and one female continuously.

thoughts of the other. The aspirations, plans, and purposes are no longer for the self alone. Another is included in all these hopes and desires.

Whether the union in marriage of one man and one woman is of high or low order, depends upon the thoughts and purposes of those entering the marriage relation. The voluntary union may be for the joint purpose of obtaining a livelihood, or there may be mingled with the purpose of one a desire to obtain this livelihood at the expense of the other; it may have for its main purpose the gratification of sexual desires; it may have for its motive social advancement. The purpose may be, in marriages of the highest order, a union of soul with soul, in such relations of love and sympathy, "that thought leaps out to wed with thought, ere thought can wed itself with speech." In such voluntary agreement, recognized legally with more or less explicitness, depending upon the degree of civilization and the consequent system, or no-system, of jurisprudence, is the ground of all family relations. The most obvious elements, as forming the basis of the marriage relation, are sex and parentage; but as a people become enlightened, the spiritual element, as a determining factor of selection for the marriage relation, becomes more prominent.

The family, in its constituted relations of the union of man and woman, soon, in the course of development, exhibits specific rights that naturally emanate from the different members. By virtue of a difference in personality the family, father, mother, and children, each has rights and duties, consistent with inherent characteristics and position in the family. The rights have a

tacit recognition, or become formally expressed in law. In the early stages of development of the family, these rights and duties are put in forms of prohibition and penalty by the father, as the head of the household. The father thus becomes the head of the family, which is also, for the time, the state. The family and the state are, for a period, identical as to numbers. The patriarchal family is an illustration of this union of institutions.

As wants, and the efforts to satisfy them increase, the rights of the individual members of the family become more numerous. And, in the course of time, the family becomes one of a group, and the group, in the relations that are established, becomes the state. The group, in its community of interests begotten of like needs, efforts, and sympathies, expresses the common thought in sayings, in customs, and in formal laws. The legislative, judicial, and executive functions now become distinctly organized, and the state presents the diversity that may be seen in the modern commonwealth, or in the nation. In this specialization of functions the family takes a place, in one sense subordinate to the state, and, in another sense, coördinate, or even superior. For, without the family the state could not be, and yet the state, in its organized unity, establishes conditions favorable to the perpetuation and protection of the highest kind of family life. The family is thus a unit in a line of activities that are fundamental for the activities of the more inclusive unity, the state.

The duty of determining favorable circumstances of birth and education of a child, rests equally upon the father and the mother. Through the natural and

necessary division of labor and duties between the father and mother of a family, the early direction of the infant life necessarily devolves upon the mother. In the home the child is taught to see, hear, and reflect. The intelligent answers of the mother to the thousand queries and wonders of the young mind, prepare the way for the more definite and extended instruction of the school. Besides the positive instruction of the home, the child is taught habits of obedience, care of his person, and details of etiquette and manners. To the child the will of the parent is supreme. Nothing but implicit obedience to wise commands is consistent with the correct development of the will of the child. Habits of cleanliness, and taste in dress and adornment, learned in early years, save an untold amount of trouble and inconvenience in later days of life. Agreeable and pleasing manners often assure success, instead of failure, in the business enterprises of manhood. And these habits of correct observance of forms of politeness, of neatness and order, prepare the way for a conscious application of the principles upon which such habits depend.

The importance of correct early training in the family is well illustrated by reference to the testimony contained in the biographies of useful and distinguished men and women. What is learned, either of good or bad, in the first years of a child's life, is with difficulty unlearned. As largely as heredity may enter, the success, or failure, of many lives has depended upon the direction of thought and will taken in the years of childhood.

The relationships of the family involve the mutual

yielding of selfish interests. The husband gives his time and attention from engrossing business or professional pursuits, that he may contribute to the welfare and enjoyment of the household. The wife, with careful foresight, anticipates the wants of those depending upon her skill and wise management of household affairs, and so orders the internal arrangements of the home that peace and order prevail, and that an atmosphere of rest may at all times be found.

The child, in the home, learns to divide his personal possessions with his brothers and sisters. From early days habits of altruism are rendering easier the task of living "not for self" in the years of more active life. In the collision of wills in the household, the one can not assert all his own peculiarities and particular wishes. One must learn to respect the rights and privileges of others. So necessary is it that children should be trained in contact with each other, that it is often a misfortune to be the only child of a household. Habits of association in work and play form a most valuable preparation for the larger associations necessary in social, business, and political life.

As childhood's days beget certain claims of the children upon the parents, and certain obligations by the parents from the children, so does the relationship of adult life bring with it reciprocal duties and rights between brothers and sisters, and parents and children. The love and care bestowed by parents upon the children in their years of infancy and helplessness, must now be returned, with the same tender interest. Family love, although it may degenerate into a kind of affection not prompted by the highest motives, yet, with all its



incomplete and imperfect manifestations, is the most beautiful type of that larger love which includes and infolds all created objects.

The kindly spirit and loving thoughtfulness for others shown in the home, are the same in kind as the love which any person, in sympathy with humanity, feels for even the meanest and humblest human being. The family affection has an element of spontaneity that the broader affection may lack, yet the interest and sympathy, that makes all men akin, have their roots in thoughts that are the same in their nature, though less intense in their manifestation, as those shown in a well-regulated family.

## SECTION II.

### PRINCIPLE OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

A glance at the historical development of the family will show that great advancement has been made in respect to many features of family relationship. For the "beginning of the family" there has been much investigation and many different conclusions. There are two theories that have superseded many minor phases of opinion, and each is substantiated by good authority: either the primal form of the family was communistic, after the order of the group system, or there has been from the beginning some sort of a family arrangement, although the primitive forms were without the legal sanctions of the present.\* One of the most recent authorities in support of the family arrangement is Westermarck: "Neither do I see any

\*As it is only necessary, in considering the ethical phases of the family, to discover the general principle of development, the historical discussion is limited to a few points useful for illustration.

reason to believe that there ever was a time when the family was quite absorbed in the tribe. There does not exist a single well established instance of a people among whom this is the case." \*

Marriage has often had its basis in religious rites and ceremonies. The forms of household worship have been various, and among many tribes and peoples ancestral worship has held a prominent place. This religious element of worship, and the desire to perpetuate the race, are the main reasons for marriage among the peoples who maintain tribal and patriarchal relations, or, in general, among the Semitic peoples. "Marriage thus grows out of the family, rather than the family out of marriage." In the patriarchal family the father, chief, or head of the family, occupies the place of respect and esteem. The wife—or wives—occupies a position of inferiority little better than that of slavery. The household drudgery, as well as the bearing and the rearing of the children, falls upon her. The object of the family relation is that a son may be born, and the birth of a daughter is regarded as a calamity.

This lowest kind of a family falls far short of the "ideal family"; yet even a condition of society in which slavery exists shows the elements of altruism. The dependence of the slave, or wife, upon the master, or head of the household, and the sense of protection and ownership on the part of the husband, show, in an imperfect manner, that the welfare of even one member of the lowest of the human race is closely connected with that of others, and the forced assistance and forms of helpfulness are the mechanical ways of ministering

\*The History of Human Marriage, p. 50: Edward Westermarck.

to the good of others, that with greater enlightenment become the spontaneous acts of a watchful affection.

The relationships of the Aryan household are of a higher order. Polygamy is not so often found as among the Asiatic people. In Greece there was still wanting the spirit that desired equality in the apportionment of rights and duties among the members of the family. The subordination of the wife to the whims and caprices of the husband made hers a position of degradation. But the fact that lofty ideals existed, at least in theory, shows that the higher conception of personality found among the Greeks would eventually become reflected in social and family arrangements. The Platonic ideal of education for the daughter did not find full realization until many centuries after its conception, and the ethical element, exhibited in the real family life of the Greeks, showed only those phases already indicated; "obedience to authority" indicates the ethical relations of the family of this period.

In the Roman world the position of the wife in the family received a definite legal recognition. The religious character, as regards the rites and ceremonies with which the marriage ceremony was solemnized, was similar to that of Greece. With the degeneracy of the people, the adoption of luxurious ways of living, and the increase of immorality, the central position of the family, as an institution of society, was lost. Unbridled license and corruption were features that wrought the destruction of the sacred ties of the family. Even the legal position of the wife, in reference to rights of property and children, did not remain intact. But in

this adoption of legal forms, in reference to the family relations, the Roman world furnished an element of great value. The content of these forms was received from other sources, when the thought of the nations had developed sufficiently to recognize an ethical principle more inclusive than that of fixed laws, whose essence had departed with the decaying spirit of a powerful nation.

The conquering barbarians were, in respect to their idea of the family, superior to the Romans. The spirit of freedom and equality that is characteristic of the Teutonic peoples, shows itself strongly in their conceptions of family life. The desire for warfare and conquest rendered the barbarian strong and aggressive. The ability to bear arms fixed the status of the members of the household. The gentler virtues were left uncultivated, but as the basis of recognition was placed on the ground of personal individual activity, there was inserted a principle that, in the succeeding centuries, showed results in accordance with the ideal life of the family.

The teachings of Christ gave to woman a definite social position. And as the position of the family, to a large degree, is indicated, in an historical glance, by the position of woman, we should expect to find a corresponding improvement in the family. The adoption of spiritual influences and conceptions of principles capable of the highest practical expansion and exemplification has ever been the work of time. The lofty ethical principles uttered by Christ fell upon unwilling ears, and hearts and minds rendered callous by the hard fixed customs of centuries. The family idea among the

Jews had been absorbed into the national idea, and the spirit of individual personal responsibility taught by Christ could be comprehended only to a slight degree. The change from the method of life governed by "law" to that of government by "principles," was a step that the unreflecting minds of the mass of the people could not immediately take.

The thoughtful experiments at adjustment of family and social relations, in all the centuries that have succeeded the enunciation of the ethical principles of the beginning of our era, have tended to show the superiority of the Gospel ethics to those of any other ethical or religious system. The definite commands and minute exactions found in the family regulations of patriarchal families and nations, as that of China and India, and the spirit of subordination inculcated, as in the family of Greece, and even the legal equality, however important, found in the family of the Roman nation, are essentially lacking, without the possibility of free individual self-determination made a factor in the development of the family by the ethics of Christianity.

The immediate results of the Christian principle of preference of reflected good for immediate good, are not readily seen; and, therefore, the positive commands and fixed regulations of such religions as Buddhism and Mohammedism are regarded as of more "ethical" value than the religion of Jesus of Nazareth. But a wicked act, done freely and reflectingly, gives more promise of eventual conquest over the weaknesses of the flesh than many correct acts done from mere obedience to authority of priest or civil officer.

The early church, in striving to live the precepts and

principles established by Christ, gave to woman a recognition of personality and individuality that she had not before received. But the canon law, emphasizing the sacramental nature of marriage, gradually narrowed the legal rights of women received through the Roman law; and the perverted ideas of the church, in reference to the celibacy of the clergy, farther corrupted and destroyed family relations. The feudal system also produced a condition of dependence and servitude not unlike that of the patriarchal family. In short, during the middle ages, the family, as also the other institutions of society, was preparing for changes that should make evident the principles of evolution and freedom that were slowly but surely transforming society.

The reformation was but a deeper recognition of the principle of personal independence and the right of private judgment, enunciated as an ethical and spiritual truth by Christ, and as an ethical and philosophical truth by Socrates. The family again becomes an acknowledged "social unity." "One of the first blows struck by the reformers was levelled against the rule of requiring a celibate clergy, a rule which Luther characterized as angelical in appearance, but devilish in reality, and invented by Satan as a fertile source of sin and perdition. The importance of this step, in its effect upon the family, can hardly be realized in our age. This requirement of the church had made virtue a byword throughout Europe, and the change, which gave a pure family life to the clergy, made possible a pure family life to the laity."\*

\*The Family: an Historical and Social Study, p. 82: C. F. Thwing and Carrie F. Butler Thwing.

But as any principle carried to the extreme reaches its opposite, so the principle of individuality and private rights in family relations has overreached itself, and the nineteenth century again witnesses a threatened destruction of family bonds and a consequent dissolution of all that is best and holiest in society. The absolute ideal of complete self-development in and through others has not been reached in the family, nor, indeed, in any institution of society, and the attempt to adjust private personal rights to those of others will always be attended with more or less struggling and friction; the amount of collision depends upon the just and keen insight into the possible adjustment of social relations, and upon the willingness of one to yield merely personal advantage for the good of the others, in securing the true self-development of all.

Instead of Aristotle's "social unity" in the family, in this century the individual has become the center and end of all activity, organized and unorganized. The idea of personality as true individuality has degenerated into that of individualism, and, as such, has been a destructive agency in church, state, and family. While marriage was a *sacramentum*, valid only as sanctioned by priests and clergy, the question of family duties was uppermost for consideration; now that marriage has become largely a civil contract, the question of "rights" in the marriage relation is separated, and almost estranged, from its correlative "duties." The spirit of individualism has become reflected in the laws of state and country, and there is thus placed about the family an environment of a disintegrating, rather than of a unifying, character. The varying, and sometimes

contradictory, marriage and divorce laws of the different states and territories of our own country, form a part of these conditions unfavorable to family unity at this present time.

The present great diversity in the marriage and divorce laws of our own country, is graphically put in Thwing's "The Family" (pp. 173-175), where it is sought to inquire concerning the legal status of wives and children when marriages are sanctioned by different states, as Indiana, California, and New York, and the divorce laws of one or another of these states are used to dissolve the marriage ties of the others. The result is confusion in regard to the rights of property and of children. One remedy suggested (p. 176) is the amendment of the Constitution of the United States. "The fourth subdivision of the eighth section of the first article might well be so amended as to read: 'Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subjects of bankruptcies, *marriage*, and *divorce*, throughout the United States.'

The recent report of Hon. Carroll D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, has intensified the interest in the investigation of the subject of "marriage and divorce," and especially awakened a desire to learn the causes for the alarming increase in the divorce rate. "The increase [in the United States] of divorce, relative to married couples, may be stated in a single sentence. In 1870 there were 155 divorces to 100,000 couples; in 1880, 203. This indicates the degree in which the divorces are gaining on the population. . . . The increase of divorce in this country has at length



attracted attention and study. Its progress for the past twenty years has been marked out. During that time the current has been rising steadily and rapidly. . . . As marriages may end by two means, death and divorce, the simplest method of estimating the future growth of the latter is by comparing the divorces with the total terminations of marriage. Mr. Wright states (p. 185) that the average duration of married life in the United States, until ended by death, may be assumed to be about twenty-four years. Then the annual number of terminations of marriage by death may be considered one-twenty-fourth of the number of couples. On this basis, it is found that of the total of 314,350 terminations of marriage in this country in 1870, 96½ per cent. were by death and 3½ per cent. by divorce. In 1880 the percentage of divorces was 4.8, and in 1890 probably about 6.2. . . . At the end of one hundred years of increase, like the last twenty, more marriages would end by divorce than by death. It is obvious that this would involve a fundamental alteration in the nature of the institution. . . . Thus far the progress of divorce has suffered no check. On the contrary, its rate has slightly accelerated. The second quinquennial increased over the first, 27.9 per cent.; the third over the second, 30.3 per cent.; the fourth over the third, 31.4 per cent. It is not claimed that such a computation has much value as determining the future. The elements are too varying and ill-determined to give good basis for a prediction." \*

That there is this apparent destruction of the family as an institution, shows that, when taken in its histor-

\*The Divorce Problem. A Study in Statistics: pp. 19, 20. Walter Francis Wilcox, Ph. D.

ical connection, the change in the ideal of the sanctity of the marriage bond, or, in other words, that marriage is simply a legal contract, has had much influence in forming marriage and divorce laws, and in increasing the ease with which a divorce is obtained, by multiplying the number of grounds, and has, in consequence, had much to do with the increase in the rate of divorce.

Progress, through freedom, is undoubtedly the watchword in establishing ideal family relations, as in other social relations. There can be no return to the days of subjection and servitude of one member of the family to another, neither can the exacting requirements of canon law be again enforced. The National Reform Divorce League has an opportunity to achieve ethical results in the attempt to secure uniform marriage and divorce laws in the several states and territories of the Union. By requiring greater publicity to marriage contracts, and by reducing the number of causes for which divorces can be obtained, a more hopeful state of family relations may be secured. The requirement of more witnesses to the marriage ceremony than is now required in some states, would prevent many unpropitious marriages, and a strict, definite, and uniform limitation to the number of causes for granting a divorce would assist parties already married to recover from a temporary fit of anger, jealousy, or spite, and so to continue in the married state, in perhaps as comfortable a frame of mind as would be possessed under other circumstances.

But while "laws" assist in establishing favorable conditions for institutional life in society, these laws can

not do more than reflect the condition of the thought, or public opinion of the times. This public opinion generally represents the thought of the minority, as far as numbers are concerned; but as this minority usually shows the highest point ethically to which society has advanced, this expression in laws, in reference to marriage and divorce, requires those of lower ideals, in respect to the family, to conform in their acts,—though not necessarily in spirit,—to the higher ideals of the few who have perhaps stronger thought in seeing the importance of the family as a holy institution.

The spirit of individualism that has shown itself so powerfully, and, in many cases, so disastrously, in the institutions of society for the last century or more, has so many times overreached itself, that the necessity of combination and association in various forms has been more and more clearly seen for the last twenty-five years. No form of union shows the necessity of a true spirit of coöperation more than that of the marriage union. The parties have voluntarily entered the contract. The spirit of those thus agreeing, “for better or for worse,” determines whether the marriage covenant is a “sacramentum,” or an unholy bond. Where the marriage-union is for the highest purpose, for the establishment of a home in which there shall be peace and righteousness, and the necessary correlative of these, right-living, the condition of the laws relating to marriage and the state of the divorce courts is of comparatively little importance. The spirit of true love, and sympathy and helpfulness in a home, renders that home above the merely restraining influences of law. The law of kindness is a law unto itself, overleaping merely

formal requirements, and reaching out for perfect communion and activity in all of the home relations.

The desire for private rights and the expression of individuality has developed in various directions. Among many specific causes given for the disintegration of the family, during the last part of the present century, is that of the "higher education of women." The attitude of independence that woman is enabled to hold, because of her educational and industrial emancipation, changes necessarily the relations of husband and wife. No longer compelled to marry in order to obtain a livelihood, many fear that women will be unwilling to enter the marriage relation, and so the family lose its fundamental place as an institution.

As the opportunity for full collegiate and university education for women is so recent, the attempt at compilation of statistics showing the per cent. of "college women" who have married, is of little value. And even more than twenty-five years more must elapse before any very reliable figures upon the subject can be obtained. But in this question the "must be's" have as much, if not more, force than the "has been's." Woman and man each has, fundamentally, different characteristics, and any rational process of training will still preserve those differences. The qualities of one will always supplement and supply the deficiencies of the other. Whatever may be the theorizing on the subject, and the fears of the influence of industrial equality and possible ambition for personal aggrandizement on the part of woman, no amount of education will keep a woman from loving the man who approaches her ideal in his intellectual and spiritual qual-

ities. And a marriage, based upon a corresponding degree of development in the masculine and the feminine mind, can but give an opportunity for an exemplification of a higher ethical principle than that based upon obedience and servitude, or upon self-interest and the desire for material prosperity.

And if circumstances do not bring together the co-ordinately developed man and woman into the marriage union, the women of education, instead of becoming cross and sour "old maids," become important productive factors in the industrial world, and by entering in full sympathy into the varied relations, — industrial, educational, religious, and social, — of society, assist in bringing society to the realization of a higher ideal than would have been possible as uneducated women.

Our hasty survey of the development of the family historically, enforces the leading thought educed in the consideration of what the family "ought to be." We have seen that, as the spirit of subjection of one member of the family by another, and of supposed superiority, has given place to an acknowledgement that the attributes and personality of each, — husband and wife, — though different, are the one neither inferior nor superior to the other, a higher ideal for the family has been reached. This spirit of freedom and willingness to recognize the essential equality one in the other, has seen a higher realization in some epochs than in others. However obscured at times, the periods of nearest approach to ideal relations in the home have been those periods when each of the family has sought self-development through the development of others; and the conclusion must be that there can be a perma-

nent development of right and true family life, only where there is a reciprocity of rights and responsibilities, and that this advance will be indicated by a higher development in every phase of institutional life.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE SCHOOL A MINOR INSTITUTION.

**ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER:** *Section I*, Nature of the School: The Kindergarten; The educational value of mathematics; Of Geography; Of History; Of Literature; Of Grammar; Manual Training; The High School and College; The University and other Schools; The child learns obedience in the school; He learns to co-operate with others.

*Section II*, Illustrations, showing historical development of the School; Epochs in History of Education; Changes in systems of education; Early attempts in establishing institutions of learning; Compulsory education; The School, the State, and the Church.

### SECTION I.

#### NATURE OF THE SCHOOL.

The child shows tendencies that ally him to the animal creation, and at the same time he shows himself capable of rising above the brute instincts. The making over of the outside world into his own thought begins conspicuously when the child is able to talk. When he is able, as he is in learning his mother-tongue, to represent classes of objects by words, he then can enter into the thoughts of those about him. The child, by this ability to use language, is lifted above the brute creation, and in this power he shows his capability of education. The outside world may be conquered in another way than by mere feeling or sensation. The child can think; that is, he can form of the outside world of nature and of man concepts that are an adequate expression, in his consciousness, of a world of activity, forces, things, and events. The

real world becomes to the human being the ideal world, but in becoming ideal, this world that thought cognizes, is the world true to reality. And each step of advancement in the education of the child, youth, and man, reveals deeper truth and more wonderful harmony in the universe.

The family is the institution in which this educational process is begun; the school, the institution in which it is continued, and in this the child and youth is prepared for the larger life and thought and work of manhood. The school is, therefore, an institution different from the family, and the state, and the church: it is an institution supplementary to these greater and more important institutions. The assistance rendered to the individual by the school is desirable, but not necessary. The help more conveniently, and, perhaps, more adequately, given by the school, might be obtained from one or more of the other institutions of society, or privately from one individual by another. But the school, in all its grades from the kindergarten to the university and professional school, is an arrangement to facilitate the work of education of the human being, that he may be fitted to unite with others in society and to help others to realize a broader experience.

Education, in its widest sense, is the development of all the potentialities of the human mind through union with others in all the institutions of society, but in the narrower sense, it is the training during the period of childhood and youth for the work and responsibilities of manhood.

Not one phase only of the mind of the child must be educated, but the mind with all its powers — the intel-



lect, the emotions, and the will, each developed in its own particular way, and yet all the unfolding potentialities blended as one harmonious whole. Each person, with his own particular characteristics, demands peculiar opportunities for the determination of his own special bent and inclination. Yet, as the essential elements of personality are the same for all minds, there are many steps in the educational process that should be the same, or similar, for all minds. For the accomplishment of the general education of the child and youth, while the details and the methods vary from decade to decade, substantially the same means have been used for centuries. The disciplinary and culture studies of the Greeks are essentially those of to-day. The "windows of the soul" must be opened; the child must become acquainted with nature, organic and inorganic, and with man in all his social relations.

Much of the effectiveness of the school training depends upon the care and thoroughness with which the early home lessons have been taught. The intelligent mother of the present day may be greatly aided by the painstaking observations of Professor Preyer and others, in her efforts to give her little one proper opportunities in which to exercise his self-activity, in the development of the "five senses," the attention, the will in walking, in the discovery of itself as cause, and of its power of imitation, which has its greatest significance in the ability to learn and to use words.

The kindergarten is designed to continue the instruction of the home. That the child may develop freely in the exercise of his own directed energy, many of the requirements are put in the form of play

and amusement. Work and play are so interwoven that the end of this stage of instruction is kept in view;—that the child may obtain ideas of form, size, color, etc.; that he may begin the process of directing his own efforts, preparatory for the required studies of the primary grades, and that he may learn to associate with others.

The studies of the common school introduce the child to the two worlds, the world of nature and the world of man. The study of the three R's, and of geography, history, grammar, literature and science, is the best method of accomplishing this purpose. The "common-school" studies, when supplemented by the "practice" derived from manual training, furnish the means for the beginning of a symmetrical development of the mind of the child.

From the early education to the later, the aim should be to emancipate the child from direct assistance and instruction by others, and to teach him to obtain his ideas from the printed page. Oral instruction is necessary for the beginnings of school life, but it is only a means to an end—the cultivation of the power in the youth to seek knowledge from books and to obtain wisdom from the experiences of others.

By learning to read and write the child may gain the experience of the human race. "In mathematics man beholds not merely a few data of sense-perception, but the universal conditions of all sense-perception. The laws of quantity, as formulated in arithmetic, geometry, and the calculus, give us the logical conditions of the existence of all matter and all motion; not only all that exists, but all that may or can exist. . . . The

mathematical province of letters reveals to the child the realm of man's victory over nature, because, having invented mathematics, it is only a question of detail — 'divide and conquer' — to subdue all nature.

"Then comes geography, lifting a curtain and showing the child his race divided into peoples and nations round the globe, all working at something that he himself needs, and the spectacle of the world-commerce bringing to him over all seas the desired articles.

"Then there is history, lifting another curtain and showing the doings of man in the past. Man reveals human nature by his actions. Each one reveals to himself a small fragment of human nature, but he does not know much of human nature till he looks into history; for history reveals the higher self of man, as organized in institutions. For the first time man comes to know his substantial self when he comes to study history. His little self beholds his colossal self.

"Then there is literature, which shows in its prose and poetry the collisions which individuals have made with institutions—Macbeth and Othello, Paris and Helen, Œdipus and Faust. It completes for us the revelation of human nature, and, more than all other studies, is humanizing and civilizing. The school initiates the child into this realm through the intense bursts of impassioned prose and poetry that the school readers contain, showing in these all the varieties of style to be mastered and how to master them; how to ascend from the mere colloquial vocabulary, which the child brings with him from the family, to the literary styles adequate to express deep thought or fine shades of emotion.

“The school also makes a study of language in itself—it teaches grammar, the most difficult of all school studies, and the most educative of subtle powers of thought. . . . To study the grammar and vocabulary of a language is to gain an insight into the structure of soul itself, and, at the same time, to gauge the spiritual development of the people who spoke it. Even the smattering of grammar taught in schools has the great educative effect of turning the mind of the pupil inward, so far as to seize definitions and classify words by the meaning that they have. It is a study of the effect which form has upon the meaning of words. Moreover, a training in grammar gives one the power, to some extent, of discriminating the accidental from the substantial—a training which fits the mind to enter successfully other fields of subtle thought.”\*

There may be room for a difference of opinion in reference to the educational value of manual training. But any one who has observed the attitude of many of our high school graduates, must be impressed that something has been omitted in the training of these youth. The general cynical air, and the aversion to any kind of hand-work, and the air of satisfaction with a “completed” education, suggests the idea that the youth of our schools need the kind of discipline that comes from giving a limited and definite amount of time, during the years of perhaps the grammar and high school grades, to some form of industrial or manual training. The chief object of this training is its educational aspect—that the child and youth may become familiar with the use of tool, machine, material, ingredient, etc.;

\* *The Psychology of Manual Training*, p. 13, pp. 15-18: W. T. Harris.

that he may learn that "work" demands the use of the brain as well as the hand, and that he may realize that the dividing line between worthy and unworthy does not depend upon the fact whether the person is a so-called brain worker or a "toiler with the hands." While it is not desirable that the boys and girls should learn any kind of trade in the common school, yet if some of the fastidious notions of the youth upon graduation from the high school at the present day, could be removed by the supplementary work of manual training in our public schools, there would result fewer criminals from the list of our high school graduates and students; and there would be, instead, a band of youth stronger, physically, mentally, and morally, and these better prepared to take up the duties of active life or of higher education, more loyal to their country, more in sympathy with humanity, and more ready to coöperate with others in all worthy undertakings.

The studies of the high school, and other secondary, or preparatory schools, are necessarily taken in such a manner that the subjects pursued are each independent of the other. Chemistry, history, literature, etc., appear to the student, each as a subject isolated from all the others, and one study of as great value as another. For the stage of development of the mind at this period of life, it is undoubtedly logical that the studies be pursued in that manner; but the object of the training, and education, and culture of the college is different. The studies of the college course are seen in their relation one to the other. The mind begins to grasp the idea of the "oneness" of all knowledge. This "comparative" study, that the work of the college demands,

can not as well be done by any other school. If the college adopts too extensively university methods, and the students are allowed to specialize too early, there result men whose education will be lacking in many essential elements of breadth and culture. For the all-round education and culture that the majority of men and women need as a preparation for home, business, or professional life, the college, and distinctively the American college, affords an opportunity that can not be dispensed with, without great loss to the strength and culture of the coming generations.

The university, with its large opportunity for elective studies, affords the facilities for individual special work and research. The technical schools, the normal schools, professional schools, and schools of music and art, supplement the culture courses of the college, and fit for the work preferred by each, according to the individual tastes. There are also military and naval schools, training for special service for the government of the country. The so-called secular education does not give opportunity for special religious instruction, and there are, therefore, Sunday-schools and schools established to give instruction in particular denominational directions, and also the theological seminaries, which are really professional schools.

And, at the present time, one sees a great increase in the opportunities for home study, which is of the same nature as the school training. Local circles for improvement in one or more branches abound, national organizations, such as the Chautauqua; and of recent advent, University Extension work. Added to these specialized means of education are the newspaper,

with its literary articles, its reports of progress in art, architecture, and music, besides the accounts of the events of the world, the magazines and cheap forms of much excellent literature—these instruments of education and culture exceed those of any other epoch, and present opportunities for the mental development of all members of society.

The end of all education is to lead the growing mind to a deeper and deeper acquaintance with the world of nature and the world of man. In this process of learning that which is external to the self, the mind becomes more and more conscious of the self and the powers of the mind that may as yet exist only in potentiality. The child and youth develop characteristics that are especially his own, and very soon he may show a desire to force his own wishes and peculiarities upon those about him. The school is, therefore, designed to assist the child and youth in curbing his selfish desires, that they may not encroach upon the rights and privileges of those with whom he associates. The child must restrain his desire to talk and play, and in the necessity of the quiet required for successful work in the school-room he learns self-control. And, in the necessity of order and regularity for the performance of school duties, there must be unquestioning obedience on the part of the pupil.

The form of coöperation in work and play, and the discipline in quiet and order, and obedience demanded for success in the common school, is an important stage in the process of the formation of habits that are voluntarily continued in the later stages of the educational process. The formation of such habits as are conducive

to a successful working with others, is the continuance of the altruistic habits of the family life. With the necessary subordination of the will to rightful authority, and with many opportunities for sharing with companions and playmates pleasant and unpleasant experiences, the child is learning to think of the good of others along with his own. He is learning to receive his good from others, instead of the immediate good, which often proves to be a detriment in its secondary effects. The almost unconscious habits of altruism formed by the child and youth, prepare the young man for a ready grasp of the principles upon which society is founded, and lead to an insight into the reciprocal relations of himself and his fellow-men.

## SECTION II.

### ILLUSTRATIONS SHOWING HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOL.

The family, in its historical development, shows, as we have seen, that the times of nearest approach to an ideal condition, have been when the principle of altruism has been most fully exemplified; likewise, that the school, as a voluntary organization, owes its eras of special progress to the labor and self-denial of earnest men and women, may be seen from a few illustrations.

Rozenkranz divides the epochs in educational progress into National education, Theocratic education and Human education.\* National education is represented by China and India where the end of the education of the individual is for the perpetuation of the state which is really the family-state. Such education compels the

\* *Philosophy of Education, Third Part: International Education Series.*



individual to give his attention to minute details and enforces an obedience that allows no scope for the expression of personality. Persia, Egypt, Greece and early Rome, in their general educational ideas represent modifications of this idea of the subordination of the individual to the nation. The Theocratic education is represented by the Hebrews and later Rome. Authority is not less respected than in the National education, but the authority is conceived as above and over nature, and God is regarded as the Supreme Being, the source of all knowledge and power.

Education from the standpoint of Christianity, is "Human," that is, the individual is taught that self-education is the highest kind of education. The human education inculcates the idea of freedom, and according to Rozenkranz, may be divided into "monastic, chivalric and citizen." With Comenius, and the rise of the German universities, education takes the form of "schools." The Monastic idea of education, valuable though it may have been for a certain period of history, in its exclusion of some of humanity from the participation in the whole, failed to teach a most fundamental thought of the structure of society. Chivalry failed in that the basis of activity was sentiment rather than strong reason.

Education since the sixteenth century shows a gradual evolution. The two forms that characterized the early humanitarian education were Jesuitism and Pietism; the former the form of education of the Roman church, the latter that of the Protestant.

The reaction from the excessive study of Latin and Greek found in the "gymnasia" of Germany led to the

introduction of studies that are considered more useful in getting a living — “mathematics, physics, geography, history, and the modern languages — reality studies.”

The names, Pestalozzi and Froebel, and of Horace Mann in our own country, stand as representative of epochs of change and reaction from old ideals in the period of “free education.” The introduction of new ideas as to the methods of education, shows the same historical process as changes in affairs of church and state. The man of large insight and practical zeal sees the possibility of a better method, or of a better way of using the systems already in use, and he devotes his life to the introduction of the ideas that may seem wholly unmeaning to his contemporaries. The opposition that occasions him much labor and yielding of immediate ease and pleasure may lead the educational reformer to put forth greater efforts to place the “new education” in a more favorable light. The opponents of the present in the life of the educational prophet may become the warm advocate of twenty years later. Nevertheless, the courage and self-sacrifice of the originator of the “new ideas” were necessary to bring about the change and advancement.

The nineteenth century has witnessed greater progress in citizen or free education than any preceding century. Ideas and plans and systems that had a beginning a century or more ago may now be seen in their maturity, and indeed perhaps surpassing in strength and utility the highest hopes of the originators. A few details of the beginning of the history of the two now largest universities in the country will

make clear the thought, that extraordinary labor and self-sacrifice are necessary to arouse public sentiment and to excite interest sufficient to bring about changes even in reference to what would seem to commend itself directly to the interest of each one, the education of the youth.

The early efforts in our own country in establishing schools and colleges illustrate the necessity of toil and sacrifice of ease and possessions to prepare the way for those that should follow, and to give to them privileges of education denied to our forefathers. Very early in the history of the Massachusetts settlers was there provision made for schools of lower and of higher grades. As early as 1636, "the General Court of Massachusetts agreed to give the munificent sum of \$400 towards the founding of a school or college." That it meant privation and the denial of the gratification of many personal wants, may be seen from the nature of the gifts; and the general interest in the new college is known from the fact that all the families of the surrounding colonies sent in their contributions to give the struggling institution a lift. "Connecticut gave annually the value of a peck of wheat for every family. In Massachusetts, they gave what they could best spare. With some, it was a cow, or sheep, or corn, or salt; with others, a piece of cloth, or silver plate — a tankard, goblet, or some other treasured heirloom of the family." \*

The gift of Rev. John Harvard of about £800 and his excellent library of 320 volumes, rendered possible the immediate organization of Harvard College in

\* History of Higher Education in Massachusetts, p. 48: G. G. Bush. Bureau of Education publication, No. 13.

1638, and thus, according to President Quincy, made the "noblest and purest tribute to religion and science this western world had yet witnessed."

Although two hundred years later and at a time when the material resources of the country had much increased, yet the history of the University of Michigan shows that the gratification of merely personal desires and wants absorbs the time and money of so large a proportion of the people of a community, that heroic acts in economy and self-denial on the part of a few are necessary to bring about the opportunities for the progress of the whole and to provide for the needs of the coming generations. The University of Michigan dates from 1817, in accordance with "An Act of the Legislature to establish the Catholepistemiad, or University of Michigania."\* Even the Indians shared in the desire for education and granted "six sections of land for purposes of education." "Judge Cooley in his "Michigan" has compared the generosity of the Indians to that of Nicholas Brown, Elihu Yale, and John Harvard, and the comparison, if we judge by the amount given and not by the sacrifice implied, is to the advantage of the untutored savage."† The story of the struggles and at times apparent failure of the new University is long, and tells of many to whom much is due for the interest and support given to the University, but among those who labored, no one was more able and efficient than Rev. John D. Pierce. "'Henry Barnard,' says President Angell, 'did no more for the schools of Rhode Island, nor Horace Mann for those of

\* History of Higher Education in Michigan: Andrew C. McLaughlin, Bureau of Education publication, No. 11.

† Ibid p. 20.

Massachusetts, than John D. Pierce did for those of Michigan.'” The act of the legislature, March 18, 1837, embodied the results of his study of the educational institutions of the East and with new features especially adapted to a new state, the University from that time had a more secure foundation.

The early attempts at the establishment of schools of a higher grade for women show the same process. In founding for women the first “chartered” institution that has had a continued existence, Mary Lyon showed a zeal and valor that may well place her name among those who have been pioneers in the work of higher education. Her aim was to grant to women opportunities for education equal to those enjoyed by men in the colleges of the country. The idea of co-education existed in germ in the first act establishing the University of Michigan, but was not carried out practically until 1870.

What is known as “compulsory education” is seemingly the opposite in principle to the spirit of kindness and interest manifested in the thoughtfulness of those who have labored that the future generations may have opportunities for the highest education. Yet compulsory education is but the voice of the state directing and commanding those who have not the desire and spontaneous activity to secure for themselves a limited amount of the opportunities for a preparation for active participation in the work and interests of society. It would seem that each family would be sufficiently interested in the welfare of its children to secure the privileges of public school education; but the immediate good of the material things that the

labor of the children can bring, outweighs in their estimation, the possible future good that may come from the capability of their children in higher kinds of work, and the satisfaction of a larger life secured through an education. Therefore the state rightfully prescribes the minimum of time that children shall attend school, and in doing this simply exemplifies its prerogative in the sphere of justice. That is, the state only gives to the child what is due the child and what the parents would grant to the child, except as ignorant and selfish motives hinder,—the right to develop all his powers and to become as strong a personality as possible.

The state as the all-inclusive unity is the guardian of all the interests of the members. It can therefore speak with authority in reference to the education of children and youth. Mere self-preservation would lead to the establishment of schools of various kinds and grades, and the farther thought, that not only the continuance of the state is necessary, but the growth and prosperity and fulfillment of a righteous destiny depends upon the strength, character and patriotism of all the citizens. Only as children are taught the principles of a free democratic government will there be men and women who are true American citizens; and only as children and youth are taught the principles that underlie the unity and solidarity of the whole human race will there be world-citizens. As a state through the thought of its leaders recognizes a higher and higher ideal for the nation, the educational opportunities will become greater, and no check will be placed upon the expenditure of time and money except that of expediency, i. e., not until the point

is reached when the individual is prevented from putting forth effort for himself because of help from the state.

The most perplexing question of the present time in reference to the relation that the state should sustain to schools, is that of parochial schools; or in fact, the relation of the school, the state, and the church. Since there will always remain the difference between a motive and its accompanying act, and simply a thought or motive unexpressed in word or act, there will always remain a difference in the sphere of the state and the church. And while the work of educating may be done by the state or the church, or by both, yet the distinction of the sphere of each must be regarded or there results the confusion of earlier centuries. The state can in no way grant aid for education to any denomination or sect whose chief object is to inculcate certain creeds and doctrines, without to a degree becoming accessory to that instruction and therefore becoming a teacher of specific religious tenets. Also the state has the right to demand that the instruction in sectarian and private schools shall be equally as good as that given and required in the public schools, and that no facts or principles be taught that shall in any way be destructive of a spirit of loyalty to the government and country or subversive of the highest principles of morality.

While the state can not be what is popularly styled a "religious teacher," yet it can and should provide teachers whose characters and influence are in the truest sense religious. And for the earnest teacher, one whose thoughts and life are in harmony with the

highest thoughts of a Divine world-order, there are numberless opportunities of teaching truths that are the most truly and deeply moral and religious. In the teaching of the child and youth, every lesson may be made an opportunity for teaching truth, obedience, honesty, generosity and love to playmates and fellow-students, and for teaching love and patriotism to native country, respect and reverence to parents and to God, and sympathy and charity for all mankind.



## CHAPTER VI.

THE STATE,\* AS A MORAL PERSONALITY, PROTECTS THE INDIVIDUAL, AND ALSO SECURES TO THE INDIVIDUAL THE OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL SELF-DEVELOPMENT.

ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER: *Section I*, Nature of the State and general lines of State action: A nation an organic unity; The unity of purpose determines the size of a nation; Freedom the underlying thought of development; All rights consistent with personality are natural; The nation specifies the positive rights; Historical development in the expression of rights of the individual; Law expresses the rights of members of society; The process by which rights constructive of individuality are gained; The State or Nation is for the expression of justice; The problem for the State; Three attitudes presented to the individual; True socialism involves both justice and grace; Progress in the institutions of society reflected in the laws of the State; Two standpoints in studying the ethical phases of legislation; Classes of laws; Many rights defined in the United States Constitution; Protective Laws; Illustrations of fundamental constructive laws, taxation, private ownership of property, contract; Illustrations of special constructive laws, "two houses of Congress," basis of representation, religious freedom, freedom of the press, laws in reference to education, poor-laws, prison reformatory laws, establishment of commissions, boards of arbitration, etc., laws establishing conditions of industry, as factory-laws, railroad legislation, and laws in reference to agriculture.

*Section II*, There are limits to wise State-action — (A) There may be too much legislation, even in the beneficial lines: Government must not take away the right of existence; Nor right of contract and ownership; Government must not interfere with the right of belief, nor with the expression of opinion; Class-legislation unethical — (B) In many relations of society, assistance from other than protective laws, and those needful for "legal organization," is

\*The thoughts as to the character of the State are largely obtained from Mulford's "The Nation," and from writers in agreement with him.

unnecessary: Range of motives in business relations; Economic and ethical acts; Self-interest; The "economic man," the "ethical man," and the "practical man"; Illustrations, as "demand and supply," "market," "consumer's wealth," "production," including agriculture, manufactures, and natural monopolies, and "distribution," including capital and wages; Direction of progress.

*Section III*, The Administration of Law: Law expresses a mode of activity; A crime; The executive officers; The initiative in the enforcement of law; Duty of the official; An alternative open to the private individual; Lawyers sometimes accessory "after the fact"; The Judiciary interprets and applies the laws.

*Section IV*, The Ethical Principle in Social Relations: "Movements" in society; Civil service reform; Woman's suffrage; Intemperance a social evil; Social purity; The "Servant" question.

## SECTION I.

### NATURE OF THE STATE; AND GENERAL LINES OF STATE ACTION.

A nation is not a mere aggregation of individuals, but a conscious moral personality. The conscious life of a nation is continuous; the unity of its organic structure becomes more evident from generation to generation. A nation is all-inclusive; all members of society are in the organic unity. While a nation is in the child-stage of development, a rude, savage, wandering people, the unity of thought is manifested on very low planes, a union sufficient to provide in a meager way for the physical needs. But, as a nation reaches a more complete stage of development, the diversified wants and interests show a varied, and yet comprehensive unity of purpose and life.

External surroundings, climate, geographical position, character of soil, etc., do much to regulate the size of a nation, but the external circumstances determine neither the size nor character of a people. The

direction and extent of the development of a nation are determined by the people themselves. The inherent differences of thought and character of a French people and a German people, preserve a French nation and a German nation, in spite of the geographical proximity. Even after centuries of enforced union, does not the same fact present itself in reference to Ireland and England?

While a nation is in the patriarchal stage it is difficult to distinguish the family from the state; the difference is in the functions, and not necessarily in the number or variety of members. The work of an individual, as member of the state, is different from that as member of a family. In comparison with the state, the family presents a narrow field for action, even in the early development of the state. The stronger individuality becomes a leader or ruler, and minor officers, or helpers, soon arise, and some form of government is established. This primitive people may pass through many stages, as the communal, aristocratic, feudal, monarchical, democratic, and yet preserve its original characteristics, its unity of purpose, which made it a nation from the beginning. Our own nation may serve as an illustration.

When did the United States begin as a nation? The adoption of the Federal constitution was a step in the process. Is it not also generally recognized now, that the civil war, with its results, was also another evidence of the underlying unity of thought in our nation? And can it be said, even now, that the unity of thought that must have existed from the beginning of the nation, is fully made real on the will-side, or in the

phases of practical intercourse in the political and industrial relations? But who can tell when the unity of thought which binds our nation began? That underlying thought is freedom—religious, political, freedom of body, and industrial freedom. Did it begin with the company at Plymouth, at Delft Haven, or in resistance to the tyranny of the English monarch? Or did our nation become a nation at some point in the colonial history—the confederacy of New England, the resistance to the stamp act, the declaration of independence, the signing of the articles of confederation? The beginnings are beyond analysis, but the nation's existence is no less evident, and its reality and strength is in the thought and purpose that is manifested in different degrees of intensity in its different stages of development. And each nation that has existed shows, in the history of its life, some conscious or ruling thought, which directs the energies of the nation as a whole.

As the essence of the individual will is freedom, so the foundation of the nation is in freedom. The true freedom of the individual is made real only as the individual thinks, loves, and acts in accordance with truth and goodness; so a nation is filling its true place in history only as it attempts to establish conditions in which each individual may realize the highest possibilities of his being. A system of caste, as in India, allows but a few to find out the power of their own thought. A monarch, like Louis XIV., crushes the expression of individuality in nearly all the members of the state. The strength and ruggedness of a Germanic barbarian horde show the human will undisciplined by righteous customs and laws. Holland, under William

of Orange, shows a nation realizing religious freedom. Since the emancipation proclamation of '63 and the fifteenth amendment of our Constitution, our nation shows a race rejoicing in freedom of ownership of their own bodies, and in nominal political freedom.

Each step of the realization of the potentialities of a human being, or of a nation, is the expression of the rights of that being or nation. The individual or nation has these rights because of personality; all rights that inhere in the will of man are natural rights. Some of these rights are rendered positive by expression in the laws of a nation; others are expressed only in manners and customs. A man has certain rights by virtue of his existence, and these cannot be taken from him without a destruction of life. Other rights become manifested because of strength of individuality; these rights may be expressed without a violation of justice, unless the assertion of these rights takes away the essential rights of another; or, these rights, which might be expressed because of great individuality, may remain as thoughts in the mind, and the formal expression be voluntarily checked.

In union with others in the nation, the individual has the widest opportunity of expressing his rights. The nation, as a whole, guards and protects the rights of the different members and classes, and secures ever-widening channels for the expression of these rights. In the power of the thought of the whole, in its self-direction, rests the sovereignty of the nation. This sovereignty, or the conscious self-determination of the nation, organizes, directs, sustains, and regulates the various relations of men with men. It considers the relation of

the "gifts of nature"—land, water, etc.,—to the wants of men, and attempts to secure to all an impartial use of its domain.

The true sovereignty rests in the thought and will of the people as a whole. In governments that are not truly democratic, or truly representative, the external manifestations of sovereignty, or power, often rest with one, or with a few. The more nearly absolute the power of the ruler, the more the probability that the rights of the individual, or of classes, will be disregarded and ignored.

The exercise and enjoyment of the individual rights of the nineteenth century represent a long struggle of the past centuries, in which the many have contended for their rights, against the selfish absorption of those rights by the one, or by the few. In the Orient, correspondent to the lack of a distinct idea of personality, the struggle is for the rights of one caste as against another caste, as in India; or, even one nation is apparently merged into another nation, as when the Jews were made captive by the Assyrians.

In Greece, while a learned few had a true conception of the personality of man, for the most part the people did not look upon themselves each as a unit necessary to the nation as a whole; therefore, the struggle for rights was that of one city against another city, as the contest for supremacy between Athens and Sparta.

The Roman world represents another phase in the conscious apprehension of what constitutes the rights of the individual. An equality, in the light of the established law, is the watchword of Roman civilization, hence the great desire and honor of becoming a Roman

citizen. But the process of the assertion of fundamental rights, whether recognized by the established code or not, changed and re-changed the form of the government of Rome; this process began with the withdrawal of the plebeians to the Aventine, and culminated in the social war, B.C. 90.\*

The teachings of Christ enforced the thought of individual responsibility with greater emphasis than it had been taught before in the history of the world. The positive command, "follow thou me," and the impressive, "Thou art the man," have been a continual lesson, at least for the will-side of the human mind, as to the significance of true personality. This thought overreached itself in two extremes, in the ten or twelve hundred years following the advent of Christ; the early monks and ascetics, failing to recognize the means necessary for the development of individuality, shut themselves away from the established channels of spiritual communication, and so became mere dwarfs, compared with the personalities they might have been; on the other hand, the later popes, filled with the idea of the importance of the *one* individual, desired to absorb, not only all spiritual power, but also all temporal power, into the one person.

But the thought of individual responsibility, when united with the wild freedom inherent in the Teutonic mind, produced characters such as, in the many struggles of the last six centuries for individual rights, the arbitrary power of the one ruler, or of a few lords, has not been able to withstand. Each of these centuries tells its own story; the scene at Runnymede, with dif-

\* Fiske's "American Political Ideas," p. 79.

ferent settings, has been enacted over and over again. Significant among the early struggles was that made evident by the Wat Tyler insurrection; "two of the instruments by which man attains his freedom" — the right of freedom of contract and the right of private ownership in property — were slowly receiving recognition and outward expression. The grand fiery outbursts of Luther proclaimed to the world the beginning of the era of religious freedom.

In the later centuries it is difficult to find a decade that does not tell of at least a minor triumph of individual rights over extreme concentration of power. The desire for expression of individuality may become mere individualism as in the French revolution; or this desire may become a quiet and persistent demand for just and legitimate rights, as when William and Mary were forced to grant the "bill of rights" in 1688; or again, a revolutionary war may be necessary to establish conditions under which an attempt at securing religious, political and industrial liberty, may be made.

The struggle for the rights of the many as against the few is not yet over. With a higher and higher grade of education for society as a whole, there will be a deeper recognition of the power inherent in the individual, and this progress will be indicated by a demand for a larger and larger scope for the exercise of this activity. No limitation except that which comes from finiteness can thus be placed upon the rights that are natural to the human mind. When the nature and scope of the rights expressing series of complex relations of the members of society, become positive through a definite expression in law, then there exists a standard



by which an infringement of the rights of another may be measured and punished. The struggles of different epochs, noticed above as illustrations, show the point of time at which these rights received that definite expression in law. The ideal standard for this expression in law is that perfect justice shall be secured to all. Since man is a being eternally progressive, the steps in historical progress can show only an approximation to this ideal. The thought of any one generation cannot grasp all the elements that go to make perfect justice for a human being, and, what is even more difficult, any one generation cannot so arrange the conditions that beings endowed with free wills shall develop in freedom, and not at the same time destroy the results of the freedom of others. With such an ideal justice as the most comprehensive insight of the wisest can grasp, one generation builds upon the experience of the preceding generations, and expresses these broader conceptions of justice in the ever-changing laws of the nation.

These broader conceptions, when expressed in law, become plainly evident to all, and about the final triumphant struggle in each instance there is no doubt; but is the *process* by which these victories in favor of individual rights are gained, always so clearly seen? However this process may be designated, in this process is the initial strength and the potentialities of all the results. It may be said that an abuse of power by the one, or by the few, leads to a revolt against tyranny. That is without doubt a step in the process. But how is the uprising brought about? There is in the human mind a natural inertia and a reverence for established

customs that tend to keep man in his present condition. Is not the process of changing these customs always the same, traced with greater or less clearness by the historian? The one or the few in a given epoch see what "ought to be" for the different members of society, and voluntarily set about establishing conditions so that the "ought to be" becomes the "is." And this always involves labor, self-sacrifice, and perhaps the voluntary yielding of life itself, before the ideas take deep root in the heads and hearts of a sufficient number to constitute public opinion. The man with a strong insight into what ought to be for society, may see a condition that can only come with years or perhaps centuries of labor. The true reformer joins a practical judgment with insight, and attempts to fit upon present conditions changes for the immediate future. His aspirations are for the betterment of society; he includes others than self. He sees the real condition of others, he sees the attainable ideal; he strives to make the ideal the real. He must arouse in those about him a conception of what they ought to be. He must meet the conservatism of established opinions; he suffers for "conscience's sake." He perhaps yields his place to another without seeing one of the principles for which he has labored and sacrificed, firmly established as "rights of the people." But since the human mind is as it is, could the result have been achieved without such work and sacrifice by some one? However mingled may be the motives, what but "the good of others," the preference of reflected good for immediate good, can produce such results? Is it not an exemplification of grace, true charity, the complement of the expressions of justice in law?

Any of the epochs of history characterized as periods of change, revolutions, "cession of rights," might be taken as illustrations. The difficulty of determining and analyzing motives, the "mighty silent forces," presents an obstacle to such study. Most historians are concerned with the external battles, the battles of arms, and pass over in silence the battles in the souls of the real leaders in the conflict. However hidden, these motives are the moving principles of progress in the development of the state; when these thoughts are established in customs and formulated in the laws, it is comparatively easy to understand and interpret the position and progress of a nation.

Justice is the fundamental principle of the state or nation. The state, in its organized forms of expression, has nothing to do with the motives of the individuals comprising the organic whole. The state measures the external act, and its province is to see that the acts of each are in accordance with the true freedom of all. While the state in its sphere of justice does not concern itself with the motives, yet it recognizes that the ideal for the state is such an agreement between motive and act that the highest good of all shall be realized. But, as we have seen, there is no other way by which this conformity of motive and act can be brought about, except by a process of education and development of each individual. This is the fact that has been so often ignored in the attempts to place in an external form of government such schemes as extreme state socialism, communism, etc.,—schemes whose fundamental principles from their nature cannot be fully externalized in organized form, but must remain as motives and indi-

vidual acts. In so far as true socialistic thoughts and feelings exist, they become in time expressed in acts which modify the form of government by obtaining an expression more nearly in justice to all members of the state.

But when the attempt is for socialistic form of government when the spirit of the people is not truly socialistic, directly opposite results are obtained. For when the state attempts to arrange the machinery of government as if all the members were actuated by a single purpose, and that purpose the highest good of humanity, when in reality the wills of the people are not so disposed, instead of an exemplification of this principle in the lives of the members of the state, the members would be in the condition of the opposite extreme; that is, the thought of the members would not be in accord with the forms established for the expression of that thought, and, therefore, such members would in reality be severed from their connection with the established thought of the nation.

The members of the state would be in the same condition as they would be had they shut themselves up in pride and self-exclusion, because the form of government had taken away the opportunity for each one to realize his own individuality by the exercise of will in freedom. The problem then is, how to arrange the machinery of government so that the state assists, by its expressions of justice, the development of true individuality in all its members.

While in the social organism, "each part is reciprocally means and end to every other part," the extent to which the other members of society are a means and

end to the individual, and the individual to the others, depends upon the attitude of the individual to the other members, and of the whole to the individual. In general, there are three attitudes which society presents to the individual, whether expressed in the form of written law or not.

(1) The other members may say to the one member: "What you do you shall have, and what we do we shall have, each for himself, and in so doing we shall all obtain what is our due, and the interests of the whole will be best advanced." This is the principle of individualism, which, when exactly followed, is the principle of justice. And if each one receives justly what is his due, then the organic unity through its institutions has nothing to do in establishing justice, and the members of the organism which have sufficient individuality to receive their own deeds, survive, and those who through their position, either because of circumstances or inheritance, are not strong enough to produce such thoughts or acts as shall return to them for good, must perish; and the "fittest" have the best places in the organism, because, having greater inherent power, they can receive more.

(2) Owing to the desires of the flesh and weakness of the thought and will, society does not keep the attitude of "individualism" toward the one member. The rights of others mingle and intersect the rights of one at so many points that there is a struggle, and the one is forcibly deprived of his rights by the many. Society is thus antagonistic to the individual, and the individual no longer thinks and feels in union with the whole. This is the condition of revolution or anarchy, or,

in its effects upon the individual, of extreme state socialism. With this difference, the condition of anarchy results from too little assistance to the individual from society, and state socialism does too much; but in either case, the individual does not enter into the thoughts and purposes of the whole, the anarchist eventually, because he will not, the extreme nationalist because he can not.

(3) The third attitude which society may have toward the individual is that of helpfulness, or the condition of true socialism—a socialism in substance, a socialism in the soul, in the motives of the individual, and not merely in state-form. Society in this attitude recognizes that the whole is stronger than the individual member or any part or class in society, and it recognizes that assistance given to a member, or to a class, in order that the weaker portions may have an opportunity to develop their activities, not only increases the thought and will-power of that portion of society, but also the power of the whole. The granting of the assistance to the weaker members may be simply justice to them, but in the others who give their assistance it is something more than justice, it is a voluntary giving up of something which they might have themselves, and it is therefore grace or true charity. And here is one of the seeming contradictions in the process of human thought; this attitude of society to the individual members demands that the sacrifice made by the stronger for the weaker, must be *for the sake* of the weaker, and not for the ultimate return of the deed upon the self, or else the end sought, the true growth of all, will not be secured.

As, in a condition of society where the principle of individualism is exactly carried out there will be perfect justice, so in a condition of society where each member knows how to yield his own interests sufficiently to secure the highest good of all, and he voluntarily surrenders those interests for the weaker portions of society, there will be nothing for the state to do in expressing and enforcing repressive laws; but since it is difficult for any one individual or any one generation to find out what will assist the varying conditions of society, and since the members are not all moved by the spirit of brotherly love, the state expresses not only the necessary constructive laws but also repressive or protective ones, both for the sake of teaching the different classes what the true interests of all classes are, and also to assist them to curb their selfish desires.

The state can do this, because in its forms of action it eliminates the possibility of expression of merely personal thoughts and feelings. Its legislators, executives, and judges, shall reflect the will of the people; even its police officers and executioners shall not arrest and put to death that their personal feelings may be gratified, but that they may express the will of a higher personality than themselves. Even if it must be granted that the law-makers and judiciaries have not always been true to the will of the people, yet a study of the history of legislation in any of its phases discloses the fact that where any wise and lasting law has been enacted, there has been involved to a greater or less extent self-sacrifice by one or more members of society.

But this principle of grace, charity, brotherly love,

self-sacrifice, by whatever name it may be called, does not contradict the principle of justice, but is its complement. The voluntary giving up for the weaker by the stronger does not prevent the return of the deeds of the stronger to themselves, and so justice is not violated; and the sacrifice of the stronger for the weaker does enable the weaker to act in sympathy with the whole, and so enables them to receive their own deeds and in turn to give to the still weaker, and so again justice is not violated.

The laws of a nation are the standards of justice as expressed by the sovereign voice of the people. The laws of the nation represent the intersection of all the institutions of society, the family, school, the church, and the organization of civil, industrial and political relations as departments of the state. The conscious progress of these institutions will therefore be reflected in the laws. By studying the changes in the laws in reference to any or all of the relations of society, essentially the same elements should be found in the process of change in the laws that are in the line of true progress. In the study of the ethical phases of legislation, the laws may be considered from one or the other, or both of two standpoints. We may consider the thought, the motives of the chief originators or instigators, so far as any record can be obtained, and so find whether the law had an inception in accordance with a reasonable ethical principle, or we may consider the effects of the law upon the community, or we may attempt both methods. Any law which originates from a correct insight into the needs of human beings, and into the legitimate and necessary means of supplying those



needs, or, in other words, any law which is truly ethical in its origin must be ethical in its results. On the other hand, laws originated from merely selfish desires, often are truly ethical in their results when a series of years are considered. In a consideration, then, of the inception of a law, that is, the process of forming public opinion, of the kinds of rights expressed and defined in a law, and of the effects of a law upon the community or state, there are found the spheres of justice and grace in their relations one to the other, when externalized in society.

A few examples taken from the laws of our own country will serve as illustrations. There are two general classes of laws of a country, whether the laws of the nation or commonwealth are considered: protective laws and constructive laws. The processes of forming public opinion in reference to a protective law and a constructive law may be similar; that is, there may be equal need of leaders in an agitation that will result in the expression of rights for protection as for measures that are directly helpful in establishing conditions for the development of classes in society. But a protective measure in its expression of rights is only negatively helpful, that is, it preserves to the members of the state, "the right of Personal Liberty, of Personal Security, and of Private Property." A protective law is therefore in the expression of these rights, a measure that expresses justice simply. (1) A protective law thus makes explicit rights that belong to man because of existence. A constructive law, in a sense, expresses more than justice to some members or some class in society, since it enables those members or that class to

take a place in the organic unity where they can develop in sympathy with the whole. But such a constructive law must deprive no other class of fundamental rights, or injustice will result. (2) A constructive law, therefore, defines and makes evident rights which enable a man to determine himself as a free personality; that is, there are two phases of the rights expressed in constructive laws: (a) some of the rights expressed are fundamental and necessary, that a man may develop in independence, in union with other men; (b) other rights expressed in laws are desirable for some classes and not unjust to any class, and therefore, their expression assists to a higher development of individuality in each and all members of society.

The facts and structure of the human mind and the relation of man to his material environment determine, for the most part, the kinds of rights expressed in (a) of constructive laws; therefore the laws embodying these rights are earlier enacted in the history of a nation than the rights included under (b) of constructive laws. Rights of the kind included in (b) can only be determined by a wise insight into the nature and limit of the first two kinds of rights, and by a patient study of the past to discover the effects of limiting the possible power of one class in society for the sake of the development of another class. Or, to recapitulate, rights expressed in protective laws are those assuring protection to the life and property of the members of the state; rights expressed in the fundamentally constructive laws are rights (a) pertaining to ownership and transfer of property and to contract; and those included in special constructive measures

are rights (b) expedient for the nation to express, and these may be expressed, when not violating those of protection and those fundamentally constructive.

When that remarkable committee went into the three months' session in Philadelphia, it was for a consideration of this very question; how to adjust the rights of the commonwealths to a federal government. Through a long struggle with the monarchs of England, the people through the voice of Parliament had settled and defined rights pertaining to protection of life and property and many of those (2) (a) in reference to ownership and contract, but many of the rights expedient for a government to grant (b) had not been so well defined; therefore, it was necessary that the laws already existing in reference to the first two kinds of rights, together with the elements of the third kind already defined, should be gathered into one compact document — a written constitution. And the fact of a written constitution was not entirely new. The very external form of our United States Constitution shows that same process of struggle in the past, the effort and self-sacrifice of some one. The over-cautious Cromwell, though seeking and striving for freedom, could recognize it as coming in one channel only, and so he refused to listen to the entreaties of young Sir Harry Vane to adopt a written constitution, and the world waited more than a century and a quarter for a successful attempt to regulate the rights of the whole people by a written constitution.

In the following illustrations, let us notice, first, one or two protective measures; second, examples of measures necessarily constructive, because they are based

upon the nature of free-will and of man's material environment; and third, measures that the processes of time and experience have proved constructive of true individuality, and therefore constructive of national growth and development.

Congress shall have power to declare war — the war may be aggressive, retaliatory, or a war of conquest — of whatever kind, this expressed right says that a nation may according to its conception of justice, protect itself, may react upon a neighboring people and return their own deeds to them, may even extend its sway over surrounding territory on the ground, that, since a superior civilization will be offered to the conquered people, no principle of justice will be violated.

The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* expresses the right that each man has to be tried for his acts before constituted tribunals, and to receive the verdict of his judges as if it were the voices of the injured parties. Such a provision for trial secures to a man liberty of which he might otherwise be deprived. That the writ of *habeas corpus* may be suspended in the time of danger is an attempt to continue the existence of the government and so an attempt to approximate justice. That the power of suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* should rest in the English Parliament became a *constructive* measure, because the experience of the past had shown the danger of giving that power into the hands of a monarch.

Protective measures are oftener expressed in statute law than in constitutional law; all legislation simply penal for infringements upon life or property, the establishment of a police force, provisions for an army

and navy, and the phases of laws respecting taxation which demand money from the people in return for the protection given, are of this nature.

Some of the protective measures expressed in the laws of our country, appear under slightly different forms as early as Magna Charta, and even the provisions of the great charter were formed upon the basis of the charter presented by Henry the Second, and this in turn is based partly upon the customs and common law of the time of Edward the Confessor. The two "essential clauses," as Hallam calls them, "which protect the personal liberty and property of all freemen, by giving security from arbitrary imprisonment and arbitrary spoliation had become the foundation stone upon which the fabric of free government rested in England and America." \* The conference on the island in the Thames between Staines and Windsor is the impressive scene which secured elements of justice to a waiting nation; on July 15, 1215, hours and years of work and sorrow were forgotten in the glad joy of the new consciousness of freedom. Such protective measures have as their expressed content only the rights of existence and preservation, and are measures expressing justice only; and the complementary altruistic principle shown in the energy and persistence of a Stephen Langton in assisting to bring about these laws is often forgotten when the victory for justice is extolled.

Rights that are fundamental in man as a personality may be expressed in laws; and any measure that will aid in the manifestation of true personality in the members of the state becomes a measure constructive

\* Hallam, *Middle Ages*, Vol. II., p. 324.

of a larger national life. Such measures express more than the right of protection or justice, and show another element, the altruistic, in two ways: in the process of the formation of public opinion for the enactment of the laws, in the same manner as in protective measures, and also in the content of the provisions of the law; because the provisions of these laws furnish opportunity for the expression of personality and so are conducive to the growth of true individuality. Laws that are most necessary for the growth of individuality are those in reference to ownership of property, to contract, and to some forms of taxation.

If the only ground for the justification of taxes is the need of the government for money, this need could be met by the full ownership of all things by the government; but by the time that the government had secured the adjustment of all the conditions of growth, the *people* would be wanting, that is, the people in the true sense of the word,—individuals making themselves in freedom through a transformation of their environment into forms suited to the wants of humanity. Without a free self-determining spirit in the people, government itself would soon cease to be government. But besides the just return to the government for its protective officer, is not the payment of taxes the form of recognition by the state of the right that each has to private ownership in property? And is not this right acknowledged by the government's reception after a prescribed manner of the money obtained through taxation?

In the history of the struggle of the English barons and the people with the kings, is not the above

thought illustrated? The kings needed money for purposes of war and government. The demands were large, but as soon as two members from each city, borough or town were chosen in Montfort's Parliament, although the burdens were not less, yet when this right of each one to express the right of ownership in property of those whom he represented was acknowledged, the burdens were more cheerfully borne.

The experience of the colonies as contrasted with the early days after the adoption of the United States Constitution, shows the desire for the expression of the right of ownership. By reason of the lack of a unified system of appropriations, the colonies often failed to contribute just shares towards the expenses incident to the Revolutionary war and to maintaining the government. But when it was recognized that each one has by virtue of his right of ownership a responsibility to assist in the payment of common expenses, the central government demanded this pecuniary support and new life and strength was infused into the weakened organism.

Taxes levied for war purposes are based upon the right that each one has of protection from the government, that is, that the government needs money; closely allied with such taxation are indirect taxes, as a protective tariff, justified by a certain state of industrial development and a temporary need of the government for money. A poll tax, if it have a justification, indicates the return to the government for an acknowledgement of the right of voting, though primarily its only justification was the government's need of money. Taxes for ordinary expenses of government, levied

upon property are based upon the recognition of the right of private ownership. Special laws regulating the forms of taxation as those which would levy an income tax or a tax that would limit the size of "bonanza farms" would be measures that recognize the danger of allowing too large fortunes in the hands of a class in society and might be illustrations of special constructive laws.

What is meant by private ownership? Its legal side is the recognition of government indicated above, but does not the fact of this recognition show that the right is inherent in man, and that the expression in laws is only making evident what already exists? For land, water, etc., "natural agents" are as much "gifts" as the will of man is, and no more.

Man's thought is his own; he energizes, he determines his development, that is, his thought must become real on the will-side of his being. The "natural agents" are man's material environment, by which he expresses his free determinations. The fact of his will, his energy, gives him the right of indicating *how*, that is, the direction in which that energy shall employ itself — the right of freedom of contract. The fact of the existence of a material environment shows on *what* this free will shall be exercised. And as it is each one's will — my will that determines, so it is my material environment on which only my will can express itself with a sure return of the deeds to the self. Ownership by all without regard to each individual, is not true self-ownership, that ownership without which man cannot express his will in freedom. The two — the right of contract and of private ownership in property — are



the fundamental rights that must be regulated by government, rights without which, "the existence of man would be a burden to himself and the possibility of development reduced to zero."

Besides the laws in reference to the forms of taxation mentioned above, laws establishing conditions of ownership and transfer of property, and laws in reference to inheritance, render definite this right of private ownership in property. That the individual will must have the opportunity for expression upon its own material environment always has been and always will be the fundamental fact upon which private ownership is based. The forms of ownership change from century to century, and a record of these changes assists in interpreting the progress of a nation. The ideal of private ownership may be "three acres and a cow"; but it must be one's own three acres and one's own cow to use or to transfer, as one may determine.

The experiences of the past present a great variety in the forms of ownership;—patriarchal and communal ownership, imperial ownership, the use of grants obtained for meritorious services leading to feudal ownership, peasant proprietor, landlord and tenant, free possession of as much as one can get hold of through inheritance, skill, or manipulation, and the later forms of partial ownership seen in association-farming and in productive coöperation. Certain stages of civil and family development may be better served by one form than by another; as, for instance, the establishment of the communal system when the children of Israel established themselves in Canaan after their life in Egypt, and the establishment of a like sys-

tem brought about by the great necessities of the Early Christian Church. And like attempts for communal ownership must be under similar circumstances as these indicated historical examples, in order to be successful; that is, community in ownership is a stage in the development to a higher kind of ownership.

In like manner, imperial ownership or feudal ownership may furnish the best conditions for growth in certain stages of intellectual and moral development of a majority of the members of society. But do not the changes in the forms of ownership of the last centuries accord more nearly with the form that reason sees as necessary for the expression of personality? Development in the form of private ownership has gone hand in hand with development in the lines of trade and commerce, and with intellectual and social progress in all directions. The last fifty years or more have seen an unusual abuse of this right, and the excessive greed of a few individuals and stock companies has brought into question the validity of the fundamental right of private ownership. But as in the past, changes restricting the possibility of so *large* ownership in private property can only be brought about by a process in freedom. When the thought of the nations is aroused as to the nature of the abuses, and this thought becomes reflected in laws, making possible private ownership by a larger number, then will these expressions of justice furnish opportunities for self-direction and self-development to many now deprived of them, through a use of their will upon a material environment which is their own.

Inseparably joined with private ownership is the

modern form of the right of contract. Some form of contract exists wherever human beings exist, and nations and people, even in early stages of development furnish illustrations that the right has always existed and has been recognized through the strength of custom and to varying extents in law; but the form that gives special significance to the right is comparatively modern — the form that has shown the possibility of a strong and continued antagonism between the rights of the capitalist and laborer dates from the fourteenth century. The results of the legislation of that century, attempting to regulate contracts between employer and employed show the fundamental nature of the right of contract. If one freely "sells his birth-right," then the consequences of his free act come back upon the individual who thus freely determines; but when this power of freely determining the direction that his property or his energy shall be used, is taken away, the opportunity of self-expression is taken away and the person loses elements of individuality. Laws that give to the members of the state as nearly equal opportunities as possible of contract, become constructive of the strongest elements of stability and growth of the organic unity. Laws that furnish conditions so that the strength of capital, or organization may deprive some of this right, show by the disturbance caused in society the full significance of this fundamental right.

Fundamental constructive laws differ from those that have an especial constructive character in this: laws concerned with the rights of ownership and contract are based upon the idea that equal conditions in these respects should lie open to all, and therefore, that there

would be equal opportunities to all of growth through personal effort; special constructive measures are concerned with the expression of rights that are desirable rather than with those relating to existence and necessary growth, and are therefore based upon expediency. Special constructive measures consider how conditions of growth can be furnished to a class in society who have not as advantageous circumstances as another class. Such measures compel the class favored by birth or inheritance to restrain the expression of possible rights and power.

The process by which changes in these laws are brought about does not differ essentially from that of protective measures and fundamental constructive measures; but in measures of this class, as they are in the realm of expedient legislation, there is a more direct reference to the laws that immediately precede, and therefore the struggle and effort required at the present time to bring about a change beneficial to the state are not so evident as in the past.

The greater part of the laws of a growing nation are constructive or those expressing rights included in (b) as above specified. As an unselfish devotion to one's country, or to the good of society, becomes reflected in the changing laws, so also may be read therein selfishness, party spirit, and disregard of weak and oppressed classes. In the developing nation, laws expressing the interests of the few will be repealed, or will become of no effect. The permanent elements are therefore best seen in laws that have stood the test of time. As illustrative of the advance in the standards of justice from generation to generation, and of the process by which

this advance has been brought about, let us notice in succession: two clauses of the Constitution; the first Amendments; the trend of thought in laws in reference to education, in "poor laws," in laws regulating the conditions of prisons, in the establishment of state charities, bureaus, commissions, etc., and in laws in reference to industries.

The constructive measure, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives," expresses centuries of effort to establish a safe and wise form of democratic legislation. The date 1265, and the name of the noble Earl Simon de Montfort are sufficient to indicate the nature of the process by which the one House was forced to yield some of its assumed rights that the "Commons" might have an opportunity to develop greater individuality.

The two-chamber system in the United States was ushered in by an event of less historical significance than the battle of Evesham, yet the story of Mrs. Sherman and the stray pig in the Massachusetts colony\* illustrates the external of the same process — the necessity of compromise. As has been said, our constitution represents a series of compromises. And what is a compromise but a voluntary yielding of possible rights for the good of others?

To attempt to give the ethical results of the establishment of the representative principle, would be an attempt to give the history of political freedom in England and in the United States.

\*Fiske's "The Beginnings of New England," pp. 106-108.

The principle of the famous Connecticut compromise, whether the basis of representation should be the same for both houses of the United States Congress was a difficult point to determine. "Neither party was willing to give way.\* 'No compromise for us,' said Luther Martin. 'You must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business is at an end.' 'Then we are come to a full stop,' said Roger Sherman. 'I suppose it was never meant that we should break up without doing something.' When the question as to allowing equality of suffrage to the states in the Federal Senate was put to vote the result was a tie. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland — five states — voted in the affirmative; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina — five states — voted in the negative; the vote of Georgia was divided and lost. It was Abraham Baldwin, a native of Connecticut and lately a tutor in Yale College, a recent emigrant to Georgia, who thus divided the vote of that state, and prevented a decision which would in all probability have broken up the convention. His state was the last to vote, and the house was hushed in anxious expectation, when this brave and wise young man yielded his private conviction to what he saw to be the paramount necessity of keeping the convention together. All honor to his memory!"

Some of the clauses of the first ten amendments of the Constitution illustrate the same thought. These ten selected out of the one hundred and eighty-nine presented at the first meeting of Congress, are a "bill of rights" to the American people in a more specific

\* Fiske's "The Critical Period of American History," pp. 250, 251.

way than the Constitution is. Two of the thoughts of the first amendment usher us into the very process of history — “religious freedom” and “freedom of the press.” When we contemplate the negative side of religious freedom, the centuries of war, bloodshed, suffering and martyrdom, the impression is that evil and not grace is the potent factor in historical transformations! But grace still triumphs! And the nineteenth century rejoices in the relief from the earlier persecutions for belief. Nothing less than a history of the Church and its relations to the State can render explicit the thought contained in the expression “religious freedom.” Each epoch from the time of the establishment of the Church by Christ until the present, has presented memorable names. Even the collective names of these steadfast people are sufficient to indicate the contents of volumes: the apostles and early martyrs, the Albigenses, the Franciscans, the Huguenots, the Manichaeans with their spiritual descendants the Puritans,\* the Calvinists, the Baptists, the Presbyterians, the Methodists, the Unitarians, with however mingled and perverted notions, have labored diligently for the same end — freedom to worship God according to the dictates of the conscience.

The fundamental difference between a sin and a crime obtained its first unequivocal assertion in this country in the separation of Church from State in Virginia. “Unlike the Puritans of New England, the Presbyterians were in favor of the total separation of church from state. It was one of their cardinal principles that the magistrate had no right to interfere in any way with

\* Fiske's “Beginnings of New England,” page 39.

matters of religion. By taking this broad ground they secured the powerful aid of Thomas Jefferson and afterward of Madison and Mason. The controversy went on through all the years of the Revolutionary War, while all Virginia rang with fulminations and arguments. In 1776, Jefferson and Mason succeeded in carrying a bill which released all dissenters from parish rates and legalized all forms of worship. At last, in 1785, Madison won the crowning victory in the Religious Freedom Act, by which the Church of England was disestablished and all parish rates abolished, and still more, all religious tests were done away with. In this last respect Virginia came to the front among all the American states, as Massachusetts had come to the front in the abolition of slavery.”\*

During the reign of Henry VIII., printed matter was subjected to various irregular restrictions. Long before this time the Romans had ordered burned, libels and anything impiously written against the gods. After 800 A. D., “the popes of Rome, engrossing what they pleased of political rule into their own hands, extended their dominion over men’s eyes, as they had before over their judgments, burning and prohibiting to be read what they fancied not.”† In the reign of Elizabeth, “the regulations of the Star Chamber for this purpose are memorable, as the first step in the long struggle of government after government to check the liberty of printing. The irregular censorship which had long existed was now finally organized. Printing was restricted to London and the two Universities, the

\* Fiske: “The Critical Period of American History,” page 81.

† Milton’s “Areopagitica,” a speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.



number of printers reduced, and all candidates for license to print placed under the supervision of the Company of Stationers. Every publication, too, great or small, had to receive the approbation of the Primate or the Bishop of London." \*

The struggles against these restrictions upon the freedom of speech have been many and severe. In England, this contest assumed definite form through John Wilkes, who "ventured for the first time to attack a minister by name." George the Third and the narrow and selfish Grenville opposed in vain the spirit of devotion to liberty. The colonists, in their resistance to the stamp act, joined in the general agitation. The stirring words of William Pitt, the election by the people of Wilkes as alderman of London, the "letters of Junius" enforced upon the aristocracy the necessity of yielding assumed rights. With the memory still keenly alive to the encroachments of King and Parliament, it is not strange that the new states insisted upon the clause by which Congress is forbidden to restrict freedom of speech.

"The early Federalists endeavored to introduce unusual punishments for the offence of criticising either the policy of the government or the conduct of officials, and the 'sedition law,' as it was termed, passed during the administration of John Adams, met with the approval of the court. But the reception of this law by the people emphatically declared that they believed in no sort of censorship, for the indignation which it aroused could not be allayed except by the humiliating defeat of the party that passed it. So far as I am

\* A Short History of the English People: J. R. Green, page 467.

aware, there has been no subsequent attempt on the part of civil authority to control the expression of opinion, or to limit the sphere of criticism upon government or upon the existing order of society." \*

These few clauses of the Constitution are simply illustrations of the process of construction of the whole Constitution — the process by which the laws establishing the correlative powers, the legislative, the executive and the judicial, had been slowly formed, and so were ready to be rendered definite in organic law.

Since the continuation and growth of any nation depends upon the development of its members, there is no inherent reason why any or all forms of government should not have a part in the process of education of the people; and even more than that, there is no reason why any institution, as the family, or the church, should not aid in this work of education. But the question would still remain, cannot some institutions and some phases of government do the work better than others? Because the state and the church have different spheres of work in other respects, is the reason that they cannot work harmoniously in the lines of educational effort; and while the *forms* of the two institutions will always be different, the fundamental object of both in this line of work is the same, to secure conditions of growth for human souls. And when the spirit of freedom has broken down denominational barriers, there is no reason why the work of education may not be carried on by both church and state.

\* *The Forum*, July, 1883: Article by H. C. Adams, "Shall we Muzzle the Anarchists?"

But as it is not in the province of the church to set up a law, a standard of compulsion, the work of education can be done better by the state. If it were not for the natural desire of the human being to remain in his present condition, the work of education might perhaps be left in the care of the family. But the work of education is the planting of new thoughts, new ideals, and if the father and mother have not the thoughts to pass on to the children, other families must supply that lack or else there is deterioration in the organism. It might be left to the voluntary assistance of one family to another, and so remain in the sphere of the private relations of society. But here again the question presents itself: Is that the best way? And even if it is granted that the order and system of government are needed to render the work of education effective, there is still the alternative — the federal or the state government?

Without doubt the process of the realization of the National Unity has been in *history*, first local, then the commonwealth, then the nation; but if the Unity is the underlying thought, the *logical* order is the opposite—that is, the nation is the essential determining power. But as it is difficult to determine in the case of the individual what possible rights may be yielded for the sake of others in society, so it is difficult to tell which government, federal, state, county, town or municipal can best frame or execute measures that shall secure justice to all. Education is one of the questions that concerns this border line of authority. Besides the question of education Mulford (*The Nation*, p. 297) also places the following on this border line:

"The powers" in reference "to divorce," "to the resident qualifications of an elector, and to the militia as a local or constabulary force."

What has been done and with what results, always assists in determining future actions. In our own country we find that the Federal government, and the state governments, with all the minor phases, have united in this most important of all governmental work. The colonies assisted private schools by money from taxation and by grants of land, even before a system of public schools could be sustained. The Federal government gave its first assistance in a land grant; this bill "known as the 'ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory,' insured to the State of Ohio two townships of land for the support of a university."\* Other land grants, provisions for experiment stations, military and naval academies, library, Smithsonian Institution and National Museum, and the establishment of the United States Bureau of Education have all been in the line of Federal Aid to Education.

The defeat of the Blair Education Bill seemed to confirm the opinion hitherto held that the states can support and manage the details of the public school system better than the Federal government.

To find out the ethical results of our public school system is a hopeless task. Some idea of the superiority of such a system which provides opportunity for so nearly free and universal education, might be seen by comparing countries having different systems; for instance, the results of the system of the United States

\*"The History of Federal and State Aid to Higher Education in the United States," by F. W. Blackmar, p. 43.

with that of England, where public education as a system was not established by law until 1870, and then only for the lower grades; or, the system of the United States with that of Spain, where the church for the most part still controls education.

To show the great opportunities for education for all classes and conditions of people in the United States, it is sufficient to indicate a few of the most recent lines of assistance given by the states. Not only *may* the children of rich and poor receive instruction in the various grades, including high schools, but in more than twenty states children from five or six to thirteen or fourteen (varying in different states) *must* attend school a certain number of weeks in the year, in Massachusetts and Connecticut, twenty being required. Also in several cities free kindergartens and industrial education for some of the public school grades have been established. In offering to the youth of the land this industrial training, the state recognizes the necessity of a symmetrical development of all the powers of mind and body; also the necessity of correct ideas of the dignity of labor: and while the state in this kind of training does not attempt to teach "trades," it hopes to train the eye and hand, to make familiar the use of tools and instruments and ingredients, and so to prepare the youth for a successful transition from school life to the more active industrial life.

That the state should provide to a reasonable extent for the needs of its poor and unfortunate classes, is grounded in the fact of the organic unity of society. The thoughts and sympathies of these classes mingle only to a very slight extent in the thought and pur-

poses of the nation. But when properly fed, clothed and sheltered, there is a possibility for the development of a greater degree of individuality, at least such a development on the will side as will restrain from mendicancy and vice. When this assistance to the weaker members of society, which might be rendered in the way of spontaneous private charity, becomes definite and systematized in a measure of justice, the opportunity for self-development of these classes is thereby assured.

There was no poor-law in England that can be called a constructive measure until the reforms of 1834. (The "poor-laws" before this time illustrate another phase of the relations of the government to the people, and will be considered later). Ill-advised legislation, dating back to the time of Elizabeth, had rendered the condition of the poorer classes deplorable in the extreme. "Drink and dissipation, indolence and insolence, deception and dependence, had become the familiar characteristics of the men from whose rank had come the soldiery who had astonished all Europe."\* The new law, through the "work-house test" sought to inspire independence and hope in these discouraged and destitute classes. Especially through the establishment of "unions" and placing the responsibility of the care of the poor upon the local government, and providing for a better administration of justice through the central board, a degree of order has been brought out of the former chaos. Among the most recent attempts at assistance to these unfortunate classes by the government, is the purchase of "Bethnal Green" and the

\* Fowle, *The Poor Law*, p. 89; English Citizen Series.

removal of unsanitary dwellings and the erection of new ones under the supervision of the city government. The same object might perhaps be better accomplished by the appointment of Sanitary Commissions, such as those of Chicago and of other cities of America. Also the British government by furnishing money and appointing a committee, and affixing a penalty in case of misappropriated funds, has endorsed "General Booth's" plan of "city," "farm," and "over-the-sea" colonies; the plan no doubt originated in ethical motives, and the results of the first year's experience more than equaled expectations.\*

Some of the New England States perhaps lead the world in the intelligent care and assistance given to the poor and unfortunate through state action. Through state boards of charities a careful survey of the whole field is made, and a judicious separation of the different grades of indigent and weak-minded is brought about, and suitable help rendered to each. Connecticut has even established "children's homes," one in each county, to which the children may be taken from the regular "town farm"; the children are in this way removed from the contaminating influences of bad habits and vices of the older inmates of the almshouse and given the comforts and watchfulness of a good home until a better is found with some good family.

"The plan of carrying on a municipal lodging-house (under the control of the overseers of the poor) has been successfully worked in Boston for nearly twelve years. Those who desire to avail themselves of its comforts make their application at the police station,

\* See article in *The Forum*, April, 1892, by Dr. Albert Shaw.

where they may obtain a ticket of admission; in this way hardened vagrants and thoroughly vicious criminals are screened out, so to speak. Decent food, hot baths, clean towels, clean bed linen, and even clean night-gowns are provided for the lodgers. The most deserving and respectable are given beds apart from the crowd. When the clothing of applicants is in a particularly bad state it is cleansed during the night with superheated steam, and in the morning, before the lodger is allowed to leave, he saws enough wood or performs enough other labor to pay for his expenses. In fact, we believe that the Wayfarers' Lodge has been not only self-supporting, but has paid a small profit into the city treasury." \*

When a person allows his bad thought or motive to become an overt act for which there has been a penalty arranged by the state, he becomes a criminal. That he should receive his own deed, expressed as correctly as possible through the established machinery of the judiciary, is simply justice. But because a man has committed one crime is not a warrant for treating him as if it were his persistent intention to continue a criminal. Until the time of John Howard the central thought of the treatment of prisoners, was retribution; punishment was inflicted for the crime and not for the preservation of the other members of society and for the reformation of the criminal. The prisoner was treated as if he had forfeited his individuality by the committal of perhaps one crime, which, if undiscovered, would have placed the man in the "best society." Howard, aroused by the inhuman treatment of prison-

\* *The Christian Union*, April 2, 1891.



ers of war, spent his time in visiting prisons, his fortune in propagating his ideas to arouse public interest and sympathy for the prisoners, and in 1789, in Russia, yielded his life, while on a continental tour, the results of which, like his preceding journeys, meant relief and hope to thousands of prisoners. Largely through the efforts of Howard, Parliament in 1774 passed bills "for the relief of acquitted prisoners in the matter of fees," and "for preserving the health of prisoners."

But it is only very recently and after the noble efforts of such women as Elizabeth Fry in England, and Dorethea Dix in our own country, that the ideas of Howard can be said to have become established as public opinion. The New York legislature in 1889 "revised and codified the prison laws in a comprehensive act commonly known as the Fassett law." The conditions which have prevailed in our state prisons until within a few years past, are described by the Secretary of the Prison Association of New York, as follows: "The convict, on his entrance into the prison, was absolutely relieved of all self-responsibility and of nearly all rights. His maintenance was secure; it was the duty of the state to provide that. His labor was hired out to a contractor at so much a head, and all the earnings of his labor belonged solely to the state. We treated our convicts precisely as we treated our cattle; we housed them, fed them, whipped them, worked them, and, to complete the degradation, hired them out by the day; but in the product of labor the convicts themselves had no more interest or right than has the ox that drags the plough. The convict's environment was closely analogous to that of a negro slave under the regime of

slavery; but it had no counterpart in any free community outside the prison. When the convict was released, he met changed conditions which his imprisonment had positively unfitted him to cope with; and the only wonder is that this vicious system did not convert every discharged convict, without a single exception, into a confirmed and irreclaimable criminal.”\*

The Fassett law has for its fundamental idea, that a criminal is still a human being, and that under pure and wholesome industrial, educational and religious influences, he may again become a peace-loving, law-abiding citizen. To that end the warden gives especial attention to the character and needs of each individual prisoner. He is placed in one of the three grades of prisoners: “In the first are those convicts who are least vicious and give hopeful promise of reform; in the second, those of a lower moral order; while the third includes the hopelessly incorrigible.” Prisoners may be degraded or promoted from one grade to another. Their work is arranged according to their classification. The labor of the first grade shall be directed “‘with reference to fitting the prisoner to maintain himself by honest industry after his discharge, as the primary or sole object of such labor.’” The first grade prisoners may be employed at ‘labor for industrial training and instruction solely, even though no useful or salable products result from their labor.’”

The labor of the second grade “shall be directed primarily to the production of salable goods, and secondarily to fitting them for a life of self-support after their discharge.”

\* Prison Science with Special Reference to New York Legislation, p. 12: Economic Tracts.

The labor of those who appear to be incorrigible "shall be directed solely to such exercise as shall tend to the preservation of health, or to manufacturing without machinery such articles as are needed in the public institutions of the State, or to other manual labor which shall not compete with free labor."

"The indeterminate sentence" is another special feature of the Fassett Bill. Instead of the present arrangement of an estimate by the Court within the specified limits of the law, of the time that the criminal shall remain in prison, the new law makes his release dependent upon himself. When he gives sufficient evidence to the warden and those having the oversight, that he is ready to re-enter the social unity from which his act has severed him, and become a member whose thoughts and acts shall be in sympathy with those of the whole, then he may return and exercise all the rights of a law-abiding citizen. At present the law "provides that the courts may pronounce such sentence: the exercise of the authority is discretionary, not compulsory."

The "pardoning power" for a long time used by the head of a nation or state or commonwealth is an acknowledgement of this same thought that is at the basis of the Fassett Bill: that the crime may not have resulted from a continued and resolute purpose, and that the criminal may again become a loyal citizen, and a law-loving and law-abiding member of the community.

The latter part of the nineteenth century is pre-eminently the time for the appointment of commissioners in various departments of government. Some of

the prominent ones are: Railroad commissions, Labor commissions, Education, Prison and Sanitary commissions, commissions for Charities and Boards of Arbitration; the powers of these are various, including those of investigation, advisory power, police and judicial. The fact that the state is ready to make these appointments indicates that the intimate connection and relation of all members of society is more clearly understood than in preceding centuries; it indicates that the public has an interest in classes in society that are suffering injustice from others, and in those who are weak, poor and unfortunate; it indicates that the ethical education of society has reached such a stage of development that in many cases rights may be adjusted and people may be persuaded to do better without the trouble and expense of coercion by the regular courts.

It might be urged that there is no need of searching for an ethical principle in the history of industrial legislation — that industry is governed by economic laws and not ethical principles, and that the basal economic law is to let business alone.

No doubt it is true that if one man makes a yard of cloth for the market, and another man raises a bushel of wheat also for society, in that transaction there is a phase of the ethical; for so long as human beings can associate together, even though it be in a state of anger and revenge, there is an exemplification of the ethical. The let-alone policy in business is a sufficient basis for the formation of customs in a rude or undifferentiated state of society, but when the wants of a growing society demand a diversity of industries and division of labor, in this process the rights of one become so

mingled with the rights of another that the customs can be no longer simple, and a reasoned-out ethical principle is necessary for the correct formation of those customs.

Fortunately, we can study the history of factory legislation from both standpoints; from the motive-side or the process of their inception, and also some of the results of "Factory Laws."

Because of the invention of machinery and application of scientific principles in the processes, during the last part of the last century and the first half of the present, there was a complete revolution in the methods of production. The abolition of the Guild and Apprenticeship system, and the extreme *laissez faire* doctrine promulgated and taught, led to a complete change in the attitude to each other of the employer and the employed. Freed from legal restraint, supported by a system of social philosophy that encouraged selfishness, the employers soon found the means and opportunities of increasing their income and power at the expense of the mental and moral qualities of the employés.

Prof. E. J. James says, "The condition of factory operatives in the factory districts and mining regions of England in the latter part of the last century and away on into the second quarter of the present, was horrible beyond belief. The mere description of the lives they led, is enough to make one's blood boil with indignation that such things should be allowed to exist in a so-called Christian land. It seemed, indeed, as if the great mass of the laborers were destined to sink into a condition far worse than that in which even the

most miserable of their ancestors had lived, and one little short of slavery in its worst form, viz., that in which the master has no duties, only rights and privileges." \* "As England was the first great industrial state of modern times, so in England the results of [this] policy first showed themselves in all their nakedness. The most merciless exploitation of the weaker elements of society by the stronger became the rule. The manufacturers, in their thirst for wealth, paid as little attention to the health of their operatives as they chose. The laborers in their necessity were compelled to accept what terms were offered. The labor of the father soon became insufficient to support the family. The mother had to go into the coal mine or factory. It was not enough; the children were sent into the mines and factories. They were compelled to work ten or fifteen hours a day for seven days in the week, in narrow illy-ventilated and dirty factory rooms, or in still more unhealthful mines. The result of such work was, of course, the moral and physical deterioration of the laborers from decade to decade."

What could be done! The operatives were too weak and ignorant to obtain their rights and just dues singly, or to combine successfully, and so the conditions were such that they could not help themselves. But help at length came—the voluntary giving-up of rights and privileges that could have been selfishly enjoyed. For forty-five years the seventh Earl of Shaftsbury made the cause of the poor and oppressed laborers of England his own. With untiring zeal and with almost incredi-

\* "The Labor Movement: The Problem of To-Day," edited by George E. McNeil, p. 48.

ble persistence and self-sacrifice, he sought to better the condition of the laborers in mines and factories. He visited them at their homes, attended their meetings, was instrumental in establishing schools, and for more than twenty years in the House of Commons he introduced measure after measure in their behalf, and for twenty-five years in the House of Lords he defended their cause with equal valor.

Before 1833, when Lord Ashley began his life-work, there had been several attempts to improve the condition of the laborers through legislation. The first Sir Robert Peel, frightened by the ravages of an epidemic disease in the factory districts of Manchester, in 1802 introduced an act "for the preservation of the health and morals of the apprentices and others employed in cotton and other mills, and cotton and other factories;" in 1819, an attempt was made to fix the age at which children should enter mills; in 1829, Sir John Broughton passed a bill providing for a partial holiday on Saturday; in 1831, night-work was prohibited.

After the defeat in 1831, and rejection of Mr. Sadler in 1832, the laboring people had no one to urge their cause in Parliament. At this time, influenced by friends already moved by the sufferings of the laboring people and the injustice shown them, Lord Ashley began his earnest and vigorous efforts to secure just labor legislation.

Point after point of benefit to the working-man was taken up, struggled for, and the consolidating act of 1878 shows the degree of success attained. The notable victories of this long period were: in 1844, the number of hours constituting a day's labor for children was

reduced; in 1847, through especial assistance of Mr. Fielden, the ten-hour law; in 1864, the extension act; in 1874, the minimum age of children in factories was fixed at ten years, and the provisions of the act extended to nearly every branch of manufacturing industry. At this time Lord Shaftsbury could say that "the Protective Acts in the statute book now cover a population of nearly 2,500,000 persons."

The nature of the evils remedied may be found by considering the act of 1878. Professor James sums up the phases of benefit as follows: "1, sanitary provisions; 2, safety; 3, employment and meal hours; 4, holidays; 5, education; 6, certificates of fitness for employment; 7, accidents."

Places of occupation must be kept clean and healthful, dangerous machinery must be guarded, a reasonable amount of time at proper intervals must be secured for meals, provision must be made for stopping work upon specified holidays, a weekly certificate of the school attendance of every child employed must be obtained, also medical certificates certifying a required degree of physical soundness, and "notice of accidents causing loss of life or bodily injury, must be sent to the inspector and certifying surgeon of the district." In 1880, The Employer's Liability Act was passed. "This gives to the employés a right to a suit against their employers in case they are injured while performing their duties, unless it can be shown that the accident was caused by the fault of the employé himself."

Without doubt it could be shown that the enforcement of the above provisions of the law did not lessen the amount of production in an appreciable degree,



when series of years are considered; but the purpose here is to notice the principle whose application secures ethical results to thousands of men, women and children. We find this thought expressed in each item that has stood the test of time; the voice of the organic whole, speaking through representatives who see the needs and correct relations of the different industrial groups, demands that one class in society who will not voluntarily give up privileges which their position in society enables them to get, must be compelled to act as if they saw the good of others and the true interests of all classes.

Factory legislation in several of the United States is essentially a repetition of that of England. Massachusetts perhaps leads in the number of points of protection granted to the employés.

The manner of securing the passage of the various acts in the United States shows another application of the ethical principle. Owing probably to a sense of independence incident to the activities which a new country arouses, to a higher degree of intelligence in corresponding grades of society in the United States than in England, brought about by a more extended system of common school education, and more especially to a larger representation in the legislative body, the laws have been enacted through the efforts and combinations of the persons more directly benefited. To be sure, the combination of one class against another class often resembles a fight in which the stronger prevails and the weaker must yield and console themselves in any way possible; yet there is another and more hopeful point of view. The fact that those of the same trades

or grades of industry will unite to secure a real or even supposed better condition, shows an interest and sympathy with others that is much better for society than the isolation of separate interests that comes from ill-will, ignorance, or sloth. And could the motives of many of the leaders and supporters of labor organizations be analyzed, who doubts but that acts of self-sacrifice as noble as those of the Earl of Shaftsbury would be found? The giving up of the scanty leisure time, the possible increase of knowledge from interchange of ideas in their meetings, the direct assistance given from their small earnings to the more unfortunate, to the sick and afflicted, the sympathy and union of interests necessary to effect a legislative measure — these are all means which assist in making minds more receptive of new ideas and truth when it shall be presented to them. As the factory legislation in Massachusetts is so nearly like that of England, it is not necessary to consider it in detail. But in the United States more attempts are made in the assistance and indirect protection given, through the appointment by the state of greater numbers of inspectors, commissioners, boards of arbitration, bureaus of labor statistics, etc.

Public opinion, or even a sentiment or fashion, moves in waves through a state or country, and fifty years, or even a shorter time, may see an entire change in public thought upon a question. A movement which was originated with much self-sacrifice may become so changed by lower motives of leaders that the lofty character of acts resulting may disappear for a time; on the other hand, worthy leaders may succeed and what was the thought and purpose of a few, may become the

common possession of society, moulding thoughts and customs. Compared with fifty years ago, it is the fashion now to legislate in behalf of the unfortunate, disqualified classes in society.

When we come to study railroad legislation on the side of its inception or motive-side, two difficulties are met; the custom for the state to assist in any wise legislation was to a degree established, and effective railroad legislation is so recent (if it can even be said to exist) that the thoughts and motives of those who have labored to secure greater equality in opportunities in railroad business are not yet open to the student in the pages of history. Therefore, the ethical element in railroad legislation can only be studied in the nature of the results sought in such legislation.

The means of transportation, the canal, the sailing vessel, the stage-coach, the private carrier, before 1828, are familiar to all. From an historical point of view we would expect as the methods of production by machinery were introduced, that the means of transportation and communication would also change.

We find that in the very beginning of railroads there was a class who considered that their rights were infringed upon—the owners of the land necessary for the road-beds. Although compensated for the land, they did not like to have their acres cut in pieces, neither did the dwellers near by wish to be disturbed by the noise of the locomotive. So from the beginning the state assisted these people to give up private selfish interests for the good of the whole.

The sense of convenience and cheapness soon led to a general desire for railroads. Not even a charter was

always considered necessary for construction. Railroads seemed only a benefit to society. They were indispensable in the long distances of the West. The new Western farmers were wholly at the mercy of the transporters of their produce. As always happens when there is too great dependence of one person upon another, or of one class upon another, power was abused. The rates charged were exorbitant. The agitation, begun by the abused class themselves, was endorsed by others who were willing to consider and work for the good of the oppressed, until, by the Granger legislation, 1870-77, the railroad corporations were forced to yield some of their assumed rights and have rates regulated by the state.

But, by the commissioners appointed to fix reasonable rates, the interests of the few were so often set over against those of the many, that the result was contrary to what was expected and the laws were repealed or cautiously enforced. To avoid the difficulty attending the adjustment of a "reasonable rate," a commission of another kind was tried in the East. In 1869 the Massachusetts Commission was established. By taking away the privilege of secrecy from railroads, it sought to regulate the interests of all classes by inspection and reports. As Professor Hadley says: "Gradually but surely, they introduced improvements in accounting, which since 1878 have been further extended by the commissions of other states. In the same way they virtually compelled the roads to adopt safety appliances, by educating public opinion to a point where it demanded such action. And in the same way they exercised a decisive influence on the policy of the rail-

roads with regard to rates, leading them to develop their local business, instead of confining attention to the through business." \*

But those things, which the Massachusetts commission sought to do for a state, are some of the problems before the Inter-State Commerce Commission. Since 1865, when the central government authorized through connections, the importance and the necessity of Federal regulation of inter-state commerce has become more evident. The efforts culminated in the passage of the act of February, 1887.

In contrast with the anticipations of what railroads would do for the country, the evils that have come alongside the advantages are surprising. At times the thought of the good of all classes, and even of their just rights, seems to be wanting. The rights and privileges of the various classes, directors, managers, stockholders, employés, shippers, consumers, and the general public, appear to be mingled in hopeless confusion.

The "Act to regulate commerce" recognizes the evils, and, by a commission having investigating, coercive and judicial powers, it attempts to regulate or eradicate them. The law attempts to establish reasonable and just rates and equal facilities for interchange of traffic between different lines; it notes the fact that the classes most needing railroad "passes" seldom receive them, and therefore tries to limit the number; it seeks to limit the power of the one or the few who recklessly manipulate stock, and overpower weaker roads to increase their own millions; it seeks to prevent personal discriminations in rates, that the

\* Railroad Transportation, p. 137: A. T. Hadley.

large business corporations may not so easily crush the smaller ones and so control prices; it seeks to prevent local discrimination, that the shippers of small towns may have equal advantages of transportation with those of larger cities; it forbids the formation of pools, for fear that there may be a combination, and perhaps a consolidation of the great trunk-lines, and thus a railroad king who would have almost absolute power over the industrial interests of the country; it demands that accounts and established rates shall be open to the public, and encourages uniformity in book-keeping, since by these means it hopes to lessen the temptation to misapply the earnings of the road, to secure to the stockholders regular dividends, and to remove the occasion for suspicion of the doings of railroads often shown by the general public; it provides means for statistical reports, that the railroad companies, stockholders, shippers, and all interested, may see reflected therein the exact condition of all the forces concerned.

Whether the power of the Inter-State Commerce Commission is sufficient to enforce the provisions of the law cannot yet be determined. Whether further legislation in the same lines, either in reference to railroads or manufactories, is needed, must be decided from the standpoint of economy as well as ethics. But since the true aim of a nation is not simply to become rich, but to secure a harmonious development of all its members, any legislation which wilfully violates or ignores the rights of any class or group of producers, or forgets to secure the good of an oppressed class, cannot in the long run prove to be correct legislation, even from the standpoint of economy.

If we notice, from our illustrations, the kinds of evils that experience has shown it is necessary to meet by legislation, given the usual weaknesses of the human mind, we find that different kinds of abuses are rendered possible because of the nature of the industry. Industries, like our second example, railroads, come in Professor Adams' classification \* under industries of "increasing returns." From the side of economy, Professor Adams concludes that the state should regulate those industries in which the returns are increasing, that is, in those industries in which for every added increment of capital there is a greater proportional return, there is a probability that prices will be controlled by a few strong leaders in the industrial world. From the standpoint of ethics, in industries of this class, if one productive process, or one line of transportation, can supply the needs of the community or state, there is a possibility of a complete monopoly. The first in time, or the more skillful in manipulation, shuts out all others. An equality of opportunity is denied and some who have special ability in that line of work are kept out, and so fail to develop an individuality that might have returned to society in a large measure. With the inequality of opportunity and the consequent inequality in results of industry, there is a probability that there will be a lower standard of living, — and the less the degree of comfort in the home, the less the physical energy and courage, the less the hope and anticipation of the future, and the fewer the incentives for bettering the present condition. And if the state assists and makes the conditions of the indus-

\* "Relation of the State to Industrial Action," by H. C. Adams.

try such that there can be greater equality of opportunity, there is more probability that the ideals, the "ought to be" of the individuals concerned, will be realized to a greater degree than would otherwise happen.

Included in this class are railroads, telegraphs, telephones, express business, (perhaps mining), also municipal supplies, as water, light, street railways, etc.

It might also seem that manufactures could be included in this class, but when monopoly in this line of industry exists, it is of a different character, or, as Mr. Bonham\* tells us, the strength of business organizations like the Standard Oil Trust, depends largely upon the secret alliances and bargains with the railroads and the rebates received from them. There is nothing in the nature of the productive process in manufacturing that forbids multiplication of "plants." And also Professor Clark states that a report of textile industries for a series of years gives an average in return of about a normal interest. Manufactures, then, under ordinary conditions, would have constant returns, and in such industries the opportunity for the capitalist to get more than his proportional share of the product is not great, and Professor Adams concludes that, as far as prices are concerned, industries of constant returns "are adequately controlled by competitive action."

But when the ethical principle is applied,—there is opportunity for the class taking the risk and responsibility to forget, or to be neglectful, of the good of those associated with them in business relations. This is

\* Railway Secrecy and Trusts: John M. Bonham.



especially true since in many industries of this class, a large investment of capital is necessary before the industry can be undertaken, and the fear that the investment may be a losing one, leads to a reluctance to spend additional amounts in safe machinery, to an exaction of the greatest number of hours of work possible, to the employment of women and children, and to a slackness and irregularity in payment of wages. Since industries of this class present these opportunities for selfishness and forgetfulness, the state comes forward and assists by regulating the conditions of production, and so prevents the physical, mental and moral deterioration of society.

Some of the industries of this class are: different kinds of manufacturing, cotton, woolen, iron, leather, wood, etc.; business organizations for facilitating exchange of supplies, such as stores, shipping companies, etc.

What shall be said of the kinds of industries known under the general head of "agriculture?" Shall we consider its "possibilities" or its "probabilities?" Is agriculture an industry of invariably diminishing returns? How has it been in our own country in the period of "land exploitation?" In older sections near large centers of population, where "intensive farming" continues and increases the natural fertility of the soil, are the returns necessarily diminishing? Professor Adams states that industries of diminishing returns are "adequately controlled by competitive action," and that there is "no call for government farming."

But it is true of this class of industries, as of the preceding, that the state can and does assist in securing

ethical results, by regulating the conditions of labor. Also there may be need of help and encouragement to those who take the initiative responsibility. If there was any thought beyond that of the increase of the material resources of our country, this desire of having a strong hopeful class in new portions of the country, must have prompted the Government to make rapid and almost free distribution of the land in the earlier days of our country. It may be that the apparent need of continuing that assistance, as, for instance, in the establishment of an agricultural department in the Cabinet, is caused by excessive legislation favoring some other industries—legislation based not upon any consistent ethical principle, but upon favoritism to special industrial groups—and that such legislation has produced an abnormal condition, so that one channel of assistance and influence must be offset by another, in order to produce an equilibrium.

Whatever may have been the causes rendering the assistance of the state necessary, further than a regulation of the conditions of labor, the state in these attempts at assistance, recognizes the fundamental character of agriculture, the dependence of other industries upon it, and therefore the dependence upon it of the very stability of society itself.

The foregoing illustrations serve as types of the different channels of assistance from the state through legislation. If the history of the specific laws has been correctly interpreted, there is a definite relation of a completed written law, as expressing a standard whereby to justly measure the deeds of individuals, to the motives in which the law originated and to the

results of that law in society. Laws that time has proved to be most beneficial to society have had an inception in motives that place the good of society before private immediate good of the individual; therefore, as the application of the ethical principle in state relations becomes general and more nearly complete, the resulting laws as standards of justice will be more nearly perfect, and greater will be the progress of the nation.

## SECTION II.

### THERE ARE LIMITS TO WISE STATE-ACTION.

*A. There may be too much legislation even in the beneficial lines.*

If the State is so strong a helper and defender of the rights of its members, why can not all phases of state-relations come under its jurisdiction, have a general settlement and then go on smoothly ever afterwards?

The will of man is essentially freedom; and whenever the state would take away from any individual or class, rights (p. 121) that are inherent in the personality of man, just then the state begins a process of destruction of its members, and so begins a process of dissolution and death. Man's thoughts are his own; the expression of thought, when that expression does not injure another member of society is his own right, for in this expression of his thoughts man affirms his right to existence; man's control over his physical energy, and over as much of his environment as he can assimilate or acquire by the free consent of others is his own (contract and ownership): these are the fundamental rights of man. And whenever in the past the state

has made laws taking away any of these rights from any class in society, results detrimental to the well-being of the state have followed.

In the governments of the leading nations, the right of existence is so well recognized that violations of this right of the subject, by the government are unheard of; but it is only necessary to go back a few centuries to find the monarchs of England, as in the time of the "Wars of the Roses," taking the life of the members of the state without any reason except the accident of birth in another branch of the Royal family.

No more significant illustration of an invasion of fundamental rights can be found than the "Statute of Laborers" about the middle of the fourteenth century. According to this statute, which deprived man of the right of freedom of contract, "every man or woman of whatsoever condition, free or bond, able in body, and within the age of three-score years, and not having of his own whereof he may live, nor land of his own about the tillage of which he may occupy himself, and not serving any other, shall be bound to serve the employer who shall require him to do so, and shall take only the wages which were accustomed to be taken in the neighborhood where he is bound to serve two years before the plague began. A refusal to obey was punished by imprisonment."\*

The system of "purveyance" used by Richard III. and by other kings of about that period, illustrates the extent to which the right of private ownership may be infringed upon by the existing government. And the system, proposed by the advocates of a "single tax," of

\* A Short History of the English People, pp. 263, 264: J. R. Green.

the confiscation of the value of land by the government of the United States would be of this nature.

Some of the rights that it is expedient that the members of the state should express are so nearly related to those that are fundamental that laws forbidding their expression produce results detrimental to the welfare of the state. The Massachusetts colony found that the invasion of the right of belief in the requirement of church-membership for the exercise of the right of suffrage was incompatible with the development of free institutions. "In 1631, it was decided 'that no man shall be admitted to the freedom of this body politic, but such as are members of some of the churches within the limits of the same.'" The troublous experience of Massachusetts, while such a measure remained in force, shows the results. We have already noticed a few of the non-ethical results which followed from the abridgement of the right of freedom of speech in the establishment of the censorship of the press.

When the laws that it is expedient for a nation to enact so favor the class in whose interest the laws are made, that the laws instead of producing an equilibrium in the expression of rights in society, become class-legislation, then the state, in granting these extraordinary privileges to some, will in all probability weaken the class over-assisted and also hinder a desirable development in other classes.

The "Poor Law" of the time of Elizabeth was of this nature; by its provisions for over-assistance to the idle, a premium was put upon inactivity and dependence upon others. The system of rates levied upon

the parishes for the assistance of the poor, dispensed as "out-door" relief took away from many able-bodied men the sense of responsibility for the support of recklessly large families. As Professor James states : \* " In 1601, the famous Poor Law was enacted which, with the supplementary acts, completed a system of legislation which did as much to degrade the laboring man and prevent him from rising out of hopeless dependence and poverty as the most bitter enemies of labor or the most warm-hearted partizans of privilege could desire."

Legislation that grants extraordinary privileges to one or more classes in society, or to one section of the country unjustly over another, or to one industrial group, appears year after year in the statute books of the states and of the Nation ; among recent laws of these kinds that have attracted a good deal of attention are " River and Harbor Bills " favoring unjustly appropriations of money to one locality over another ; the McKinley and the Wilson Tariff Bills, favoring classes of industry ; the repeal of the Bennet Law of Wisconsin, which, by removing the compulsory education requirements in the English language, favors the establishment of local Germanies, Hungaries, etc., and encourages the establishment of sectarian schools.

There is, then, a large sphere in industrial, political and social relations where the state may enact laws that result injuriously to the members of the state : all legislation that deprives man of his fundamental rights, ownership of his own body and of his own energy, physical and mental, freedom of ownership of a sufficient amount of his environment upon which to

\* The Labor Movement the Problem of To-Day, p. 14.

expend his energies; and that legislation which does not take away fundamental rights, but grants rights to a few or to a class in society, so that this class is weakened, or so that another class has not the opportunity of needful self-development, is included in this sphere of injurious state action.

*B. Also in many relations of society, assistance from the State other than protective laws and those necessary for "legal organization"\* is unnecessary.*

All growth of the human mind is the result of activity and effort; and as voluntary assistance from one member of society to another, when the work can be done equally well without assistance, injures the individuality of the assisted member, so, assistance from the State when an equilibrium can be preserved without it, only corrupts and destroys the individuality of the assisted class. Although in many relations of society special constructive measures of the state are not needed for the development of society, yet the protective measures and the fundamental constructive measures, or what is known as "legal organization," is presupposed.

The special constructive measures of the state are not needed in the field of competitive action in the industrial world, and in the general social relations of society.

In these many relations the applications of the ethical principle are not of less importance than those that have been considered; but since the acts of an individual concern one or a few members of society,

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\*The laws and relations considered under "B" are often designated by the term "civil community."

the surrender of selfish interests for the good of others becomes private in its character.

But many of the forms of voluntary private organization of industry at the present day give to almost every kind of industry a quasi-public character; and also, the very unity of the organic structure of society presupposes the dependence of one kind of industry upon another, so that the business customs and methods of one industrial group affect all others. As we have seen, the customs of society are made over or changed by the motives of the members of society. The customs of the business world are modified by this change of motives; the inquiry presents itself, What is the range of motives possible to an individual in his business relations?

We have already seen that a motive is a thought, and that a man is responsible for his thoughts or motives. All relations of society are those of the self to the other members of society. From the standpoint of ethics, the acts of man in his business dealings will be based upon one or the other of two positions — either self will be placed first, or others will be considered first; and therefore the ruling motive in business relations may be that of self-interest or that of altruism (all motives lower than that of self-interest, that is, motives to destroy the good deeds of society, do not have even a recognized place in business relations). It may be said that a person need not take a decided motive either one kind or the other, yet either he does or he follows custom; these customs have had a formation in a conscious thought-process at the initial stage of their development, and these customs are in a large measure the environment side of the individual.



In the development of a child or of a nation in its early stages, the sphere of acts when considered in its ethical aspects, is largely "obedience to authority." The sphere of its acts in reference to its economic interests is the instinctive gratification of physical wants. As soon as the child is able to reflect, the motive becomes a conscious thought involving a choice of ways of acting. The gratification of wants is no longer a blind appropriation of that which is presented, but the child chooses in a limited way, that which best suits his appetites. "The growth of the instinct to discard inharmonious elements from our consumption aids in the acquirement of a tender conscience; this being the name we give in morals to the instinct to eject discordant elements."\* This "instinctive" discarding of inharmonious elements comes through acts of obedience to those in authority, or it is a conscious decision on the part of the child; in either case the thought involved in the act of discarding become a motive; and implied in this power of making motives is the whole moral character. From the time that the child is capable of forming habits, the development of the economic instincts is simultaneous with that of the moral instincts.

In the business world, acts instigated by the motive of self-interest, whether performed from custom or from a deliberate act of calculation of consequences, may have far-reaching results of benefit to society. And in these acts prompted by self-interest, there will be much sacrifice of present ease and of immediate enjoyment. Man is placed in the surroundings of heat and cold, storms, winds, including all the various phases of

\* Economic Causes of Moral Progress: *Annals of the American Academy*, September, 1892; S. N. Patten.

change on land and water. From his advent into the world he must overcome these elements or succumb to the pressure of cold and hunger and thirst. As children, these dangerous features are kept in check by the watchful care of parents ; but the child must soon learn to assert his own energy against these natural conditions. The instinct of self-preservation prompts an exercise of the self so that the persistence under change that characterizes personality remains dominant.

Business callings in whatever direction demand a battling with the elements of nature. The farmer has the barrenness or the luxuriance of excessive fertility of the soil to overcome, in order that grains, vegetables, fruits, etc., necessary for the sustenance of man may be produced. The manufacturer must make the raw products into secondary products, fitted to protect the body from the changes of heat and cold. Transportation demands the work of large numbers who must undergo the dangers and exposure incident to railways and steamships. The more numerous the wants of society the greater will be the number who must sacrifice ease and comfort to bring the articles to supply these wants. The amount of labor that has been expended for a single breakfast of a modern family is enormous and not easily computable. But in all these phases of work and exchange of products there is rightfully no thought of the end of the labor farther than a preservation of the self through the recompense for services. The results to society are productive of a great amount of good, and the plane of thought indicated by persistent industry in one's business is in a high degree ethical in its results to society ;

but that such is a fact does not contradict another fact, namely, that the full development of thought and motive has not been reached when a man enters the industrial field with no farther desire than to "get on well" through his industrial efforts.

There are innumerable ways in the business relations of society in which a man having the motive of self-interest the predominant one, helps all other members of society. The workers above mentioned, the farmer, the manufacturer, the transporter and the merchant do not work each in isolation from the others. The labor of one industrial group so directly conduces to the comfort and welfare of another group or class, that each in working for himself necessarily makes possible a higher standard of life for others. The products of the farmer are needed by the merchant, and the merchandise of the manufacturer contributes to the physical well-being of the farmer. The unity of society makes it impossible that any man live unto himself.

And, besides, the business interests bring men of different occupations together. In such intercourse there is an interchange of ideas. Each from his range of experience contributes to the possible experience of others; and he in turn receives from others. Though each is concerned primarily with the advancement of his own, yet the unity of thought is such that he assists others in their difficulties by simply making known his experiences. In the primitive state of society the means of communication were limited, but with the era of inventions the means of communication have increased so greatly that the remotest parts of the earth have been brought in contact with each other. Good and

bad kinds of business are carried on with a facility undreamed of in the early part of the present century. Means of improvement, books, papers, etc., are so widely distributed that even the dwellers of the forest may share the "news" with the dwellers of the metropolis.

Along with the inventions for increasing the rapidity of communication, have been introduced all sorts of machinery as aids in production. With the use of machinery has come "division of labor," and with this division of labor a larger opportunity for skilled work. With the introduction of machinery has come also the possibility of shorter hours of labor and consequently more time for self-improvement and for social duties and pleasures. Inventions, however disturbing to the interests of the laborer at the time of their introduction, render possible a higher grade of living and a multiplication of a kind of wants that may be conducive to a higher spiritual development. With the motive to advance the self, these possibilities of moral advancement for all have been brought about.

No doubt a higher thought than the conquest of the forces of nature or of self-advancement has actuated many of the discoverers and inventors. The labors, discouragements, and persecutions of discoverers like Columbus, of astronomers like Copernicus, of inventors like Watts, Stephenson and Arkwright disclosed purposes that place them in the list of those whose motives arise in the highest plane of thought of which the human mind is capable.

There are, as we see, legitimate fields for the exercise of the principle of self-interest; in the past, however, it has been much the fashion to consider man in

all his industrial relations as acting wholly from the motive of self-interest: this has been done by different writers for two reasons. One reason has been to simplify the industrial elements that the course of reasoning may proceed from simple to complex phenomena, and another has been that men have been really regarded as having use in business relations for the motive of self-interest only, and as having use for higher motives in social, family and church relations.

In some phases of business relations, men are so bound by the circumstances of birth or inheritance that there are few opportunities for the exercise of any motive higher than that of self-interest. The whole amount of a man's energy may be demanded to keep himself from pecuniary dependence upon others; but in the majority of cases, each has an opportunity to choose between a lower and a higher course of action in the details of business-life; therefore the phenomena presented in business relations may appear different, from different standpoints.

If we consider some illustrations from business relations, we may be able to see how the same phenomena may appear from different standpoints; that is, we will try to look at the same set of phenomena from three standpoints, from that of self-interest, from that of altruism and from that of environment or custom. To simplify matters, these illustrations will correspond to the classical divisions of Political Economy, "fundamental principles," "consumption," "production," and "exchange and distribution."

These three standpoints may be broadly taken to represent three positions of writers upon subjects of

Political Economy and Ethics: that of self-interest, nominally the standpoint of Mill and those in agreement with him; that of emphasis upon environment, the standpoint of Marshall and some other leading writers on Political Economy of the present day; that of altruism, the standpoint of men of strong faith or remarkable insight into the possible adjustments in industrial relations.

The fundamental conditions of existence from any or all of the three standpoints are the same as those that we have noticed above: that is, there is the space-element, the time-element, the forces of the material universe or wealth, and man's energy, both mental and physical. And the same problem presents itself, the best adaptation of wealth to the needs and wants of man. The "things" of the world are brought into just the same direct relation to his spontaneous and self-made wants, and man therefore measures the utility of the objects and gives them a value. Although the kinds of utilities vary in number from each of these different standpoints, yet as man's wants remain, there is "demand." There are also like attempts to adjust the supply to the demand.

While these "concepts" as fundamental principles remain the same from any one of the three standpoints, the practical application will vary; as, for instance, the "economic man" (calling, for convenience, the man who emphasizes self-interest the "economic man," and the man who emphasizes altruism the "ethical man," and the man who recognizes the influences of environment upon altruistic motives and acts accordingly, the "practical man") — the economic man, in considering

the course of action when he has a desirable "corner lot" for sale, decides to keep the lot as long as its value increases and will sell for the highest possible price, irrespective of the purposes for which the lot may be used, or what public interests suffer by the retention of the lot in his private possession for so long a time.

The ethical man refuses to sell the lot if it is to be used for purposes that will harm his neighbor, or for the sale of intoxicating liquors, gambling or any other form of vice, irrespective of the fact that a very high price is offered for it; but if the lot be needed by some one just starting a business which will furnish employment for those needing work, and for whose product there is a legitimate demand, the ethical man sells for such a price as would enable the less fortunate man to get a good start in business.

The practical man, before selling his lot, considers the history of business in the town, the probable demand for building lots during the next few years, the rate of increase of population, the needs of the would-be purchaser and his own resources, and with the aid of competent judges, he tries to strike a medium between his own interests and those of the purchaser, and sells at the time when the equilibrium of interests will be least disturbed.

The fundamental considerations of the "market" are the same from all the given standpoints; business transactions must be based upon a consideration of "time" and "place," "initial cost," "demand and supply," etc.; but there are other elements in the customs of the market which can be varied, largely depending upon the individual standpoint.

The economic man, having ever in mind the desire of advancing his own interests, does not hesitate to put the best articles "on top," or to advertise "the best things in the world"; does not hesitate to keep "leaders," or to advertise to sell for a certain number of days "below cost," if thereby he may undersell a neighboring merchant, and bring more money to himself, irrespective of the effect upon the market as a whole; does not hesitate to monopolize a given line of business, whoever may be "driven to the wall" in consequence; does not hesitate to "make rates" or to take "rebates," or to evade the spirit of a law, if he can shield himself by a mere technicality.

The ethical man condemns all the above-mentioned practices of the economic man. A plain statement of goods and their prices is the kind of advertising done by the ethical man; for he has a due regard for the public standard of ethics in business transactions, and he permits no desire of advancing his own interests to induce him to forget the interests of those associated with him in business as customers, fellow-workers or dependents. He is also willing that even a new-comer shall have an opportunity of starting in the same line of business in which he himself is engaged, and if, on account of greater ability, by using correct business methods, he can outdo him, the ethical man will yield the field to him and either become an employé or start business in a new line. The ethical man also assists in the enforcement of a law made in the interest of the public, even where his private pecuniary interests suffer.

"Honest goods and fair profits on all," is the motto



of the practical man. He studies the market as a set of forces which must be kept in a stable condition, if his own interests, along with others, are not to suffer. This interest in the "market" is not thus strong, because the fluctuations may mean loss and suffering to many human beings, but because there is a great satisfaction in being able to interpret and perhaps control vast enterprises and to feel himself in touch in a business way with the remotest parts of the commercial world. The quality of his goods varies just enough from the trademark to escape detection, that he may preserve the confidence of his customers. He scorns all manner of dishonest dealing, yet he is on the lookout that no one gets the better of him. He will not violate a law of the land, neither will he take an aggressive position in introducing new measures, even for the public good; his business interests may suffer by such a course of action, and while recognizing that some one ought to take the initiative, he is reluctant to take any steps that may affect his business prospects. To the practical man, the most economical adjustment of different forms of wealth to the needs and wants of man is the ultimate object or end of industrial effort.

The self-centeredness of the economic man often takes the form of lavish expenditure in consumer's wealth. This economic man persuades himself that, since he keeps a large number of servants to minister to his personal pleasure and since the destruction of utilities gives opportunity for new supplies, therefore, in furnishing or giving occasion for employment to a large number of poorer members of the community, he should be viewed in the light of a benefactor to society.

The ethical man considers that such a course of enlightened self-interest is really a form of selfishness. The ethical man consumes that he may live and work, the above-type of economic man lives that he may consume as much wealth as possible. The ethical man sees the fallacy of the reasoning of the economic man and puts his wealth, beyond what is required for the healthful needs and elevating wants of his family, into different forms of productive enterprises. He also invests in public museums, art galleries, libraries, and different forms of educational efforts, free to all members of the community; he realizes that such kinds of wealth by being shared are increased in value.

The practical man regards the relation of wealth to man's needs in much the same way as the ethical man; except, that the practical man sees in the consumption of so many pounds of bread, meat, etc., so many units of working force that can be utilized to farther increase the wealth of the world. The primary consideration for increasing the comfort of the worker is that his efficiency may be increased; though, through the improvement of his environment, it is granted that he will become a better individual and a more worthy member of society.

Production is the process of transforming primary utilities into those more directly suited to the wants of man. This process is a union of the forces, "gifts of nature," and the energy of man; but as the wants of man become complex, the production of utilities for his satisfaction becomes difficult and often requires much time. From whatever standpoint "production" is considered, there will be three general factors in the pro-

ductive process: (1) The land, at a degree of fertility found naturally, together with wind, water, air, sunshine, etc.; (2) Capital, or that force whose initial energy is represented by the unconsumed food-supply, and whose accumulation is due to the element of time and to the increasing wants of man, which, encroaching upon the existing "sustenance fund," indicate new and wider channels for the directive effort of man to produce new grades of utilities; (3) The expended energy of man, both mental and physical. There are thus for each, the economic man, the ethical man, and the practical man, these same fundamental conditions of activity. And by each, these facts are recognized: that the aggregate amount of wealth must be increased by a coöperation of all classes in society in the productive processes; that with the increase of the aggregate amount of wealth, there is more for division among the different classes of producers; and that it is necessary to have the physical wants well supplied, if there shall be time and inclination for intellectual improvement and a direction of energy to fine arts, to practical arts and inventions, and to the production of masterpieces in poetry and literature.

As an agriculturist, there are also facts to be regarded by each, among which are the following: that land at the degree of fertility furnished by nature is limited in quantity; that, in general, land is subject to the "law of diminishing returns." But the significance of these facts varies from the different standpoints.

The "economic man" takes advantage of a "legal structure" that enables him to control immense estates, "bonanza farms," "ranches," "sections," etc., regard-

less of the fact that others want an opportunity to own a portion of the limited area of the earth's surface. The law permits him to do this, and since he can manage many tenants, or workmen successfully, his interests will be best advanced by farming on the large scale, and as he furnishes employment and perhaps produces grain at less cost than could be done with "small farming," of course the interests of all will be best advanced. The fact that a large working force is required in the summer for the sowing, planting and gathering of the crops, that in "large farming" there is nothing for employ  s to do in winter, and that they are therefore discharged to wander over the country, does not enter into the calculations of the economic man. The workmen agreed to work for a certain price and when that is paid, the responsibility of the employer ends.

The fact of the comparatively small amount of the earth's surface that each one can have for his own use, enters strongly into the thought of the ethical man. If he inherit a large estate, or come into possession of large tracts of land, he will not retain it that he may have the returns from it for his own exclusive use. Although he knows that he can manage it well and perhaps be able to cultivate it and obtain a larger product, and he may by reducing the cost of production or by increasing the supply be even able to make grain cheaper, yet he will not keep large estates under his control. He realizes that it is necessary, in order that individuality be developed, that an opportunity be given for each one to exercise his own energy upon his own material environment, and, as he himself wanted this opportunity, he knows that others desire equal oppor-

tunities to develop their potential energies. He also knows that unless a person's energy can be turned into channels productive to society, it will destroy the results of good deeds of other members of society. Considering such facts, he offers to sell portions of his land at such price as he would himself be willing to pay; or he leases for a sufficiently long time so that the tenant may have a personal interest in the use and improvement of the land; or he tries some kind of association farming. In some way, he tries to give others the opportunity for exercising the control over external forces and for independence which he himself so much enjoys.

The practical man computes carefully the advantages of large farming to society as a whole; the possibility of using the best machinery, of saving much time by doing in a single process what might require much repetition with small farmers, of utilizing through overseers a much lower grade of labor than could otherwise be used; and by reducing the cost of production he can sell more cheaply, and as a result many people could have better food and homes than would be possible with other methods of agriculture. Since the practical man is not likely to emphasize the need of nurture and care of individual souls, there seems to him more symmetry and organization in the one-man management of a large estate than in the varied and sometimes weak attempts in management of smaller farmers. Production to the practical man is a net-work of forces that must be skillfully manipulated; but he sometimes ignores the fact that the condition of dependence of the employés of the large system of agriculture prevents

self-directed effort and therefore growth, and that this loss of individuality eventually weakens the productive forces of society.

For the manufacturer (understanding by manufacturers all who take the "raw materials" and shape them into goods of "second or higher orders") as a producer, the conditions must be other than they are for the agriculturist. From the nature of the industry, concentration of means is necessary. The processes are so interdependent and so much machinery is necessary that great waste of capital would follow a separation into small industries. The kind of industry influences the course of action of each, the economic, the practical, and the ethical man. The position of the economic man as a manufacturer is well illustrated by reference to the general attitude of the manufacturer previous to the passage of the Factory Acts already referred to (pp. 148-153) and his opposition to the same. The attitude of the practical man is suggested in the monograph of Prof. H. C. Adams, "The State in Relation to Industries," especially the portions treating of industries of "constant returns." The position of the ethical man in industries of this class has already been indicated (p. 159).

But the ethical man, besides advocating the regulation by law of conditions of labor, is impressed with the evils that are necessary to the "factory system," — evils that uniform action of the kind enforced by law cannot reach, but evils that must be in a large degree remedied by voluntary effort. He gives careful attention, beyond the enforced sanitary regulations, to the evils attending the grouping of large numbers of families in tenement

houses for the sake of carrying on production on a large scale. He even considers that in some respects the man who works for wages only, was better off under the old system of manufacture, that is, he considers that the gain to the wage-earner in personal freedom is not sufficient to balance the disadvantages that have come with the loss of the fixed industrial position of medieval times; but the ethical manufacturer also recognizes that the wheels of progress do not turn backward, and that industrial freedom must be achieved through the same general process that has secured personal independence, that is, there must be a more thorough adoption of the democratic principle, and to that end, he advocates productive coöperation whenever feasible.

There would still remain the evils attendant upon the great division of labor necessitated by the use of machinery. The monotony of doing the same small, seemingly insignificant portion of work, day after day, week after week, and year after year, dulls even the original activity of mind, and makes the worker almost as much of an automaton as the machine which he tends. But such work must be done, and the only thing left for the ethical manufacturer is to assist in making possible opportunities for the incitement in other needed lines of activity. Such monotonous work demands fewer hours than interesting, pleasing work, and with the shorter working day, there would be time for recreation and restful kinds of activity. All the available means in the way of clubs and reading circles, Chautauquas and University Extension, and evening schools, concerts and social gatherings to which should

be invited others that did not belong to "our set," sewing classes, cooking classes, and opportunities for learning simple uses of tools would be utilized as far as possible.

The practical man might advocate the same above-mentioned measures, but he would first find out whether a working-day of eight hours in all kinds of industry could produce sufficient to feed and clothe the people of the country, and whether the democratic control in business brings sufficient amount of good to balance the loss that comes from a lack of individual control, and whether all the means for education and recreation tend to educate the workers out of their station, that is, whether the good obtained is more than offset by the discontent engendered.

In industries that are monopolies by nature, or semi-public in character, the position of the practical man and of the ethical man has already been indicated (p. 158). The economic man insists that this kind of industries is also subject to the laws of competition and that the state has nothing to do with the regulation of industries, and therefore his position is essentially the same as that of the economic manufacturer.

One more illustration :

While the producer and consumer are both concerned with the articles, the amount of the utilities and the mechanism of exchange, the distributor and the recipient of economic wealth are each interested in the comparative values represented by the different articles of production; and the problem is to find an equitable basis for a division of the value of the results of the productive process.



Entering into every productive process with greater or less prominence are the four classes: (1) The owners of natural resources — landlords; (2) owners of an applied portion of the sustenance fund — capitalists; (3) owners of a comparatively large degree of mental energy — undertak'ers; (4) owners of physical energy — wage-earners. There is a characteristic about each of these factors that must not be overlooked — the nature of the limitation of the kind of ownership. The landlord owns land; land is limited in quantity, its space relations is the prominent element for consideration. The capitalist owns capital, whose quantity may theoretically become unlimited; its rate of accumulation, its time relations are the most prominent. The business-managers own skill, insight and ability; the use of this intellectual energy, the direction in which it is employed is the chief element for consideration. The wage-earner owns physical energy in a larger degree than mental power; the amount of energy is the emphatic element. As all of these elements enter a productive process, so in every process of distribution each one comes in for a share of the value, and it is only when one element is more efficiently an agent in the creation of value than the others, that that one should have more of the value than the others.

Also it should be noticed that all these factors are, in a sense, not coördinate; that is, the two former have similar characteristics that coördinate them and the two latter. The value of the product is dependent upon and therefore belongs in a more direct way to human energy, mental and physical, than to the inanimate forces. The value of the product is logically first dis-

tributed to the workers, business-managers and wage-earners, and they in turn distribute to the landlords and capitalists.

The nature and functions of capital and the relation of the capitalist to the wage-earner appear different from the different standpoints we have been considering.

The general position of the economic man on these points is well known. It is only necessary to mention certain familiar and much-quoted phrases to define his extreme position: by "abstinence" the capitalist amasses a sum of money which he may determine to put into a productive enterprise and this sum becomes his capital; and as a portion of this sum must be set apart for the support of labor, this portion becomes a "wage-fund" which divided among a larger number, gives a less portion to each wage-earner. The most efficient remedy for low wages is therefore to decrease the divisor. The perfect competition supposed gives each man an equal opportunity with every other man to become of more importance and to get higher wages. Since the wages and the profits must both come out of the same fixed sum, as wages increase profits must decrease; and consequently there can be no real spirit of coöperation between capitalist and laborer, but only one of antagonism occasioned by the effort of each to get the larger share of a certain sum.

To the economic man, the capitalist is the one who puts things in motion and upon whom the laborer is wholly dependent, and the laborer seemingly has a fixed industrial position which can only vary between the points of "starvation wages" and the greatest amount

that can be obtained from the wage-fund by decreasing the number of workers. And any amount of combination among wage-earners by the way of organizations like trade-unions, cannot possibly increase the amount of the wage-fund and consequently cannot raise wages.

The practical man and the ethical man need not necessarily differ from each other in their fundamental conception of the nature and functions of capital. They may take any one of the various views held at the present day. The following example, which attempts a partial interpretation of the ideas of Böhm-Bawerk, Jevons, and H. C. Adams, may serve the purpose of this illustration :

While the landlord gets his amount of the results of the productive process as pay for the quantity of space which he controls, the interest which the capitalist receives comes to him because of the importance of the time-element in production and the demands of society. Suppose the value of all the agricultural products in a given country at the end of a year is  $100x$ . By a restriction of the amount that might have been consumed, this country has  $10x$  that is not consumed ; but as no one knew that that amount would be left over, the value of each unit of that amount is the same as each unit of the  $100x$  ; then some enterprising people, seeing the increase of population and the consequent demand for utilities, put this  $10x$  into tools, machines, etc., the labor and land forces remaining the same during the year, by the means of which the increased amount of surplus at the end of the next year becomes  $12x$  in value. Now the additional  $2x$  came from the putting of the  $10x$  sustenance fund into forms of

“capital;” the  $2x$  was really gained upon  $10x$ , or the rate of gain upon this form of applied force is  $\frac{2x}{10x}$ , and this gain has come because at the end of the year the wants of society are such that the amount of force represented by the  $2x$  will be needed to supply the demands of the country. Therefore, in very much the same way that the rental value of land depends upon society as a whole, the accumulation of this amount of value comes because the various changes in the demands of society have given this time-element a value that is called interest. Several other elements are of importance and capable of analysis, but the thought is, that the emphatic steadfast element in interest is the time-element which renders the social and productive changes possible.

As Professor Böhm-Bawerk says: \* “The loan is a real exchange of present goods against future goods. \* \* \* Present goods possess an agio in future goods. This agio is interest.”

The language of the quotation appears to be from the standpoint of “individual capital” rather than from that of “social capital.” But the thought can be applied to the above example. The different articles, or their utilities, which represent the  $10x$  value at the beginning of the year, though they may have changed in form and in number many times during the year, at the end of the year have a value of  $12x$ , because the number and range of wants of the people have changed. It does not follow that changes always mean an increase of social capital; as, in a time of famine, one individual capitalist may obtain a large rate of interest, which really comes from another capitalist or from wealth

\* (Capital and Interest, Vol. I., p. 259.)

that should have been converted into forms for immediate consumption by starving people, and not from a real increase of social capital. Thus, in our example, at the end of the year, while society as a whole would have 2x value, if there were no hope of increase of wants or no increased ability with each one to satisfy them, the marginal utility of the capital of the individual capitalist would have decreased approximately one-fifth.

Although, according to the above example, the normal rate of interest is twenty per cent. some business manager with strong insight into the probable demands of the next year, will be willing, in starting a new business, to pay more than the normal rate, and yet, owing to his getting ahead by the way of an invention, or by "taking up" very fertile soil, he will have a large surplus from his business venture. On the other hand, the business man may not estimate correctly the direction in which this force should be employed, or some sudden change in the fashion may reduce the special form of his capital to uselessness; but as its value may have passed into other forms, this deterioration of value may be a loss to the individual capitalist, but not to society as a whole. That is, an individual may estimate his capital and express it in terms of money at any time, but the social capital is a force whose intensity can be estimated with surety only when in a certain form.

It may be suggested that there is a possibility of estimating the value of capital from the social standpoint just as well after it has assumed the form of machines, tools, etc., as when in the form of a sustenance fund. That would be true, if it were not for

the element of "thought" that enters all estimates of value. For instance, suppose the value of all the capital of a country or of the commercial world were estimated at the beginning of the year; a machine is directly afterward given a place-value by being transported from the East to California, and that machine makes a kind of cloth which immediately "sets a fashion," and there is an immense demand. How much of the value of the cloth should be attributed to the engine that gave the machine a place-value? Or should none of this value be considered as entering the value of the engine? Should an arbitrary dividing line be made and the value of the engine be estimated from the "cost of production," and should this cost of production be reduced to terms of labor, or to the "supply-prices" of the materials composing the engine? Or shall the value of the engine depend upon the "reciprocal demand" for engines when compared with other articles; and if so, what elements enter that demand?

May there not be a complete readjustment of values all over the commercial world, by the simple change of the wants of consumers? If true, is there any certain way of estimating social capital after it leaves the form of "sustenance fund?" For since the thought-element of a want will always enter for consideration, can the variations of thought, which enter as an element to cause the fluctuations in values which in turn cause some capital to assume new forms and other forms to become useless, be ever estimated?

Both the practical man and the ethical man acknowledge, that, while the existence of capital is due to individual foresight and prudence and self-restraint in

refusing to consume all the utilities represented by the sustenance fund, yet the rate of its accumulation and the variations depend closely upon the increase in the needs and wants and resources of society; and they consider that the individual control over capital that society has logically and rightfully granted to them, places upon them certain obligations which in other capacities they might not have.

Both the practical man and the ethical man, taking the above view of "natural interest," grant that by foresight in anticipating elevating wants of society, and by skill in investing, the individual capitalist may justly get more than natural interest. Also both grant, that wages as well as "profit" come from the product and that there is no fixed ratio in which the distribution must be made. Both also agree that the "standard of comfort" and not the amount of money measures the wages received. And both see that the kind of industry and the consequent constructive legal measures are elements that assist indirectly to determine the relations of capitalist and laborer even in the competitive phases of industries.

But there are other points upon which there would be different conclusions, depending upon the standpoint.

Some practical men say that the whole problem of distribution may be solved by an application of the "law of rent" to determine the "profit" of the business manager, and when one portion is fixed as a starting point, the problem becomes easy; other practical men, as well as the ethical man, say that the law of rent can be applied in a similar manner to determine

the portion of any one of the four classes of claimants, and that such a theory of distribution is simply a conception of a series of forces in equilibrium without any really self-consistent, self-determining element, and that with such a conception, the starting point in the distributive process can be none other than an arbitrary one.

The practical man says that wages depend upon the "efficiency of labor and upon the amount of land," or expressed differently, upon the "law of substitution," or that "the wages of every class of labor tend to be equal to the produce due to the additional labor of the marginal laborer of that class."

The ethical man says that the conditions are so various that different trades and branches of industry must be considered by themselves in order to find the "marginal worker," and that it is not much more difficult to discover the "normal man," than it is to discover the point of equilibrium at which a worker would as soon do one kind of work as another; that the practical man's competition, or "economic freedom and enterprise" seems to be largely confined to freedom in a particular kind of business and that the employer really estimates how much the man is worth to him, and pays for his ability and skill accordingly with not much reference to other kinds of industries; and that in such a process of estimating the worth of a man to the particular industry, competition takes the desired vertical direction or that which depends upon the skill and ability of the worker rather than the horizontal competition or that where "numbers" is the chief factor.

Marshall says: \* "The corrected law then stands

\* Principles of Economics, p. 581.



that the tendency of economic freedom and enterprise is generally to equalize efficiency-earnings in the same district; but where much expensive capital is used, it would be to the advantage of the employer to raise the time-earnings of the more efficient workers more than in proportion to their efficiency." The ethical man would see that the "corrected law" might have applications for other reasons than the "advantage of the employer."

The practical man also says that wages depend upon the amount of capital, not that the capital forms a wage-fund, but that the product is increased by an increase of capital and therefore wages indirectly depend upon the capital invested; the ethical man grants that such a position is a true one, but that it does not necessarily follow that the laborers will get their share of the product because of any inherent "natural law": that "natural law" in the distributive process is largely the will of the business manager.

The practical man sees that the present state of antagonism between capital and labor is in a measure due to either the tacit or open combination of capitalists in accordance with the ideas of the economic man in the decades that have passed, and that trade-unions, etc., among wage-earners are for the most part counter-combinations to obtain rights that in justice are theirs, and to secure a more correct proportional share of the "producer's surplus" than they seem to be able to get in any other way: the ethical man sees that the same result can be accomplished in a better way; he takes the position granted by the practical man, that the wage-earner's position is not fixed in that stratum and

that anyone may develop the ability which fits him for a business if given the opportunity. And to that end he will try to increase the sense of personal responsibility of the wage-earner in all practical forms of coöperation, — productive, distributive, and association-farming — and in different forms of profit-sharing; for the ethical man sees that such measures are not revolutionary but are only making more explicit what already exists to some degree in industries where no one of the above-mentioned forms is avowedly used: as Professor Marshall states, "Even where the same price is paid all over the market for the same work with the same machinery, the prosperity of a firm increases, for almost every one of its employés, the chance of advancement, and also of continuous employment when trade is slack, and much-coveted overtime when trade is good. There is *de facto* some sort of profit and loss sharing between almost every business and its employés."

The practical man grants that through combination of wage-earners, wages may even encroach upon loan-interest and that in the course of time interest may become zero; both the practical man and the ethical man grant that such a condition is in accordance with the above ideas of natural interest, that is, when the capital of a country has a tendency to increase more rapidly than the possibilities of industry to satisfy the wants of the people, or the individual resources in satisfying them, natural interest may become zero; if such is the possibility, the ethical man has a double assurance that it is not sentiment when the circumstances and character of the borrower justify it, to remit the interest upon a loan or mortgage, or to

allow the payment to be deferred until a year of better crops or of more successful business; if his principal remains intact the ethical man considers that he has still the reward of his own individual industry.

Some practical men say that "Protection" raises wages in the kinds of business protected to the rate paid in unprotected industries, and that protection is only necessary in a new country and then for the sake of the industrial education thereby attained through diversified industries; the ethical man joins in the conclusion, that to continue "protection" after the industrial education is well advanced is a method of self-exclusion from the reciprocal business and trade interests of other countries.

The practical man as a laborer considers that, as the employer has the advantage of opportunity and perhaps of superior mental power, he is justified in getting all of the product that he can; the ethical wage-earner looks very carefully after his own faithfulness, and considers that there may be an identity of interests between his employer and himself, and if he sees that his efficiency is not equal to that of others of the same grade of workmen he offers to work for smaller wages.

The practical man sees that many of the evils of the "sweating system" can be done away with by the means of "consumers' leagues," by which only those firms which pay respectable wages shall be patronized, also that the influence of public opinion is a powerful agent in assisting business managers to a method of distribution more nearly just to all claimants for shares of the product; the ethical man considers that his responsibility for the work from his establishment ends

only when the articles are ready for consumption, and in limiting his energies to a business of the size that he can manage personally he is able to see that the workers receive what in justice is theirs. His interest in wage-earners extends beyond their efficiency as workers; for he looks upon them as human beings with wants, desires and aspirations like his own. And the ethical man has learned well one of the seeming contradictions of the human mind: whenever a person seeks his own good first, regardless of the good of others, that which he seeks eludes his grasp; but as soon as he consciously and determinedly prefers another's good to his own, or seeks his own good through another's, at that moment the person enters into a larger and more complete life.

The inadequacy of illustrations to convey completely the thought contained in a principle is readily granted. It is doubtless to a large degree true that the "economic man" of Mill's conception has become the "practical man" of present writers through the recognition of the fact, that men in business relations are moved by motives other than that of self-interest; and, if all the possible grades of business motives may be resolved into some form either of self-interest or of altruism (laying aside the perfectly valid thought of the reason, that the universe is created in accordance with altruistic principles, and that man can only truly develop as he adopts and exemplifies these altruistic principles in all his relations with his fellow-men), is there not reason to think that progress in the future will be by a more extended adoption and exemplification of altruistic principles, and that the "practical man" of future generations will in many more points resemble the ethical man of the present?

## SECTION III.

## THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW.

A Law is the formula for the expression of an activity or force. "Laws of nature" express the definitely ascertained activities of heat, light, sound, electricity, etc., the motions of the stars, planets, etc., and the activities of matter in the form of mass as it becomes formations, strata, etc. Laws in reference to the plant or animal kingdom express the mode of activity of plant and animal life. Laws in reference to man state and describe the modes of activity of the human mind. And these laws of man may be subdivided into laws of the specific departments in which the activity of mind shows itself. When the thought of man is directed towards discovering the best methods for the formal organization of the natural organic unity of mankind, there result the laws of the state or nation, known as "international law and municipal law."

When the customs of a people in reference to government and the administration of affairs become well established, these customs become expressed as rights rendered positive in laws; these laws may be definite and formal, as statute-law, or they may remain as "common law" expressing customs recognized by the courts of a nation as binding in the relations of citizens with one another. Whenever there is a violation of these expressed or implied and understood rights, this violation becomes a wrong to one party and the act by which this wrong is perpetrated becomes a crime. For this crime the state by reason of its sovereignty can fix a penalty, and in the expression of this penalty it

attempts to measure the deed of the person and to return to the person this deed directly or to render to him some symbolic expression of his act.

The state through its executive officers, attempts to arrange the conditions so that the rights of individuals as expressed in laws are regarded, but when there is a crime committed the state farther sees that the violator is brought to justice and that the proper penalty is imposed upon him for his crime or misdemeanor. The officers for the execution of law are the President of the United States in some of his capacities, the Army and Navy, and the "Police Force" of the nation, commonwealth, city and town. These officers, declared such by the will of the people, do not express their own thoughts of the guilt and penalty of the criminal party, nor do they express any feelings or thoughts of anger or revenge, but carry out exactly the thought as expressed by law and interpreted by the courts of the land. The President is an executive officer of the laws of our country in times of war or of especial danger, but in times of usual peace and prosperity, the "police force," including the United States army, state militia, and agents and commissioners are the executive officers.

As we have seen, the laws that must be interpreted and enforced are in general of two classes, protective laws and constructive laws. The state through the legislative departments of nation and commonwealth, expresses the rights of its citizens that should be protected; and it defines the rights that are fundamental for the development of personality; and it also expresses and makes clear in laws the fact that

classes in society must give up many possible rights for the sake of the development of other classes in society.

In the rectification of wrongs that ensue from the violation of law, the initiative in the enforcement of a law may be taken either by the state as in criminal cases, or by the party injured as in contract. Laws that a nation passes on the ground of expediency (2 (b) p. 121) are executed by the regular police officers and by agents, commissioners, etc., named as executive officers in the specific laws; therefore the initiative in execution rests almost entirely with the state. The ordinary police force in the execution of laws not simply for the protection of life and property are enforcing laws that are constructive in character; for instance, in the enforcement of laws that tend to produce a higher state of morality in the community, as in closing saloons, gambling houses, houses of disrepute, etc. But in the execution of all classes of laws the principles that govern their enforcement are the same. For public officials in the execution of law there is no alternative; the letter of the law must be carried out.

If law is undesirable or unnecessary, it rests with the legislative bodies to repeal, and not with the executive officers to disregard. That this principle is recognized and very often carried out, is shown in our own country by the general condition of peace and security that prevails. Especially is this true in the case of laws protecting life and property. In the violation of laws of this kind, the acts are evidently "overt" and the violation is against rights so fundamental that police officers recognize the necessity of prompt action.

When we remember the number of poor and vicious persons that are annually landed upon our shores, and when we remember the crowded conditions of our larger cities, notably New York,\* and the vice and ignorance that abound, we find many noteworthy illustrations of the execution of law in accordance with the established decrees of justice; also every city, town and village throughout the country can furnish examples of faithful service in the execution of measures securing peace and safety. However, in laws that are constructive in character, laws that have for their general purpose the establishment of conditions for development and therefore include many measures that have for their object the prevention of crime rather than its punishment, there are many instances in which officers whose function is the enforcement of law fail in their duty and so fail to carry out the established measures of justice. No stronger illustration of this fact could be obtained than the recent disclosures in New York city made primarily through the efforts of Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst.

The kind of "police laws" disregarded and violated are those designed to secure the attention and vigilance of the police officers that a vast amount of crime may be prevented, or if perpetrated, that the offenders shall be brought to justice immediately. "It is one of the rules and regulations of the Police Department, that 'it is the duty of the Superintendent to enforce in the city of New York all the laws of the state, and ordinances of the city of New York, and ordinances of the Board of Health, and regulations of the Board of

\* See *Darkness and Daylight*; or, *Lights and Shadows of New York Life*: Helen Campbell; Thomas W. Knox and Thomas Byrnes.



Police; to abate all gambling houses, rooms, and premises, or places kept or used for lewd or obscene purposes and amusements, and places kept or used for the sale of lottery tickets or policies. Another rule is: Captains will be diligent in enforcing the laws relating to lottery policies and shops, the selling of liquor, and gambling of all kinds. Still another rule governing patrolmen is the following: Patrolmen must carefully watch all disorderly houses or houses of bad fame within their post, observe by whom they are frequented and report their observations to the commanding officer. Again: Each patrolman must by his vigilance, render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for any one to commit crime on his post.' '\*

Dr. Parkhurst, with the aid of his friends, obtained during one month, "legal evidence" of 284 violations of the above ordinances. By such complicity with vice, police officers, instead of being true executives of law and guardians of the peace and moral order of the community, become associated in the worst forms of vice and wickedness, and instead of exemplifying an ethical principle that accords with a decree of justice, in becoming partners in such nefarious practices, they are accomplices in the exemplification of an ethical principle such only as the inhabitants of the inferno show in their lives (p. 39). Or as Dr. Parkhurst expresses it: "You cannot have men even of tainted reputation (saying nothing of character) high in municipal authority, without that fact working the discouragement of virtue and the reduction of moral standards. It is a pretty trying state of affairs for such

\*The Vilest Men Exalted; Sermon by Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst, March 13, '92, reported in *The Christian Union*, March 19, '92.

as are attempting to improve the moral condition of our young men, in particular, to have officials high in power against whom the most damning and excoriating thing that can be done is to publish their history."

New York, from its size and situation and political history, can probably furnish as many illustrations of official complicity with vice as any city in the United States, yet every city, town and village in the country might, without doubt, realize a higher ideal of virtue and secure to its inhabitants better opportunities for business and social pursuits of a lofty character, were the officials, charged with the enforcement of law, always true to the established standards of justice. And when not only police officials join hands with vice for "a consideration," but also the people of a city agree to license besides liquor saloons, houses of prostitution, as in San Francisco,—then is public sentiment far below an ethical principle of the highest order. (Such a condition of society comes for consideration in social ethics rather than in political ethics.)

Another illustration of the failure to execute law is sometimes seen in agents or commissioners appointed to enforce special laws, as for instance, when agents appointed to see that "factory laws" are enforced, connive with the manufacturer in a misrepresentation of the age of children employed in cotton and woolen mills. But in such laws, as the enforcement of the law falls upon one or a few, the sense of personal responsibility and the power of public opinion assist the public officer in continuing steadfast to the lines of action established for him.

The private individual has open to him an alternative.

He may if he wishes, forgive the offence, but even the private individual violates the principle of justice, if his spirit of kindness and mercy leads him to ignore the fact that it is showing a human being respect to treat him justly, that is, to treat him as a being responsible for his deeds. As, for instance, if a man steals the watch of another: even though the person robbed has another and better one at home, and even though his circumstances would not lead him to seek to recover the watch for the sake of its money value, yet the man who stole the watch has committed a crime — theft — for which the state has established a penalty, and unless the robbed man reports his loss to the police officers and takes steps to recover the stolen property, the man who has lost his watch is violating the principle of justice, and by his indolence or indifference he is helping to increase the number of criminals. And again, in the matter of contract, it often rests with the individual to determine whether he will show indifference, and thus exemplify an ethical principle, that is of the order of the infernal (as sloth may lead to every kind of vice and wickedness), whether he will bring the offender to justice, or whether he will “forgive the debtor.” Any failure to execute justice even in the matter of a few cents, be it an individual or a corporation that is concerned, if this failure tends to weaken the sense of responsibility for the wrong and criminal act, tends to increase the desire for the contraction of debts in society, and to that degree, renders it more difficult to carry on the necessary business of society on sound and honest principles. But if the person indebted is hindered from paying his debt by circumstances over

which he has no immediate control, and for which he is not guiltily responsible, then there is opportunity to exemplify the principle of charity.

Closely connected with the executive force and in a sense intermediate between the executive system and the judicial system, are "lawyers." As private citizens their acts and motives fall within the sphere of the "individual," or of the social relations; but in their semi-official character their acts are open to study in a way different even from those of other professional men, as physicians and ministers.

For instance, what must be the ethics of a lawyer in deciding whether he will plead the cause of a party whom he knows to be guilty? "Innocent until proven guilty," is the standard of justice. But does that demand that a lawyer shall use his knowledge of a mere technicality to prevent the punishment of a guilty man, even if by so doing he can "win his case" and get a larger fee? Does not the good of society come in for consideration, in his decision to accept or refuse a case? Was not the custom that even the lawyer shall consider the arraigned party innocent, and therefore that he shall have the benefit of all the *devices* of the law, made by the conscious thought-process of some one? And if so, can it not be changed to perhaps a higher custom? Do not these "devices of the law" often pervert justice under the semblance of assisting its maintenance?

And when the "case" has been accepted — what shall be the criterion for decision in reference to withholding facts from the opposing party, or for making facts really detrimental appear to the advantage of the client through a skillful manipulation of these facts?

In reference to the withholding of facts that might be advantageous to the opposing party, an eminent authority \* states that according to his opinion, one party in a suit at law is under no obligation to furnish facts for the opposing party, and that the ethics of the question demands silence only. Such a course of action may represent the exemplification of the highest ethical ideal in law cases at the present day, but is there not possible a higher ideal in this matter? Could not many cases of the adjustment of rights be settled through the use of the knowledge of lawyers in forms of private arbitration without the trouble and expense of a full trial at law? Does not the fact that such a course of action is sometimes followed at present, suggest that the custom might be extended to an advantage to society, if not to the pecuniary advantage of lawyers?

An experienced lawyer and judge † expresses the following thoughts in reference to the question of the perversion and manipulation of facts: "It is almost impossible to find a criminal case where there is not at least an attempt to pervert the facts on both sides; on the side of the government's or state's attorney, there is a desire and an attempt to make every fact, or assumed fact tell against the defendant; and on the part of the defence there is an attempt to ignore or glose over or explain away every inculpatory fact. And the defendant starts out by denying *in toto* the accusation against him by pleading, 'not guilty.' This is true in all criminal cases except the cases in which the guilt of the defendant is so plain that his counsel think there is no chance of an acquittal, or in which

\* Judge Knowlton: University of Michigan.

† Robert Kerr; Archer, Texas.

the defendant is too poor to pay a lawyer, or in which the fine and costs would be less than the lawyer's fee even if he should be acquitted, and if he should be convicted of course he would have to pay both fine and fee. A lawyer can not be an ethical doctrinaire with regard to abstract justice and at the same time a successful practitioner.

"Take a concrete case, one in my own practice: I had two clients, prosecuted for a criminal offense. They were arrested and gave bond to appear at the next term of the court, to answer to the charge against them. The cases were very similar. The offense was one where the defendant if convicted, would have to be imprisoned, and, consequently, had to be at the trial, and his attorney could not appear for him if he were not there. One of my clients was there at the trial; the other was detained and could not get there. The prosecutor for the state did not know this, but I did. I found a flaw in the other indictment in which I thought I could clear that man whom we will call 'B.' I knew the other one, whom we will call 'A,' could not get back in time, and I could not save him from conviction or his bond from being forfeited. So I said to the prosecuting attorney, 'See here, we have a good many cases to try, and are pretty busy; now, there are 'A' and 'B,' their cases are much alike; let us make both their cases depend on one. Let us try 'B.'s case, and if you convict him, I will plead 'guilty' for 'A'; and if I clear 'B,' then you dismiss the case against 'A.' The prosecuting attorney said, 'all right,' so we went to trial.

"The indictment on which we went to trial on 'B.'s'

case read like this: 'the defendant — did on the 30th day of June, A. D., one thousand and ninety-two,' leaving out 'eight hundred' in the date. When the prosecutor tried to prove the commission of the offense on the 30th day of June, A. D., 1892, I objected, for the reason that that could not be the same offense as the one for which the accused was being prosecuted, which was alleged to have been committed eight hundred years before, if the indictment was true. Of course the Court sustained the objection, the defendant was acquitted,—and was guilty, and under the agreement the prosecutor had to dismiss the case as to 'A.' If I had demurred to the indictment on account of the defect in the date, it would have been quashed and a new one might have been found for the same offense, and both defendants might have been convicted, as they probably deserved. But there is a rule of criminal law, that a man shall not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. And when he plead not guilty to the charge and was acquitted, that was the end of it. From a professional point of view, my action in the matter was not only justifiable, but commendable."

Another incident that happened in one of our cities is related.\* A certain lawyer was counsel for a woman arrested for poisoning another person by the means of cookies. The lawyer stated that he could prove that the cookies had not been poisoned, and he ate one; however, he soon took an emetic: yet he gained his case and the defendant was acquitted.

What kind of ethical principles are exemplified in

\* Joseph H. Vance: Librarian of the Law Library, University of Michigan.

these instances? Do not acts of such kind tend to subvert all true ideas of justice, and to destroy the possibility of the administration of justice by the state?

Does the lawyer lay aside his responsibility as a man when he becomes a lawyer? Is it not precisely like having two consciences in business transactions — one for the store and one for the home? Do not such ethics of judicial procedure really make law the “private property” of lawyers? The people for whom the laws are made are deprived of the influence that comes from the punishment of known criminals. To be sure there are phases of a case in law in regard to which the lawyers have no ethical responsibility; but are these two points, “responsibility in taking a case” and of “perverting facts” included? Are not lawyers who take “doubtful cases” and “pervert facts” accessory to crime even though it be “after the fact,” and even though their unethical motives do not result in acts directly amenable to the law?

The courts local, county, state and federal, of the various grades, act as interpreters of law and have the jurisdiction in the application of law in the conflict of rights. The judiciary is the arbiter between the legislative power and the executive. The sphere of the action of the court is in the attempt to realize justice in particular cases without allowing feelings of interest for any particular party to enter. The decision of the court may be expressed by a judge or by a jury. “To demand confession of the culprit as is common in German courts of justice, has this truth in it, that by so doing the subjective self-consciousness is satisfied, since the sentence which the judge pronounces should not



differ in the consciousness of the convicted person, from the sentence of his own conscience, and since the judgment does not cease to contain an alien element to the transgressor until he has confessed his offense. Here is the difficulty, however, that the transgressor may refuse to confess, and thereby the interests of justice be endangered. But, again, if the subjective conviction of the judge is to be supreme, there is once more a hardship, since man is no longer treated as a free agent. This mediation, however, takes place when it is demanded that the verdict of guilty or not guilty should come, as from the soul of the transgressor through the verdict of a jury." "His twelve peers state their opinion of the relation of the criminal's particular act in regard to the acknowledged common good."\* Unfortunately, the high ideal of a just expression of opinion by the twelve peers becomes lowered when that opinion is obtained by bribes and by the influence of interested parties. And the requirement that jurymen shall come to a trial with unbiased judgment does not fit so well with times of free education, rapid spread of intelligence through newspapers, and the telegraph, etc., as it did with the days of the isolation of forest life and absorption in individual interests.

But the experience of our country has proven that the organization of the Supreme Court of the United States was a measure highly conservative of the ethical ideas of the nation. The stamp of fidelity to important trusts, and of loyalty to a government that should be of and for all the people, and of liberality and broad-

\*The Ethics of Hegel, pp. 184, 185: J. Macbride Sterrett.

mindedness in the interpretations of the nation's laws was placed upon the Supreme Court in the early days of our history by Chief Justice John Marshall; and almost without exception, those who have sat in the highest tribunal of the nation have shown like characteristics.

"The Supreme Court is the most original of all American institutions. It is peculiarly American, and for its exalted character and priceless services it is an institution of which Americans may well be proud." \*

#### SECTION IV.

##### THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS.

The acceptance of the kind of ethical principle for a guide in the life of an individual is indicated by the kind of motives that an individual creates for his rule of action. In general social relations the results of these motives of individual minds are seen as "movements," "questions of the day" and "social reforms."

The phases of activity and discussion brought about by the "advanced" ideas in the realm of social relations do not all become fixed in a standard or measurement for acts as in laws, but remain as "opinion" accepted by some and rejected by others. In time, certain phases of the popular questions of a time became expressed in law, and other phases still remain as public opinion. Such questions as "civil service reform" and "women in politics" are at present in our country on this border line and represent movements of our times.

The early ideas of service to the country for the sake

\* Civil Government in the United States, p. 252: John Fiske.

of the welfare and interests of the nation and not for personal aggrandizement and gain, were lost through the inauguration of the "spoils system" in Jackson's Administration. From that time the ethics of political parties seems to demand no higher ideal in political aspirants than the acquirement of as much as possible from the government and for as long a time as possible. The very enormity of the demands of political parties upon their accession to power has for some years past aroused something of the early spirit of patriotism and loyalty to the interests of the nation. These higher sentiments of what civil service ought to be have received partial expression in law, and with the accession of a new party a portion of the offices are not now open for free distribution to personal or political friends.

The name "*Civil Service Reform*" is a continual reminder that the early ideals of service for the government and country have not been preserved. In the early days of struggles for existence and the opportunity for growth, there was no thought that there would ever be the need of a legal measure, whose requirements would keep out men who would not fill government positions for the interests and good of the government. An adherence to the ideals of representative government, in an unselfish devotion to the good of the whole was supposed to exist and to receive sufficient exemplification through the motives and activities of the citizens unconstrained by law. But these early ideals have not been realized, and the new National Civil Service Reform League, whose immediate work is to secure the names to a pledge favoring

the abolition of the Spoils System, will find a large field for their energy. The hope is to raise public sentiment to the point where such a law can be passed and enforced that very few offices of the United States government will remain as the spoils of the victorious party.

Expression of opinion by the ballot is only one step of a complex act of the members of the state. Whether these ballots shall be cast by all the men of the state or by a part, or by the men and women, is a matter of expediency. The "right of voting" is as natural to women as to men. The only question is: in what way can all of the interests of society be best forwarded? There are many steps in a representative form of government before a law is made and executed. It is inexpedient that, for instance, in our country, all the men of the state should meet and directly make laws, as was done in the days of the pure democracy of Athens, and as is still done in some of the cantons of Switzerland, and in our New England town meetings.

The expression of opinion at the polls is hardly so significant a part of the whole process of making laws as the expression of opinion before the time of voting. The voice of woman has a power in forming public opinion when unhampered by duty of voting and ambition for office-holding that would be in a measure lost, were her work directed in exactly the same channels as that of men.

There are two general classes of laws, as we have seen (p. 120). The question is, is the assistance of women needed in the enactment and execution of one or both of these classes of laws?

Protective laws. The solidarity of the interests of men and women is such that laws that protect the life and property of men do at the same time protect the life and property of women. It needs no argument to assure one that women are not fitted by nature for service in the army or on the regular police force.

The two phases of constructed laws. (a) Those fundamentally constructive. The contest in the past has been largely in reference to laws of this kind. But a close consideration will discover that the historic cry, used by woman-suffragists, "Taxation without representation," is not based upon the same conditions that have made it so potent in the past. Laws in reference to the ownership of property and in reference to contract have often discriminated unjustly against women. But have these discriminations been against women as women, or against ignorance and weakness and consequent danger of mismanagement? Do not the many changes in laws giving more nearly equal opportunities to women, in part answer this question? If so, can not other changes be made more effectively and with less detriment to the other interests of society than by the direct vote of women at the polls? For, when two parties meet on election day, there is simply a contest of numerical strength; and the finer qualities of mind shown in the power of instruction and persuasion lose much of their significance. In bringing about the desired changes in laws, is not the education of women doing more than would be possible in any other way?

But the question is: "what ought to be" from the nature of this kind of laws. For instance, a certain town builds a bridge and taxes all the property to

pay for it. In this town there are twenty women who own property and who are not represented by father, brother or husband. Are not these women unjustly taxed? Taxes upon property are based logically upon the idea of the recognition of the right of private ownership in property. This right of ownership is acknowledged through this reception by the state of the taxes. The bridge is not built for one class in society, but for all. The public interests of men and women in these fundamental questions are identical; the men in representing the interests of the whole represented the interests of women as well as of men. For convenience, the men did the work of meeting to vote, of building the bridge, of levying and collecting the tax, etc. The women, while having an equal interest with the men that a good bridge should be built and money judiciously expended, had their time and strength for duties that men could not do so well as they.

In all measures regulating these fundamental rights of ownership and contract, the same principle will hold true. Laws establishing equal opportunities for men and women in these respects, express and include all the possible rights of men and women in both these channels of expression of individuality. In other words, men in establishing universal (for the state or country) conditions for ownership and contract do at the same time establish them for women. If the nature of these fundamental rights has been correctly interpreted, there should be no need for the assistance of women in making and executing this kind of laws.

(b) Special constructive measures. This kind of laws is not concerned with the existence and *necessary*

growth of the members of the state. These special measures limit the expression of possible rights of some of the members of the state for the sake of assisting another part to express a larger degree of individuality than would be possible without these laws. In the making and execution of laws respecting education and temperance, at least in their local aspects, from the nature of the subjects it seems that the vote of woman would add force to her opinions already more or less forcibly expressed by written and spoken word. And the experience of the twenty-two states that have given women the privilege of voting upon educational questions does not contradict this conclusion.

The temperance question is one concerned with the physical appetite, and so long as human nature remains, it will be a "question of the day." The supposedly permanent regulations that issue from state capitols seem to fail in the matter of continued effectiveness, and for a stable, developed condition of society, regulations resulting from local option seem more effective. Different kinds of legislation may be fitted to the different parts of the country, but in local option the real sentiment that must be felt in the execution of the law is likely to be expressed in the license or no-license vote.

It is acceded everywhere that women are less addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage than men. Women also feel the most keenly the degradation brought about through drunkenness in the family. Therefore, in this contest with appetite she could be counted upon to place as strong safeguards as possible around the members of society bound by the habit of

drink. The exercise of the power of voting upon the local phases of the temperance question, would supplement the work of instruction and influence now exerted, and even then the strongest assistance in a question which is a matter of strengthening a weak will, will ever be the direct personal influence in instruction and persuasion. The question of voting upon the local phases of "education" would come under the same head but for somewhat different reasons. Women are the teachers of the race and they possess the qualities that fit them for looking after the details of work in the educational system and in such work requiring time and patience, all concede that women fail less often than men. Phases of the educational question that come for consideration at the national or state capitol become mingled with questions in which there is such a solidarity of interests of men and women that they are adequately cared for by the vote and representation of men at these centers of law-making; but the local affairs of the educational system are often treated by men merely as particulars of political machinery. That education is the end of the laws and regulations of the school district or ward is therefore often lost sight of in the scramble for office and exhibition of favoritism. Women with their sympathies quickened by contact with children, in their various opportunities of teaching, would keep in view the purpose of a system of public education, and, removed from the temptations incident to a full political career, she would more faithfully adhere to the ideal, that all the children and youth of the community should have the best possible opportunity for self-development



regardless of office-seekers. With their characteristics and training, women are well fitted to become school visitors and assistants in enforcing compulsory education laws.

Other kinds of special constructive laws mentioned above (p. 131) may perhaps in the future need the active assistance of women at the polls. Expediency governs this whole realm of legislation. How far can law regulate the possible rights of the different members of the state? How much is it wise to repress the expression of the power of one class in order to give another class an opportunity to become more thoroughly in sympathy with the whole? And as it is also a matter of expediency how many of the members of the state shall give the final expression of public sentiment at the polls—there is a double question of expediency to be considered in such legal measures. Experiment only can determine in reference to the utility of many phases of this kind of laws, and also experiment must help to decide whether women shall vote upon other of this class of laws than “temperance and education.” If it be unnecessary that she take part in making laws relating to the “poor,” in sanitary laws, in the appointment of commissions, and in laws regulating industries, it seems to be proved that it is expedient to have woman’s assistance in executing some of these laws. The results of recent appointments of women to the superintendency of state “children’s homes,” in prison commissions, as factory inspectors, etc., where women are the objects of interest, are in the highest degree beneficial. Even the desirable assistance of women at the polls on the questions of temperance and education will not be an

unmixed good in its results upon women, and therefore upon society. The same qualities that are developed in men through participation in some phases of political life will be fostered in women in so far as the social questions are treated as simply political questions. The same kind of ambitions may be aroused in women as in men when engaged in politics: the National Woman's Temperance Union serves as an illustration. Even in its few years of existence we see it rent in twain, and no one doubts but that wire-pulling of many descriptions has been resorted to, to carry points that the leaders considered necessary as a political organization. The work of amelioration and uplifting of society, carried on through the many excellent departments of the W. C. T. U. appears to be the really permanent work of the organization.

The movements among the nations of Europe as well as upon this side of the Atlantic, seem to indicate that the "ideal" in respect to the "expedient number" who shall cast the vote for the nation is universal suffrage for men. But there is often occasion to question whether even in the United States, the intellectual and moral development of men warrants the full realization of that ideal at present. And so in reference to women, the ideal, in consideration of the facts that appetites will always remain, and that the fitness of women as teachers of the race will continue, may be permanent suffrage for women, on the questions of temperance and education in their local aspects; and an approach to this ideal may be such a temporary extension, as in Colorado, Wyoming and Kansas, of the privilege of voting and participation in politics as a new

and comparatively undeveloped condition of society may demand.

Intemperance is a social evil that will always exist as long as men have the appetites of the flesh. The work of conquest over the vileness and degradation of the drink-habit must be largely through the education, assistance and encouragement of individuals. An environment of legal restriction is one element of assistance, but a weak one, unless reinforced by the determination of the individual will.

In the midst of the conflict of figures and statistics in reference to the increase or decrease of the rate of drunkenness and in reference to the results of prohibition, high license, and local option, it is difficult to tell what measures one ought to advocate in order to secure conditions more favorable to those who are striving against the strong bonds of intemperate habits. Any vice or sin which in its origin is individual, produces in society evils that may be traced with greater or lesser exactness. The immediate effects of vice upon the individual may be readily seen, but the results of deeds soon become mingled with others in their social influences and an exact calculation of consequences is impossible. But records of courts, prisons, insane asylums, almshouses, houses for refuge and correction, all substantiate the sad fact that drunkenness is the cause of more open misery, poverty and crime than all the other vices.

While not resulting in so many acts that are capable of measurement and calculation as drunkenness, yet in producing annoyance, unhappiness, and vexation of

spirit, in disturbing the home fireside and delightful social arrangements, are the habits of using tobacco, and of excessive indulgence in jewels and fine clothes. The amount of wealth consumed in these merely personal gratifications of appetite or vanity, is oftentimes a robbery; because this wealth converted into articles of consumption is dissipated or locked up in forms that are not productive to society. And in the immediate home-circle the effects are directly felt, it may be in the deprivation of some other member of the family of some useful or very desirable article that the money may be used for the indulgence of appetite or of vain desires.

Not less disastrous in its effects upon home and social life is gambling. In gambling, there is an exchange of wealth between parties upon unequal terms; the promise to pay is not for "value received," and gambling therefore virtually amounts to robbery. This idea of getting something for nothing is the destructive element that appears in all forms of gambling, even when dignified by the name of church-fair, lottery, "stock exchange," or "dealing in futures," etc.

More insidious and stealthy in its forms and ways of procedure, but perhaps equally as destructive of the home and family ties as drunkenness, is the vice and sin of licentiousness. The recent agitation begun several years ago by the social purity department of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, and carried on more recently by other forms of organization, has disclosed facts too unclean for the printed page. But this very agitation crystallized into methods of instruction

and enlightenment upon the effects of such social evils as intemperance and licentiousness, bears fruit in the adoption of higher ideals in society; and the safeguard of the voice of public opinion condemning such vile practices, is a wonderful support to the weak wills of tempted ones. And besides the various national organizations for the furtherance of social purity and the creation of a sentiment demanding a like standard of purity in men and women, there are large numbers of local associations, notably the recent ones in New York and in San Francisco. Until recently in the latter city, upon the petition of twelve property owners, the city commissioners were compelled to grant a license to any one desiring to establish a nefarious "dive" in which hundreds of girls might be ruined in a few months. The enormity of the evil has resulted in an energetic association to be called, "The Citizens' League for the Suppression of the Dives of San Francisco."

The relations of mistress to servant have received no farther expression in law than the regulations concerning contract and protection. Nevertheless the "servant question" is one that is of great importance and interest; because the atmosphere of the home is often dependent upon the ease with which the wheels of the domestic machinery move. There are the ideal relations in which the servant always faithfully performs her tasks, with or without the continual careful oversight of the mistress, and does not forget that there should be the right of command and the duty of obedience: and the ideal also demands that the mistress should remember that "wages" are not all that her

position enables her to give; that the domestic may have a mind and heart quick to respond to a helpful word of education and sympathy; and that, of whatever nationality, common feelings of human interest bind all peoples together and in a sense make all races one, and this unity of interests forbids the entire exclusion of any inmate of the house from all phases of the family life, interests and pleasures. The carelessness, untidiness, and sometimes rudeness and viciousness of the servant, and the love of ease, absorption in too many interests outside of the home, and feeling of superiority shown in harsh and unsympathetic tones on the part of the mistress, lead oftentimes to only a slight approximation of the ideal. If the etiquette of "afternoon calls" did not demand so frequent a recital of the good and bad points of the "girls" with so frequent an intensification of the objectionable features of domestic service, the annoyances of the kitchen would not seem so great; and if this same "rigorous" etiquette did not set up a standard of falsification in the "not at home" excuse, the servants would gain higher ideas of loyalty to truth and right which, when practiced in the kitchen, would add greatly to the exactness and order of the household arrangements.

The story of the servant girl who preferred the small pay in the city to a good home and good pay in the country, because "Folks is better th'n stumps," illustrates the desire for companionship possessed by all human beings. Whether in household arrangements or in general social circles, all feelings of caste arising from thoughts of proud seclusion are contrary to the

ideals of democratic institutions and subversive of the exemplification of the ethical principle. Wealth, fine clothes, "blue-blooded" ancestry, education — all are accessories for which a person may or may not be responsible for the possession ; but in the possibility of purity of motive, and of the right exercise of "good-will to all," each, in this his true soul-life, stands equal to every other human being.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE CHURCH AN INSTITUTION FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF IMPERFECT BEINGS IN THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD PERFECTION.

ANALYSIS:— *Section I*, The Ground of the existence of the Church; it is an Institution for the exemplification of Grace; Man's fallen condition; Help for Man; Man's vocation; Man a religious being; Three grades of worship; Church organization; Three kinds of creeds.

*Section II*, Grace made evident in the church through the two lines of development, the theoretical or doctrinal, and the practical or ethical: Christ's teachings; (A) Changes in Creeds and doctrines; Sects or denominations, the Puritans, the Independents, the Baptists, the Methodists, etc.; Failure of the Church to show Grace; Unity in spirit of Church; (B) Practical lines of effort in the Church; Failure to show justice; Authority and Reason; the Question since the Reformation; Union of faith and works important; Ethical precepts of Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Christianity, etc.; Periods of ethical development in the Church, especially, of the 19th century; An enlarged spirit of Charity; Work of State and Church supplementary; Kind of unity possible for Church and State.

#### SECTION I.

THE GROUND OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH; IT IS AN INSTITUTION FOR THE EXEMPLIFICATION OF GRACE.

The limitations of finiteness in man are shown in an outreaching for the infinite and invisible. The spirit of man is constrained by the weaknesses of the flesh, yet these very weaknesses are an indication of the need and possibility of progress. Man *falls* because of these restrictions that the desires and appetites place upon him. He recognizes that something external to himself fits a want of his nature, and he reaches out toward it for its attainment. He must



realize the potentialities of his being ; he sees the possibility of this realization in the satisfaction of his wants by these external objects. Assaying to be a god, that is, to obtain all the knowledge of good and evil, man makes mistakes as to the direction that self-activity should assert itself and as to what objects should be appropriated or what desires should be gratified, and the results of his acts and the reaction upon himself are different from what he had anticipated ; or, what is more disastrous, he consciously chooses the gratification of animal desires when he sees the possibility of self-restraint and obedience to a higher principle, an obedience to the law of spiritual development. He thus alienates himself from God, and consequently from the direction of true progress. He becomes a sinner ; a man fallen from the "high estate" of pure innocency. He retires into himself ; he becomes absorbed in the fulfillment of selfish desires and purposes. His thoughts become dark and evil, and he plots destruction and ruin for other members of society. His evil motives and acts raise an impassable barrier between his soul and the holiness and righteousness of God manifested in the Holy Spirit. He is in the condition of eternal death ; no spiritual growth is possible while man persists in yielding to the weaknesses and desires of the flesh as an end in themselves.

But such a condition is the unnatural rather than the natural condition of man : nor is such a condition the realization of the grand possibilities of his being. It is the Divine Order of the Universe that man should exemplify and reveal the Power and Grace of God. In this divine world-order, in the process of

self-creation, God created man, the highest being among created objects, as a revelation of the nature and characteristics of Himself. We get a glimpse of the mystery of this creative process, in a study of the profound idea of the "Trinity." "But the Christian thinking adds two new ideas to the two already found by Plato. It adds to the divine first and the second (the Logos), also a divine third, the Holy Spirit, and a fourth not divine, but the process of the third—calling it the *processio*. This idea of process explains the existence of a world of finite beings, for it contains evolution, development or derivation. And evolution implies the existence of degrees of less and more perfection of growth. The procession thus must be in time, but the time process must have eternally gone on, because the third has eternally proceeded and been proceeding.

"The thought underneath this theory is evidently that the Second Person or Logos, in knowing himself or in being conscious, knows himself in two phases, first, as completely generated or perfect, and this is the Holy Spirit; and secondly, he knows himself as related to the First, as His eternal origin. In thinking of his origin or genesis from the Father, he makes objective a complete world of evolution containing at all times all degrees of development or evolution and covering every degree of imperfection from pure space and time up to the invisible church.

"This recognition of his derivation is also a recognition on the part of the First of His own act of generating the Second—it is not going on, but has been eternally completed, and yet both the Divine First and the Divine Second must think it when they think of

their relation to one another. Recognition is the intellectual of the First, and Second is the mutual love of the Father and the Son, and this mutual love is the procession of the Holy Spirit.

“But the procession is not a part of the Holy Trinity; it is the creation in time and space of an infinite world of imperfect beings developing into self-activity and as self-active organizing institutions—the family, civil society, the state and the church. The church is the New Jerusalem described by St. John the apostle, who has revealed this doctrine of the Third Person as an institutional person—the spirit who makes possible all institutional organism in the world and who transcends them all as the Perfect who energizes in the imperfect to develop and complete it.”\*

Man, either in drifting into the process of degeneracy, or in fulfilling the possibilities of his being, shows the chief characteristic of a human being—freedom. The process of “falling,” of degeneracy, is the same for each and for all of the human race. “In Adam all die”; that is, through the same process of the subordination of spiritual interests to present gratification of the desires for “things of the sense,” all men sin: in Christ shall all be made alive, that is, for each one there is a possibility of knowing the infinite love of God and of a realization of a life in accordance with the principles of the existence of the Divine Second Person. In this possibility of the unity of finite and Infinite Thought, there is a reconciliation of sinful man with Divine Love. This possibility of reconciliation, or of

\* Lecture by W. T. Harris: “The World’s Parliament of Religions,” p. 311, edited by John H. Barrows.

the reception by sinning man of Atoning love existent from the Beginning, received its historical demonstration in the sacrificial life and death of Jesus Christ.

Man develops through consciously making the Divine process his own method of activity. Man's continuous and eternal vocation is then, to act in accordance with this natural process of creation; putting on the "form of the Divine Second Person, he "loses his life" in service to others, but he saves it in the return of Infinite thought and love which reinforces and enlarges his finite limited thought and desires and acts. Subordinating self and selfish interests, man, filled with the love that is mighty to save, as he consciously reaches out to cheer and help others, takes a larger and larger hold upon the unseen and eternal. The Divine Love permeates all the activities of his life and every act is an expression of the divine life of his soul.

The ability to make a low motive and to choose a low course of action rather than a higher at each step of his development, shows that there is the recognition of thoughts and resources and power that is higher than his own. This higher power and help is his God; and man in the acknowledgement of his dependence upon a Being higher and more powerful than himself is a religious being. Even in the early stages of the thought-process, in the mind of the child, or of savages, or of people in the child-stage of thought, there is a feeling of dependence upon something outside of and other than themselves; there is a reaching out to something that seems to them to have greater power than they themselves have. There is a desire for communion with the power higher and better than the self.

To the first or lowest stage of thinking this power exists in trees, stones, etc., and in images made with hands. To a mind in this stage of thinking, each object has independence in itself and one object can be deified as well as another. The power that the individual feels that he has not in himself, he strives after and regards as coming from special objects around him. To his plane of representative activity, these lifeless objects become pictured and exalted as the source of all help that comes to him from without himself. His soul becomes filled with reverence and adoration for these objects of nature, or for the rude stone and wooden images. He believes in them and cherishes the cold images with fondness. This act of belief is to him a real act of faith; it expresses the spontaneous desire of his soul for something that he has not. These gods that he has set up embody to him the power and goodness of the universe, and he worships them. These gods can punish him for his wrong acts and they can reward him for his goodness. But in this lowest grade of thought religion has very little connection with the will or action-side of the individual. The god is set before him as something to which the emotional nature goes out and in which it finds satisfaction, but no real connection is seen between worshipping and living. This plane of religious thought, when viewed from the highest plane of religious thought, or the Christian, becomes atheism.

To a second or more advanced stage of thinking, God, or the gods, have a different aspect. There is an idea of the true nature of cause and effect. The representative activity of the mind has given way to real thought-processes. There is the same kind of desires

for something that one has not, the same reaching of the finite towards what seems infinite. There is a calling upon the not-self to strengthen and reinforce the self. Such a stage of faith or thought implies that there is a slight grasping of the true world-process, and that this insight can not be satisfied with the mere embodiment of power in one "dead" object, but something more adequate is set up as an object from which to receive help; as, a river, the sun, fire, the concourse of Nature, a Brahm. This conception of "infinite power" embodies the idea of force, and the faith of those who have this conception can rest only in something sufficiently adequate to represent this idea. The act of worship in the individual arises with the same spontaneousness as in the lower phase of thought and the god is a like source of all blessings. This stage of thought implies a more correct conception of the nature of sin and holiness, that is, that good and evil are principles opposed in character, and that a change from one state to the other demands a process; there is consequently a more adequate idea of the relation between the worshipful element in man's nature and his acts than is found in the lower plane of thought.

A still higher plane of thought sees this grade of belief, thought and worship as pantheistic.

The highest plane of religious thought and belief sees God as a person,—not a person in the sense that personality consists of an external form, a big man pictured by the imagination, but God, a true personality, a Spirit, with all the qualities and characteristics of spirit, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent Being—Absolute Personality; such a God is a Personality whose Power

has been revealed from the timeless beginning and whose Activity is from eternity to eternity an ever-present influence upon the souls of men. From this plane of thought and belief, God is not a mere thing nor simply a Force or Power, but a conscious Personality. To such a Being man's whole nature may go out in acts of worship and by the insight of faith and reason man may see the invisible things of the eternal Godhead, and feel himself "endued with power from on high" and filled with a power not his own to accomplish what his faith sees to be God's Will. This form of faith and thought which recognizes God as a true Personality is Theistic.

All faith is in a sense grounded in the third or highest stage of thought; that is, the blind faith accompanying the low grade of thought of the savage or untutored mind is the same in kind as the larger faith of the cultured and exalted saint. And this power of insight through faith is closely allied to the power of mind that may through discipline become the conscious insight of the reason. Faith and Reason each have the same characteristic, clearness of vision, but the "vision" of Reason differs from that of Faith in this respect: Faith sees, accepts and acts upon its insights; Reason reflects upon the intuitive acts of the mind, and is satisfied only as the intuitive conclusions are logically justified, and acts only when its activity will unite and coalesce with other forms of activity to bring about a higher conception and realization of a true world-order.

The extent to which faith and reason have become coordinately developed at any period of the history of the world, or in any nation or people, determines the char-

acter of the creeds, doctrines and systems of theology of that time or people. Certain formulas of belief become developed and expressed corresponding to the grade of thought expressed in the worship. This thought may be more clearly seen by noticing the forms of worship used by a few of the different nations and then observing how the "Church" as an institution expressing these beliefs has grown up along with and corresponding to these different grades of worship.

Fetichism is the lowest grade of worship. Such worship is found in many African tribes, in Indian tribes and in the blind worship of ancestors in the Orient, where it consists in an unreflecting obedience to customs, and in a reverence for relics, bones, etc.; and also this mode of worship is found in every land in people who unreflectingly place power and help in some "material object" and look with reverence, emotion and affection upon such an object.

The higher or second grade of worship may be seen in Brahmanism, Buddhism, in the fire-worship of the Parsees and in the attitude of the Egyptian mind in its struggle to solve the problem of "spirit." And this kind of worship is seen in individuals of whatever country and nationality who see the Highest Principle of Nature to be a blind force without Spirit or true Personality. The religion of Greece arises to the worship of Beauty, but as it fails to express the thought of personality as Subject and Object and the process of return unto the Self, it fails to express the idea of Truth and so remains a religion in which worship is a worship of beautiful reposeful forms, and not a worship in "spirit and in truth."



Christianity is the only religion that embodies the elements by which there is a possibility of an expression of the highest acts of worship. The God of the Hebrews is a true Personality, though conceived abstractly until the explicit revelation of His Nature in the Advent of Christ. The Christian religion admits of a worship that, while capable of expressing emotion, is at the same time intelligent and reflective.

Mohammedanism, while possessing the element of abstract personality, gives no consistent opportunity for the development of institutions of society; for in the conception of the One God and Mohammed as His Prophet, there is an exclusion of all thought of the possibility of a process of evolution, and therefore this abstraction gives no opportunity for an expression of thought in a series of concrete objects, each manifesting a phase of activity of its own, and each necessary for the completion of a world. The idea of "processio" is omitted from the Mohammedan conception of God; and this omission takes away the possibility of a religion that admits of the most comprehensive ethical principle at its basis of practical activity.

Of whatever grade the worship, the religious thoughts and emotions express themselves in some form or change of attitude and some place is selected for such expression. The place may be by a river, in some particular wood, in a cave-temple, in temples representing massiveness, or beauty, in cathedrals and churches framed for impressiveness and convenience. Whatever the place selected, it is for the expression of the thoughts or feelings of dependence, and the reaching out of the emotional nature in fear, love and reverence

towards an object higher and more powerful than the self.

Like thoughts and feelings lead people to unite in carrying out a purpose. And in a union for religious worship as for any other object, the necessity of leadership is soon felt. In different grades of religion this has been supplied in different ways. The emperor may constitute the head of the church, as in China; the chief, as among some Indian tribes; priests, as in India, Egypt, etc. God himself may be regarded the temporal ruler as well as the spiritual, as with the Jews, until there is a necessity of delegated leadership, as in the choice of Moses, the Judges and the Kings. In the Christian church the leadership is variously denominated, but in all churches through this necessity of leadership in the direction of affairs the external organization develops. This organization may be crude and incomplete, it may be a matter of caste, it may be so interwoven with the state that one can not be distinguished from the other, it may become a purely voluntary organization, as the early Christian church.

The kind of thought involved in a religion of fetiches, rites and ceremonies has not inherent stability sufficient to admit of extended and complex organization independent of the other institutions of society.

It is only in Christianity that there may be found the fundamental thought comprehensive enough to admit of strong external organization and church government united with the other institutions of society. While the invitations of Christ to become his followers were strong and forceful, it was only those who responded willingly who became members of the band of Christ's

disciples. While we have no evidence that organization in the form of church government was emphasized by Christ, yet the fathers and leaders of the church from the time of the second century of our era in forming a well-ordered system of worship and government were only using the means necessary for the successful continuation and usefulness of a body of people united for a given purpose.

The formation of the ecclesiastical government from the second and third centuries and the development of the creeds and doctrines of the church and the contest of the powers of church and state form the history of the Middle Ages. The extent to which organization and centralization of power in the church may be carried is illustrated by the government of the Roman Catholic church, which during all the centuries has preserved nearly intact the perfection of organization of the Middle Ages.

The natural spontaneous reverence and worship of the soul soon finds expression in set forms and ceremonies. The formulation of these thoughts becomes rites, ceremonies, creeds and dogmas. These receive authority by adoption by the church, whether the church be rude or well-organized. The church as an organization may be said to have developed almost simultaneously as its ceremonies, creeds and doctrines were formulated — both are the result of the desire to express a higher or lower grade of religious thought and emotion.

The expressions of faith in the form of ceremonies and creeds have in general the three stages corresponding to the grades of religious thought; these are the "ritualistic, the dogmatic and the spiritual." \* Ritual-

\*Lecture by J. G. Schurman.

ism exists whenever obedience is demanded to a given set of rules and ceremonies without involving an intelligent choice on the part of the one who obeys. Dogmatism demands belief in formulas and principles that may have been carefully propounded by philosophers and theologians, but it does not necessarily imply that the one who believes is himself able to give a reason for his belief. The spiritual stage of development implies a state of mind and heart that transcends in its insight any merely prescribed form or any fixed articles of belief, and it implies so complete a penetration of the Divine Thought that forms and creeds are of secondary consideration, and it also implies a reception of the influences of the Holy Spirit from whatever source, and an expression of holy and righteous thoughts in all the acts of life.

## SECTION II.

GRACE MADE EVIDENT IN THE CHURCH THROUGH THE TWO LINES OF DEVELOPMENT, THE THEORETICAL OR DOCTRINAL, AND THE PRACTICAL OR ETHICAL.

No creed or other form of expression can convey the spiritual truth so completely and in so universal a manner as the teachings of Christ, who is "the way, the truth, and the life." All the creeds and doctrines of the Christian Church are avowedly based upon Christ's life and teachings as represented in the New Testament, and the value of such creeds depends upon the faithfulness and correctness with which these New Testament teachings are interpreted.

For the life, teachings and death of Christ are the strongest historical embodiment of the Grace manifested and revealed in the process of creation and development

of the universe. Divine Grace is revealed in an especial manner in the life of man. The institution for the manifestation and revelation of this grace in its most evident form is the Church, the invisible Church which may comprise all the souls of this world and other worlds. The spirit of this invisible church is the Holy Spirit, the Third Person of the Trinity. The Church has thus a Personality that is higher and different from the personality of the aggregate membership. This Personality represents perfect Grace, and this grace may be revealed more or less perfectly by the members of the "invisible" church. The church, this institution for the complete embodiment of Grace or Divine Love, is an eternal institution whose historical development at any given time only partially represents and exemplifies this divine love. The more complete the unity of thought in holy purposes in the members of the church and the more perfect the communion of souls filled with this divine love or altruism, the stronger is the manifestation and revelation of this eternal love or grace. The Holy Spirit is revealed through the thoughts and acts of the members of the church and by studying the *historical* church on its creed-side or doctrine-side, and on its action-side or ethical side, we may find evidences of the indwelling life of the Holy Spirit and find different degrees of the revelation of Grace.

As a help to a better understanding of the nature and office of the church, let us notice first, some of the epochs that seem to exemplify the principle of Grace in the development of creeds and doctrines, and then some of the periods that seem especially fruitful as

illustrations of harmonious union of faith and works, or the periods when there seems to be an intelligent and comprehensive application of the golden rule or the ethical principle.

*A. Grace may be exemplified through changes in creeds and doctrines.*

The visible Church at the time of Christ, and even at any time, has in organized unity only those who voluntarily adopt the principles of Christ and promise to abide by certain articles of faith and practice established by this voluntary combination. The early church for nearly two centuries left few records of the form of organization, of the establishment of creeds or of the kinds of work undertaken. It seems to have been a period of germination of the principles enunciated by Christ and taught by his disciples, the apostles and immediate followers. But from the second century until the Reformation, the church was actively engaged in discussion of the fundamental principles of Theology. The leading minds of those days, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Athanasius, and also those of Tertullian, Cyprian and Ambrose, and later, Augustine, were considering and defending with energy such questions as these: the nature of God and His relation to the Universe, or the Doctrine of Divine Immanence, the relation of Christ to God and the problem of the Incarnation, the relation of man to the Father and Son, and the possibility of the freedom of the Will. Later in the history of the church, while the nature of the questions remained substantially the same, the phases that engaged the attention of Erigena, Anselm, Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Albertus Magnus, etc.,

were the relation of Faith to Reason, the doctrine of trans-substantiation, predestination, future punishment and the efficacy of baptism. With the decline of the papacy and the separation of the provinces of faith and reason rendered especially clear by William of Occam, the church was preparing for the period of the Reformation. The results of these discussions were through the "Councils" gathered into compact forms under the name of "creeds." Of these none are more important than the council of Nicaea, which formulated and arranged the "Nicene creed," and the council of the ninth century when after prolonged discussion and opposition, the expression "filioque" was introduced into the Nicene creed.

It is sometimes difficult to see how in the discussions of all these centuries there is any exemplification of the principle of Grace. But truth is many-sided in the planes on which it may be grasped and set forth by minds of varying degrees of comprehension. And instead of being fruitless, many of the results reached and formulated have been capable of expressing doctrinal truth of the most comprehensive nature. New peoples were being constantly brought in contact with these principles and the ground must be traversed by each person and nation for itself, before these principles become a part of the thought of that person or nation. And who can estimate the indebtedness of the church of the nineteenth century to strong fearless men of the church during these earlier centuries? The same questions remain to the present day, but Christian men have learned that there is a better way of settling such questions than by years of discussion on sometimes

hair-splitting and verbal differences of opinion. The vicarious throes of intellect of the early church-fathers and of the scholastics save the present century much of the like kind of suffering.

For four centuries before the time of the Reformation, the Church was making the conditions that would ripen into the far-reaching changes of the sixteenth century. The work and the steadfast purpose in the life and death of Wickliffe, Huss and Savonarola prepared the way for Luther, Zwingle and Calvin.

Luther stood alone and fearless before the whole Roman Catholic hierarchy, nominally for the purpose of denying the right of the Church to sell "indulgences," but in reality he was maintaining the right of decision by the individual even in opposition to the authority of the Church. His extreme ideas on the Pauline "justification by faith" have produced momentous consequences in the division of the church into sects or denominations. And when Calvin had rethought and rewritten his "beliefs" until they reached the compact form of "The Institutes," the Protestant church had a basis for the numerous creeds that have been formulated since his time.

The question is often considered whether the division of the church into sects is really a sign of progress or of retrogression? Is this process of division and redivision an exemplification of the principle of Grace? Would not the work of the church have been better accomplished, had the church retained a strong and unified organization? As the human mind has infinite possibilities of development on the thought-side, the formulated statements of belief must be able to contain



these varied phases of faith and practice. And as the historic church is a voluntary organization, there is needed many different forms of worship, ritual, creed and liturgy, that these infinite longings and desires of the free thought and will of the church may be satisfactorily and adequately expressed. Thus the Puritans found that neither the Church of England nor the Church of Rome satisfied their ideas of the office and government of the church, and in the years of struggle and civil war, they were asserting the right to worship God according to the dictates of the conscience, although the means necessary to bring about this exercise of freedom in belief may at the present time be interpreted as unspiritual.

Following close upon the Puritan movement was that of the Independents or Congregationalists. In America the Puritans are the recognized ancestors of the Congregationalists who delight in "the churches" rather than in The Church, and who delight in their free and independent system of church government, and in these later days in the simplicity of their church-creed.

The Baptist movement which followed that of the Independent in England, originated earlier on the Continent. "Religious liberty, and a church composed of none but believers, are the two bed-rocks on which the Baptists rest and build. They began in the Netherlands; they continued in Switzerland; they did the same in old England, and they entered this new world with these two as fixed and far-reaching principles of church life. That the church should have no control over the state, and submit to no control by the state in things of religion; that the civil authorities should

have no say concerning religious beliefs; that the state has no natural right; should be given no delegated right, nor be allowed to assume the civil right to interfere with the praying, preaching, or profession of religion, so long as the public peace is not disturbed by any in the exercise of their religious privileges, the Baptists contended tooth and nail; and to achieve it they suffered bonds, banishment, and burning.”\*

Each denomination in its turn has contended vigorously for its own tenets and doctrines, and each has found authority in the life and teachings and the interpretations by the early followers of these teachings of Christ to substantiate the particular views advocated; and who can measure the progress that has been brought about by the discussions of one denomination with another? Is there not a clearer understanding to-day of the rightful place that creeds and doctrines should hold, because of the numerous contests of opinions during the last three centuries? And while a higher ideal for the church would have been — that each individual has an authority in the self that transcends any merely external authority in a church organization and can therefore place his own interpretation on Christ's teachings, yet as the human mind does not grasp ideals without a process of struggle, could the comparative freedom of thought and belief that the nineteenth century enjoys have been brought about in any other way?

“The moral of the Puritan struggle against the authority of the Church of England does not lie, as some fondly think, in the confusion and enmities which

\* *The Interior*, March 3, 1892: a series of articles, by Rev. J. L. Withrow, entitled “Many Folds, One Shepherd.”

arise when ecclesiastical uniformity is broken down. The confusion may be only the sign of a deeper life. The evils of the sectarian spirit, the divisions and subdivisions of religious parties, undoubtedly weaken the true church idea, which aims at the largest, most comprehensive human fellowship as the truest expression of the one common spirit that indwells in humanity. But little as the actors in the great struggle might discern its full significance, it can now be seen that the confusions eventually ministered to a higher order. The rigid invincible exclusiveness of hostile sects became the indispensable condition for obtaining religious toleration. It was for civil and religious freedom that the English people had been blindly striving through all the confused and complicated struggles of the seventeenth century. When the principle of religious toleration had been acknowledged, the confusions and the enmities subsided, and England entered into the serene and placid atmosphere of the eighteenth century."\*

The separation between natural and revealed religion in the deist movement made way for Whitefield and Wesley, and the wonderful spread and growth of Methodism. "Free grace" and the hearty invitation to "come," "repent" and "believe," came with a welcome sound to many who had been taught that only the elect few could be saved. Methodism does not divorce faith from works to the extent that Calvinism does, and from the last part of the last century we can find in the religious movements that have followed, strong illustra-

\* The Continuity of Christian Thought, pp. 333, 334: A. V. G. Allen.

tions of the practical or ethical phases of Christianity as well as of its doctrinal side.

While the Church as an organized unity serves as the best medium for the activity of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men, and is the institution that best exemplifies the principle of grace, yet oftentimes in the history of the Church has there been a whole or partial forgetting of its high prerogative. From the days of the betrayal by Judas of his Lord, there have been those who have failed to enter into the unity and community of thought of the whole Church. And history has repeated many times the scenes of the early conflicts of struggle between leaders of one line of theology and those of another. In the bitterness of wrangling and the unwillingness to acknowledge the partial correctness of an opponent's view, brotherly love and divine charity seem to be entirely forgotten. In the period of the extension of the Church for the sake of the temporal power and absorption of authority, both religious and secular, the Church seemed to have lost sight of the purpose for which the Church of Christ was established. And when the Calvinists and Puritans, even while smarting from their own struggles for liberty, turned and refused to others the very liberty of belief for which they had so valiantly fought, we almost wonder at the lack of exhibition of grace or true charity. Again, when we remember the trials for witchcraft which were so directly instigated and encouraged by church members, and the frequent outcries against heresy and even trials for the same in this our nineteenth century, we may be almost persuaded that the Church has failed to realize the high ideal that Christ

placed before his followers. But such periods of seeming failure to realize and exemplify grace are the negative side of a period of larger fruition. That is, given the frailties of the human mind, and the desire even in the church for self-aggrandizement, these periods of failure to realize the highest possible ideal seem to be necessary to teach an organization as well as a person that the sure principle of progress is through a process of "losing life" for the sake of others. And while the Absolute Ideal for the Church is that at all times every member shall completely exemplify divine charity even in the matter of church creeds and doctrines, yet in the condition of finiteness in which man is placed, that ideal can be only approximately realized at any given time and epoch in the history of the Church.

But is there at the present time a closer approximation to the ideal of the Church, an institution for the complete exemplification of divine love or altruism, than ever before in its history? When there are beside those denominations already mentioned many others, as the divisions into Northern and Southern and several other phases of Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, etc., and also the Quakers, the Christians, the Unitarians, Universalists, Swedenborgians, etc., are we not forced to answer the question, to what extent may this division into sects be carried? Is not the Church gaining for itself the charge so often made, that it is a "man-made institution"? Fortunately, if the signs of the times may be read, the Church, which is none the less divine because man-made, shows a movement indicative of a stronger spiritual life than an external view discloses. The diversity of desires for expression of

the will in different forms of organization and government, will probably never warrant a union of the churches into one church under a single kind of government, yet are there not signs of a greater *unity of spirit* in the nineteenth century than ever before in the history of the Church? Is there not greater toleration of the opinions of the sister churches than ever before, even by the Roman Catholic church and the Episcopalian, which are supposed to be the most conservative of all the "divisions"? And are there not more modes of cordial fellowship than ever before? The fact that the different denominations begin to realize the necessity of coöperation in all forms of charitable work and in the establishment of churches in new territory, shows that the spiritual phases of church-life are better understood and appreciated than in the past. What does it signify that trials for heresy are settled in a comparatively amicable way, and that not only the days of inquisition and torture are passed, but even in church-councils the spirit of brotherly love silences to a large degree the differences of opinion upon theological questions? And now it is not an uncommon thing to find all the churches of a town uniting in union services — an event that could hardly have taken place a quarter of a century ago. Who can estimate the reflex influence upon the creeds of the churches from the spirit of unity manifested in the young people's church societies throughout the land? It seems almost incredible when the history of the Church, even in the early part of the present century is considered, that the spirit of toleration and christian unity and fellowship is so far developed that all the

religions of the world can unite in a "world's congress"! The past eighteen centuries of discussion have been sufficient to test the various phases of doctrine that it is possible to draw from the teachings of the New Testament and to show that with the possible variations of opinion upon minor points of belief and profession, there are a few essential points of doctrine upon which all may unite. And with the unity that is possible in a diversity of opinion, may there not be so complete a unity of spirit that in all the practical phases of church work, there will be such complete sympathy and helpfulness, that the historical church may become more and more an institution for the exemplification of the Holy Spirit?

The following recent propositions for a union or alliance of the various Protestant churches of the United States may be taken as indicating the most advanced sentiment in reference to Church Unity:

"1. The acceptance of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, inspired by the Holy Spirit, as containing all things necessary to salvation, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of Christian faith.

"2. Discipleship of Jesus Christ, the Divine Savior and Teacher of the world.

"3. The Church of Christ ordained by him to preach his Gospel to the world.

"4. Liberty of conscience in the interpretation of the Scriptures and in the administration of the Church.

"Such an alliance of these Churches should have regular meetings of their representatives and should have for its objects, among others:—

"1. Mutual acquaintance and fellowship.

“2. Coöperation in domestic and foreign missions.

“3. The prevention of rivalries between competing Churches in the same field.

“4. The ultimate organic union of the whole visible Body of Christ.”

*B. Grace is exemplified through the practical lines of effort in the Church.*

The historic church has seen progress in the interpretation of its creeds and doctrines in the time intervening between the discussions of the church fathers and the present time. Or rather, the present century sees a partial return to the substance of the teachings of Christ. During all these centuries, as we have seen, at times the Church has failed to exemplify the principle of grace. Grace is the complement of justice. Justice is the fundamental element of freedom. Justice permits each individual, endowed with a free-will the opportunity to energize, and to freely receive the effects of his own deeds.

The Church in its attempts to exemplify grace can then never consistently contradict or ignore the principle of justice, without at the same time contradicting the principle of grace. Even this contradictory attitude of the Church has been assumed at times in its history. Forgetting that the province of the Church as an organ for the expression of the Holy Spirit, has no jurisdiction over the acts of men in the way of setting up a penalty for a transgression of the divine law, it has assayed to step into the province of the state and to fix a law as a standard of belief to which each one must assent and the departure from which, must be



expiated by an external punishment. In accordance with this assumed prerogative of the Church, we find scourging, imprisonment and even death inflicted by this organization established by Christ for the purpose of saving to the uttermost those who should come unto him.

Sin in its very nature is infinite ; for it is the product of a motive, a thought, and thought in its nature is self-limiting, and therefore infinite. Sin is thus in the intents and purposes, and exists in the heart of the individual, when in the light of a higher ideal or law, he consciously chooses a lower. The individual stands face to face with infinite love and thought on one side and his own desires for gratification on the other, and in choosing other than the highest thought and line of activity before him, he places about his thought and life an environment that no merely external power can remove. Sin can therefore never be measured by an external standard ; it can only be expiated by complete repentance and a new birth into higher thoughts, desires, and acts made possible by the atoning love of an eternal and Divine Saviour. When the Church attempted to set up a standard of forgiveness for sins as in the "sale of indulgences," it is evident that it had lost the conception of the true nature of the Church and the work for which it had been established by Christ. For justice, although the fundamental principle of all existence and all institutions, should remain latent in the Church as a background as it were, for the manifestation and revelation of grace or charity. And when the Church attempted to assume the province of the state and to become a channel for the administra-

tion of justice, there were just the results that could be expected; the internal discord produced by this confusion of fundamental principles showed itself in the destruction of much of the power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

The periods in the history of the Church in which there was an attempt to measure the thoughts of the individual were the periods in which there was much stress placed upon the authority of the Church. From the time of the early attempts to interpret the teachings of Christ the question of whose interpretation is authoritative has been of vital interest. Shall the interpretation of the Church be received implicitly, and if so, which interpretation; or shall each one interpret the Bible according to his own understanding of the words and spirit of Jesus. The conflict early begun between the advocates of faith and of reason has not ceased even to this day. From the nature of faith and reason, it is evident that the true insight of faith must accord with the insight of reason, and the difficulties have arisen from the separation of one from the other, and from the undue emphasis of one at the expense of the other. Consequently, as the Church became a strong ecclesiastical body, and became powerful through the absorption of the empire, the emphasis upon "authority" was very great. The concession by the Church that "councils" were above the recognized authority of the Church was an acknowledgement that reason or independent interpretation of the scriptures has a legitimate place. But when the "councils" became merely the mouthpiece of an infallible pope the voice of reason seemed entirely silenced. But now and

then until the sixteenth century brave men dared to face this stronghold of authority, though perhaps only to succumb as did Abelard of the twelfth century. From that time the contest has assumed another form. Before, the question was, Shall the individual yield to this *Church* and receive his rules of faith and practice upon "authority," or shall he dare to interpret for himself? Since the Reformation, the question changed in form has been, Shall the individual believe implicitly the words of God as *tradition* interprets the Bible, or shall he strive to understand these teachings and in so doing make use of reason as well as faith as a guide to conduct? As we have seen, the undue emphasis placed by Luther and Calvin upon justification by faith and articles of belief, has led to a revolt and the separation of the Protestant church into many denominations. This undue emphasis upon belief also led to the undue emphasis of reason in the eighteenth century, when we find the deists separating God from nature, and revealed religion from natural religion. The reaction of the nineteenth century gives evidence that the Church recognizes that a combination of both principles is necessary for the maintenance and continued well-being of the Church. And while this century sees on the one side a return to strong "authority," as in the case of Keble, Pusey and Cardinal Newman, on the other side, in Schleimacher, Coleridge, Maurice, Chalmers, Robertson, Kingsley, Bushnell, etc., we find earnest advocates for granting a recognized place to "reason."

"Coleridge's most distinctive work was to restore the broken harmony between reason and religion, by

enlarging the conception of both, but of the latter especially, — by showing how man is essentially a religious being having a definite spiritual constitution, apart from which the very idea of religion becomes impossible. Religion is not, therefore, something brought to man; it is his highest education. Religion, he says, was designed ‘to improve the nature and faculties of man, in order to the right governing of our actions, to the securing the peace and progress, external and internal, of individuals and of communities.’ Christianity is in the highest degree adapted to this end; and nothing can be a part of it that is not duly proportioned thereto.”\*

The acknowledgement by the above-indicated line of thinkers, that “reason” has a place in the interpretation of Divine Truth, joined with the fervor and practical zeal of the evangelical movement begun in the last part of the last century has restored Christianity to something of its original Christ-likeness, and has given it an interpretation that enables it not only to remain the fundamental moving power of the church as an institution of society, but also to put its principles in such a form that they are recognized as most important principles of growth and progress in all the other institutions of society. In short, the Church of the nineteenth century is seen to be an institution whose two sides, theoretical or doctrinal, and practical or ethical, when rightly understood, are in harmony with each other. And it is also seen that if emphasis is placed on the side of creed-development, the efficacy of the Church as a factor in the education and upliftment of

\* *Religious Thought in Britain during the XIX. Century*: John Tulloch.

humanity, is weakened ; and that if the side of "works" is over-emphasized the Church and society are deprived of the grand ideals of love and self-sacrifice, and of the inspiration that comes from a strong and living faith in God and humanity.

It may be asked, do not other religions show this union of a reasonable faith with noble and enduring works? Do not other religions show as reasonable and comprehensive an ethical principle, as does Christianity? As we have already considered, no other religion has as its fundamental idea a God who is truly a Personality, an Absolute Self-Determining "Trinity," and *a priori*, no other religion can admit of as comprehensive principles fundamental in the institutions of society. And, farther, from an examination of the ethical precepts of the principal religions of the world, can any other religion be found with as comprehensive an ethical principle as the "golden rule" of the Christian religion? Let us notice a few of the precepts of Buddhism, of Mohammedanism, and of the Christian religion.

Those indicating the scope of the ethical thought of Buddhism are taken from S. Johnson's "Oriental Religions" and from "Hinduism," by Monier Williams: and those showing the ethical thought of Mohammedanism are taken from E. H. Palmer's "The Qur'an; Vols. I. & II.," Max Müller's "Sacred Books of the East."

Buddhism says:—

"Let us live happily then, not hating those who hate us: let us dwell free from hatred among men who hate."

"Whoever loves will feel the longing to save not himself alone, but all others. Let him say to himself:

When others are learning the truth, I will rejoice at it, as if it were myself. When others are without it, I will mourn the loss as my own. We shall do much, if we deliver many; but more, if we cause them to deliver others, and so on without end. So shall the healing word embrace the world, and all who are sunk in the ocean of misery be saved."

"Never is wrath stilled by wrath, only by reconciliation; this is an everlasting law."

"Overcome evil with good, the avaricious with generosity, the false with truth."

"One day of endeavor is better than a hundred years of sloth."

"Watch thyself with all diligence, and hold thyself in as the spirited steed is held by its owner."

"Never forget thy own duty for the sake of another's, however great."

"Perform all necessary acts, for action  
Is better than inaction, none can live  
By sitting still and doing nought; it is  
By action only that a man attains  
Immunity from action. Yet in working  
Ne'er work for recompense; let the act's-motive  
Be in the act itself. Know that work  
Proceeds from the Supreme. I am the pattern  
For man to follow; know that I have done  
All acts already, nought remains for me  
To gain by action, yet I work for ever  
Unweariedly, and this whole universe  
Would perish if I did not work my work."

"Let thy motive lie in the deed, and not in the reward; perform thy duty, and make the event equal, whether it terminate in good or ill. This is devotion."

"Foolish is he who would lay up riches in a world that is like a bubble."

"To do good in secret, to conceal one's good act, to help the poor when he comes, to be moderate in prosperity, always to speak kindly, is the path of wisdom."

"Give, if thou art asked, from the little thou hast, and thou shalt go near the gods."

"Think not lightly of evil; drop by drop the jar is filled: think not lightly of good; the wise is filled with purity, gathering it drop by drop."

Buddha's song of triumph over the senses: —

"Painful are repeated transmigrations;  
But now have I beheld the architect.  
Thou shalt not build me another house:  
Thy rafters are broken, thy roof-timbers scattered.  
My mind is detached from all,  
I have attained the extinction of desire."

"The one great tenet of the Mohammedan faith that 'Allah is Allah,' is a conviction of the unity and omnipotence of God. The experience of the Mohammedan is very defective and inadequate."\* The prescribed rules of the ethical code of the Mohammedans are strict and exacting, and in consequence of the rigid prohibitions (as also to a degree of Buddhism), there is an external observance of moral customs that often surpasses the obedience to ethical principles in Christian countries. But this exemplary conduct as desirable as it may be, is brought about by a sacrifice of freedom and self-determination in the individual members of society. It is an illustration of the application of the

\* Ethical Christianity, p. 162: Rev. Hugh Price Hughes.

principle of "obedience" which we have already seen is an ethical principle corresponding to a lower grade of thought than the "golden rule."

"Your God is one God ; there is no God but He, the merciful, the compassionate."

"O, ye folk ! eat of what is in the earth, things lawful and things good, and follow not the footsteps of Satan, verily, to you he is an open foe. He does but bid you evil and sin, and that ye should speak against God what ye do not know."

"Expend in alms in God's way and be not cast by your own hands into perdition ; but do good, for God loves those who do good."

"They will ask thee what they are to expend in alms : say, 'Whatsoever good ye expend it should be for parents and kinsmen, and the orphan and the poor, and the son of the road ; and whatsoever good ye do, verily, of it God knows.'"

"And do not covet that by which God has preferred one of you over another. The men shall have a portion of what they earn, and the women a portion of what they earn ; ask God for His grace, verily, God knows all."

"O, my son ! be steadfast in prayer, and bid what is reasonable and forbid what is wrong ; be patient of what befalls thee, verily, that is one of the determined affairs."

"To those who do what is good, goodness and increase ! nor shall blackness or abasement cover their faces ! these are the fellows of Paradise, they shall dwell therein for aye."

"This is what is in the heavens and in the earth ; to



Him is obedience due unceasingly ; other than God then will ye fear ? ”

“ And give full measure when ye measure out, and weigh with a right balance ; that is better and a fairer determination.”

“ And walk not on the earth proudly ; verily, thou canst not cleave the earth, and thou shalt not reach the mountains in height.”

“ Be thou patient then ; verily, God’s promise is true ! and let them not flurry thee who are not sure.”

The highest ethical conception of the Greeks was reached by Socrates. Yet, the then startling and remarkable precepts of Socrates which awoke the Greeks from the dead uniformity of customary morality, lacked one essential element. His exhortation to reflection and self-examination introduced an element at that time unfamiliar to the ethical codes of the world, but his idea of knowledge as the basis of right action, while furnishing an essential element of a true ethical principle, left unsupplied in precept, though not in his own practice, that other element — a will in sympathy with the divine world-order, a will moved by divine love, or altruism.

The “ ten commandments ” are a law to bring us unto Christ, which negatively express the thought of the Golden Rule. “ Even the Ten Commandments, so superior to any other code fall immeasurably short of the ethical standard of real Christianity. They fall short in two respects. First of all, they do not exhibit the inwardness of Christianity. In our code, to look after a woman lustfully or to think of a man murderously is to break the Law. Outward obedience does not suffice. The very thoughts of our hearts must be cleansed

and brought into obedience to the captivity of Christ. Again, the Ten Commandments fall short of the outwardness of Christianity, because Christianity applies its moral precepts not only to our own kith and kin, but also to the entire human race.”\*

The ethical code of Christianity demands that a person do something that “is not found in any ethical code except that which Christ taught and practiced: A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another, even as I loved you.”

The religion established by Christ is essentially an ethical religion. “The coming of the Son of God, the incarnation, was not simply physical, a manifestation of external power, as that which has been so often assumed in history. St. John says, the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth. It was ethical and organic; and it was not ethical in a formal way, but in the realization of personality; and it was not simply in an individual way, but in the life that was given for man, and became the life of humanity.”†

Some of the Christian precepts are:—

“The first of the commandments is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord: And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these.

“Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.

\* Ethical Christianity, p. 11: Rev. Hugh Price Hughes.

† The Republic of God, pp. 125, 126: Elisha Mulford.

“A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another.

“By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.

“Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.

“It is more blessed to give than to receive.

“Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal, it shall be measured to you again.

“Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.

“If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, take up the cross, and follow me.

“When thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward. But when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth: that thine alms may be in secret;

and thy Father which seeth in secret, himself shall reward thee openly.

“When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, neither thy kinsmen, nor thy rich neighbors; lest they also bid thee again; and a recompense be made thee. But when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee; for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just.”\*

While Christ enunciated truths that in the later generations were put in the form of creeds and doctrines and formed the basis of the historical church, yet these truths and His acts were largely in the line of the practical assistance of the poor, weak, helpless and sinful. To Him, God the Father was an ever-present Spirit, even forming a unity of Spirit with His own. A God, a Ruler, a Moral Governor as a Being far removed from the Universe was not his conception of the Power and Spirit which was in the Beginning. Christ's meat was to do the Father's will and to finish his work. His time was too valuable to be spent in word-disputes while humanity about Him was needing his love and help. His life was one of constant activity; the short seasons of withdrawal from free intercourse with those who wished His teaching and assistance were for the renewal of His exhausted physical energy. With withering severity He condemned hypocrisy, dishonesty, double-dealing, slothfulness, pride, and false judgment. He made known the blessedness that surely fol-

\*Copied by The Outlook, Jan. 13, 1894, from "The Great Discourse," published by A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

lows meekness, purity and righteousness, but He at the same time foretells the antagonism that must certainly be incited by the introduction of the higher ethical life into the customary morality or rather immorality of His country and times. He saw that right motives must be implanted and that His life was in part sacrificed because of ignorance; and His forgiving love was shown in its grandeur when not only the perverseness of His persecutors, but their ignorance was pardoned in the "Father forgive them, they know not what they do."

The process of the education of the race into the nature and scope of the religion of Christ has been going on for nearly nineteen centuries. The world realizes to-day better than ever before the ethical character of the religion of Christ. This spirit of love and helpfulness shown in such an extraordinary way in the life and death of Christ, must permeate and transform all the institutions of society before it can become the world-spirit.

After the time of the early disciples and the Church Fathers, or from the third or fourth century until the twelfth, the ethical phases of Christianity were hidden by the mass of discussion of doctrinal points, and by the attempts to build an empire that might bear the name "Holy," irrespective of its character. The twelfth century witnessed the beginning of the rise of those orders that, revolting from the worldliness and self-aggrandizement and absorption of authority in the Church, endeavored in humility to teach the principles of Christ and to urge the Church to return to the purity of life that characterized its early days. Among the best known

of these orders or sects are the Waldenses of Italy, the Albigenses of France, the Franciscans, and later the Huguenots, and animated with the same purpose only emphasizing particularly the necessity of right-thinking as well as right-acting, was the rise of the various denominations that we have already noticed.

It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that we find that the firmness and the steadfastness of the early reformers and Puritans had made a sufficient impression upon the thought of the times to admit of the rise of a sect that should come in contact with the lives of the mass of the people in a way similar to that by which Christ reached the multitudes. The rise of Methodism and the outgrowing evangelical movement produced perceptible modifications of the institutions of society to a degree impossible before that time. "But the Methodists themselves were the least result of the Methodist revival. Its action upon the Church broke the lethargy of the clergy; and the 'Evangelical' movement, which found representatives like Newton and Cecil within the pale of the Establishment, made the fox-hunting parson and the absentee rector at last impossible. In Walpole's day the English clergy were the idlest and the most lifeless in the world. In our own day no body of religious ministers surpasses them in piety, in philanthropic energy, or in popular regard. In the nation at large appeared a new moral enthusiasm, which, rigid and pedantic as it often seemed, was still healthy in its social tone, and whose power was seen in the disappearance of the profligacy which had disgraced the upper classes, and the foulness which had infested literature ever since the Restoration. A new philan-

thropy reformed our prisons, infused clemency and wisdom into our penal laws, abolished the slave trade, and gave the first impulse to popular education." \*

As is well known, Whitefield and the Wesleys were the men foremost in initiating this movement towards a higher exemplification of ethical Christianity. Other movements were in progress which in their combination had culminated to produce the decided advance in the many forms of practical Christian work during the last half of the nineteenth century. The intellectual and philosophical movement (of which one feature was a system of ethics from the historical standpoint) of Germany which reached its height in Hegel, made its appearance in England in the writings of Coleridge and the "liberal" writers in the Established Church. The reaction from the formal theology of the Deists of the eighteenth century, shown in the evangelical movement, when combined with the philosophical investigation and inquiry of Coleridge produced in the early part of this century a period of intense intellectual activity in the Church of England. On the doctrinal side the result was the separation of the clergy into the two parties, the one represented by Cardinal Newman and others, and the other following in the steps of Erskine, by the "liberals," Arnold, Hampden and the galaxy already noticed (p. 250).

The practical or especially ethical phases of Church activity that resulted from this union of movements were the revival of missionary zeal or the modern missionary movement, the establishment of Sunday schools

\* History of the English People, Vol. IV., pp. 149, 150: John R. Green.

by Robert Raikes, the numerous societies formed in the Church for Christian work, the recent methods of Church activity, and connected as another reaction, resembling the Methodist movement, from the more conservative methods of the older denominations are the Salvation Army, Christian Crusaders, etc.

The fundamental thought of all true Church activity is that there are souls outside the sphere of Church influence, and that there are among these, those who have never heard of the Saviour's messages of love and peace and of the possibility of a higher and better way of living; and ever since the days of Peter and Paul, organized missionary work has been acknowledged as one of the first duties and privileges of the Church.

The missionary enterprises of the Roman Catholic church have always been characterized by an energy and zeal scarcely surpassed by the Protestant church. No more impressive records of lives of self-sacrifice can be found on the pages of history than those of Francis Xavier, and P  re Marquette.

In the early days of the Reformation, the churches were too much engrossed in settling the differences of opinion on doctrinal points, and too much occupied in withstanding the opposition from the Roman Catholic hierarchy and in maintaining their own existence, to give any thought to the nations and peoples as yet unevangelized.

The modern missionary movement received its definite external impetus in the last decade of the last century. Four large missionary boards were formed in England, and early in the present century the United States added to those already formed for work among



the Indians, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Since that time in England, in America, and in other countries societies for foreign, home and city missionary work have been multiplied, and missionaries and teachers have been employed in large numbers. From the nature of the work of the church, statistics of church work give very little idea of the work of education and regeneration of souls that has been accomplished through organized missionary agencies. It is estimated that one in five of all the inhabitants of the globe is now a member of the visible Church. The "student's volunteer movement" of the past few years shows the intense interest that the young people of our country have in the nations and peoples who "sit in darkness" and who yet are our neighbors. And the spirit of coöperation in the churches themselves in their united desire to reach out a helping hand to the ignorant and unsaved is shown by the many plans for union charitable work, especially in our cities.

While the problem of Sunday schools as a permanent department of effective church work is still unsolved, yet the number of children who have been given higher ideas and more lofty motives for the everyday work of life, is more than sufficient to place the Sunday-school as one of the desirable channels through which to express the love that the Church has for even the least of "these little ones."

One of the strongest evidences that the churches are learning better the divine character of the work given to them to perform, is in the kinds of societies that have been formed, especially among the young people of the churches during the past quarter of a century. The

Master's injunction, "work while it is day," joined with a simple "credo," is received as a message divinely committed to their care. The Christian Endeavor societies, the Epworth Leagues, the Guilds, the King's Sons and King's Daughters' societies, the Lend-a-Hand clubs, Young Men's Christian Associations, and as an expression of the spirit which is fostered by such organizations, the practical forms of work, the Woman's Christian Temperance Unions, the College Settlement and University Extension work, Girls' Lodging Houses, Refuges for Fallen Women, Free Hospitals, Prison Work, Flower Missions, Girls' clubs, Vacation Fund societies, free Kindergartens, Toynbee Halls, Andover Houses, Berkeley Temples, Le Play Societies, etc., all indicate a phase of development in the exemplification of the spirit of true charity never before seen in the history of the Church. While granting and gladly acknowledging a faith not separated from, but in accordance with reason, the rising generation of church members emphasizes an idea of the Church as an institution for the expression of altruistic feelings, thoughts and acts, in order that all people may learn to receive and show forth the divine love that is eager to assist even the lowest and humblest of created objects.

The Church in its most recent methods of working shows in like manner this spirit of development in the lines of applied Christianity. No longer bound by certain prescribed rules for the way of using "God's House," the Church applies practically in the nature of its gatherings the principles of social and Christian unity. "Conversion" is no longer regarded as the only act necessary. "Growth in grace and in the

knowledge of divine truth" wherever found, is now considered the continuance of the first important step of a new and higher life. Degraded tastes, appetites and tendencies must be made over and the process demands time, and to meet these necessities of weak human nature the Church has come to acknowledge that the process of growth may demand various steps. Accordingly, such means of help as the People's Palace of London, and the Tabernacle and People's Palace of Jersey City have been arranged. The children and young people must be given something of an entertaining and profitable character to do, or idle hours and repressive restrictions will result in vicious acts and habits.

The Church has learned that the Puritan ideas of long sermons and few relaxations from stern and strict surveillance do not fit so well the changed thought and customs of a time of comparative material prosperity and leisure from arduous toil as they did in the early days of our country; and it has learned that, unless the Church encourages the establishment of means for the harmless gratification of the desire for amusement, agencies of a doubtful character will secure the time and interest of the young people and their affections will be forever alienated from the church-home and its associations; and also, to prevent the absorption by young minds of thoughts from bad literature, the Church has made partial provision for good strong books that are true literature, to take the place of the older style of "goody, goody" Sunday school books.

These methods of Church activity are in accordance with a conception of God as an intimate and ever-abiding Presence; that God speaks unto men in count-

less ways, and that His message of love to all mankind must be made known in forms that can reach all sorts and conditions of humanity. The recent methods of Church activity have tended to break down in a measure the strong denominational barriers that existed earlier in the century. With the enlarged spirit of charity that sees the good points of a sister denomination, there has also come a more willing acknowledgment of the good that may be accomplished through the other institutions of society, especially the State, which has been regarded with more or less suspicion, owing probably to the traditions and attitude received from the days of antagonism between Church and State. And the enlarged spirit of charity in the Church is also willing to grant that there may be a partial exemplification of the Christ-spirit in such secret societies as Free Masons, Odd Fellows, etc.; these societies seem in many instances, though inadequately from the standpoint of the Church, to take the place of the Church in providing avenues for fellowship, sympathy and assistance.

The Church has from early times regarded the education of the people as one of its especial provinces of activity. The Church of the Middle Ages was indeed the treasure-house of the learning and wisdom of the world. While the present phases of development of the Church in its ethical aspects do not take away from the importance of the Church as an agent in this work of education, yet the Church sees as never before the magnitude of the work involved in the education and upliftment of the "masses," and it is therefore ready to coöperate with the state to a degree never

before manifested. The Church as represented in its theological schools, has within a few years taken an enlarged interest in all kinds of social reforms, and has considered it necessary to send out its ministers well equipped in sanitary, social and political sciences, as affording power to cope with the evils that become organized into the structure of town, city, state and national government, and in many kinds of industries in this era of over-organization. It is seen by the Church more clearly than ever before that a man can not be a good church member and at the same time be a corrupt citizen, politician, or business man.

The tendency in the Church to seek a better understanding of the needs of society in all the relations therein manifested, and the tendency of the state to acknowledge the unity and independence of the Church organization points to a clearer comprehension of the fundamental principles of the organization of each, the Church and the State. As the ethical character of the Church is more fully seen, the work of the Church and State is seen to be more completely supplementary. Not that the standards of the Church and of the State can be in any way mingled, and the revenue of one organization be used for the work of the other, but with the deeper insight into the nature of each and the more detailed information of the amount and kind of work undertaken by each, the work of one will be found supplementary to that of the other when each is working to the best advantage.

As we have seen in considering applications of the ethical principle in state relations, the tendency is to express in legislation ideas that have originated in altru-

istic motives and the legislation of the present day is therefore in the direction of true socialism, that is, measures are enacted providing for the conditions necessary for the development of personality. This tendency in the state may be interpreted as showing a more widespread recognition of the fact that there is opportunity for an exemplification of both justice and grace in the state. In the lines of progress that we have tried to indicate as those of the Church, there is also seen a tendency to acknowledge that there must be an exemplification of justice as well as grace in church relations.

Divine Love as manifested and revealed in the only begotten Son, expressed through the Holy Spirit in the souls of all human beings makes possible the Invisible Church. Whether all souls consciously participate in the thought and activity of this Invisible Church depends upon the attitude and choice of the individual. Every human being by virtue of his birthright is a son of God and has the seal of God's love and mercy, and only as the individual voluntarily places himself in hell, by closing his thoughts and affections to divine influences, does he cease to be a member of the Invisible Church. "The kingdom of heaven is within you," were the words of Christ, and one must close his own prison walls about himself by sealing his heart with pride, or he continues to reveal in however slight a degree the divine love and mercy, and he thus continues a member of the Invisible Church. The visible or historic Church, as we have seen, places before each individual its own standards for admission to its organized fellowship.

The state as an organic unity includes all, even those who through pride express this attitude of mind in deeds of violence, and in its expressions of justice acknowledges its all-inclusive character; but even the Invisible Church must wait for such voluntary aspirations of the individual as indicate an awakening from a state of "spiritual pride" into higher thoughts, desires and acts.

This all-inclusiveness of the state and the possible all-inclusiveness of the Church indicate somewhat the goal of each, the Church and the State. From the nature of these institutions, the province of each will always remain substantially the same as at present, the State for the exemplification of Justice, the Church for the exemplification of Grace. But if the tendency of the State is to express more of the altruistic spirit in its laws and the tendency of the Church is to conform more nearly to justice, will the State and the Church of the future show even as diverse aspects as at present? Not that the organization and government of the State and the Church will become identical, but each having its own kind of government, may not the spirit of one so interpenetrate the spirit of the other, that the New Jerusalem, the heavenly city, will be in *form* the Nation of nations, but in *spirit* the City of our God, in which there shall be a consummation and fulfillment of many tendencies that now are seen only in their beginnings? The processes of the development of spirit are slow, but nevertheless sure, and all the institutions of society express and reflect the gradual unfolding of the World-Spirit as it receives its gradual expression in the more complete exemplification of the golden rule given to sinning humanity by a perfect Christ.

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